Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
173 detections
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Detects the use of esxcli or vim-cmd commands on VMware ESXi hosts to power off virtual machines, remove software components (VIBs), or enable maintenance mode. These actions are commonly performed by the Akira ransomware group to disrupt operations and facilitate encryption.
Detects the execution of QEMU virtualization binaries from non-standard or suspicious file paths (such as Temp or AppData) or with command-line arguments indicative of VM configuration (e.g., -drive, -net, -kernel). The rule further correlates these process executions with subsequent network connections within a 5-minute window, potentially identifying unauthorized VM usage, data exfiltration through tunnelled connections, or adversary-controlled virtualization tools.
This rule detects the execution of QEMU-related binaries (qemu-system-x86_64.exe, qemu-img.exe) and subsequent file operations involving specific virtual machine disk image extensions (.qcow2) and database files (.db) located outside of standard application directories. This activity may indicate the unauthorized deployment of a virtual machine or the use of QEMU for staging or hiding data on the host.
Detects deployment of the VMAccess extension via Azure Management plane, which can be abused by attackers to create local backdoor administrators on Azure Virtual Machines.
This rule detects the successful execution of the 'Run Command' action on Azure virtual machines outside of defined business hours (8 AM to 6 PM). Run Command allows the execution of arbitrary scripts on a VM, which can be leveraged for administrative tasks but also by attackers for post-exploitation activities, persistence, or lateral movement. Monitoring these operations during off-hours may indicate unauthorized use or anomalous administrative activity.
This rule detects potential cloud resource hijacking (e.g., cryptojacking) by monitoring for a sudden spike in the deployment of Azure virtual machines by a single user. It triggers if a user creates five or more virtual machines in a 10-minute window, specifically looking for deployments in regions where the user has not recently created VMs, or deployments utilizing high-compute SKUs commonly targeted for cryptocurrency mining.
This rule detects the successful execution of the 'Run Command' action on Azure virtual machines outside of defined business hours (8 AM to 6 PM). Run Command allows the execution of arbitrary scripts on a VM, which can be leveraged for administrative tasks but also by attackers for post-exploitation activities, persistence, or lateral movement. Monitoring these operations during off-hours may indicate unauthorized use or anomalous administrative activity.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the host header or URI contains keywords associated with virtual machine software (virtualbox, vmware, qemu) and the URI also contains the word "create". This combination suggests the potential creation or interaction with virtual machines, which could be used for defense evasion by adversaries to hide malicious activity.
This Suricata rule detects HTTP requests containing 'VBoxService' in the URI. This string is associated with VirtualBox Guest Additions, which are often installed in virtualized environments. The presence of such a string in network traffic can indicate that a system is a virtual machine, which attackers or malware might query to detect if they are running in a sandbox or virtualized analysis environment. This detection is categorized as 'trojan-activity' and is related to discovery tactics.
Detects instances of QEMU emulators, particularly renamed binaries (e.g., svvhost.exe), executing with arguments indicative of loading a .qcow2 virtual disk image. BlackSuit affiliates are known to deploy QEMU virtual machines containing Linux or Windows operating systems to conceal backdoor proxy tools from host-level EDR.
Detects the execution of known desktop hypervisor management CLI tools such as VBoxManage or vmrun to enumerate local virtual machines. Attackers may use these commands during the discovery phase to identify running virtual environments for evasion or subsequent actions.
Detects the use of esxcfg-advcfg to alter the BufferCache settings (MaxCapacity or FlushInterval) on an ESXi host. This activity is often associated with ransomware variants like Gentlemen ransomware, which modify these settings to prepare the storage layer for fast, reliable bulk file encryption.
Detects the use of esxcfg-advcfg to alter the BufferCache settings on an ESXi host. This activity can be a precursor to bulk file encryption, as seen with the 'Gentlemen Linux variant' which modifies VMFS write buffer and flush interval to prepare ESXi hosts for fast, reliable encryption.
Detects PowerShell commands used by Kyber ransomware to enumerate and forcefully shut down Hyper-V virtual machines. This action is typically performed to release file locks on virtual disks prior to encryption.
Detects the PowerShell 'Stop-VM -TurnOff' pattern used by Kyber ransomware's "experimental" Hyper-V functionality to force hard-stop all running VMs prior to encryption, releasing file locks on VHD/VHDX disks. This rule also includes an extended field 'IsEnumeration' to identify instances where 'Get-VM' and 'ConvertTo-Json' are used, which could indicate VM enumeration prior to termination.
This rule detects the installation of suspicious extensions on Azure Virtual Machines. These extensions, such as CustomScriptExtension, RunCommandHandler, DSCExtension, AADLoginForWindows, and NetworkWatcherAgent, can be abused by attackers for various purposes including remote code execution, configuration manipulation, unauthorized account access, or network reconnaissance. Monitoring their installation can help identify potential compromise or malicious activity within an Azure environment.
Detects the execution of QEMU where a .dll file is specified as a hard disk image. This is a known TTP associated with the "Bring Your Own Hypervisor" (BYOH) technique, where attackers hide malicious activity within a virtualized environment using non-standard disk image formats.
Detects access to VMware virtual disk files (.vmdk). This technique was
observed being used by the Muddled Libra (Scattered Spider) threat group,
where they would power down Domain Controllers, mount their disks to a rogue
VM, and steal the NTDS.dit and SYSTEM hives for offline credential extraction.
This method bypasses security monitoring that would typically occur on the
Domain Controller itself.
observed being used by the Muddled Libra (Scattered Spider) threat group,
where they would power down Domain Controllers, mount their disks to a rogue
VM, and steal the NTDS.dit and SYSTEM hives for offline credential extraction.
This method bypasses security monitoring that would typically occur on the
Domain Controller itself.
Detects PowerShell execution using Get-CimInstance to query Win32_ComputerSystem, Win32_BIOS, Win32_BaseBoard, or other WMI classes commonly checked by malware to detect virtual machine or sandbox environments. This technique is frequently used by malware families to evade analysis in virtualized security research environments.
VM Escape VMware VMCI Device Disabling
Cortex XDR
This rule detects attempts to disable VMware VMCI (Virtual Machine Communication Interface) devices using 'devcon.exe'. This activity can be indicative of a VM escape attempt, as disabling VMCI might be a step to bypass security mechanisms or facilitate further exploitation within a virtualized environment. The rule specifically looks for 'devcon.exe' executing with 'disable' in the command line, targeting either 'PCI\VEN_15AD&DEV_0740' (VMCI device) or 'ROOT\VMWVMCIHOSTDEV' (VMCI host device).
Detects the execution of QEMU with parameters to launch a virtual machine with a disk image and networking capabilities. Adversaries have been observed using this "Bring Your Own VM" (BYO-VM) technique to create an isolated operational environment on a compromised host, evading host-based defenses and establishing persistence. This activity was notably preceded by social engineering via Quick Assist, leading to execution by "wscript.exe".
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