Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
577 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
217
107
83
74
34
Contributors
152
115
89
63
39
Categories
20,440
11,814
5,871
5,145
4,864
577
Platforms
576
8
1
1
1
Products / Services
377
207
152
92
74
MITRE Techniques
435
385
161
151
111
CVEs
1
IDS Classtypes
9
3
2
1
IDS Protocols
14
1
This analytic identifies the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments used to query domain groups via the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet and the `-class ds_group` parameter. This activity indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks and privilege escalation.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet with the `DS_User` class parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). It identifies attempts to query all domain users using WMI. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team operation attempting to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance, enabling attackers to map out the network and identify potential targets for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
The following analytic detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments used to query local user accounts, specifically the `useraccount` argument. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate local users, which is a common step in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further targeted attacks, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with specific command-line arguments used to discover remote systems within a domain. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to map out network resources and Active Directory structures. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain situational awareness, identify critical systems, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.
The analytic detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with the `node` switch, indicating an attempt to spawn a local or remote process. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain remote control over the targeted system, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges or persist within the environment.
This analytic identifies the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions, which can be used to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. It leverages Sysmon data, specifically EventCode 21, to detect the creation of WMI EventFilters, EventConsumers, and FilterToConsumerBindings. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker setting up mechanisms to execute code with elevated SYSTEM privileges when specific events occur. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, and execute arbitrary code, posing a severe threat to the environment.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` using the `Invoke-WmiMethod` cmdlet to start a process on a remote endpoint via WMI. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process telemetry. This activity is significant as it indicates potential lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.
The analytic detects the execution of a process by `WmiPrvSE.exe`, indicating potential use of WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) for process creation. This activity is significant as WMI can be used for lateral movement, remote code execution, or persistence by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands or scripts, potentially leading to further compromise of the affected system or network.
The following analytic identifies the use of the WMIC command-line tool attempting to uninstall applications non-interactively. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns associated with WMIC. This activity is significant because it is uncommon and may indicate an attempt to evade detection by uninstalling security software, as seen in IcedID malware campaigns. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to disable security defenses, facilitating further compromise and persistence within the environment.
Detects the addition of a new "Allow" firewall rule by the WMI process (WmiPrvSE.EXE). This can occur if an attacker leverages PowerShell cmdlets such as "New-NetFirewallRule", or directly uses WMI CIM classes such as "MSFT_NetFirewallRule". This activity is often associated with defense evasion tactics to allow adversary communications or lateral movement.
Detects potential adversaries leveraging WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers remotely to move laterally in a network. This event is best correlated and used as an enrichment to determine the potential lateral movement activity.
Detects a specific PowerShell command line pattern used by the UNC2452 threat group (also known as APT29 or Nobelium) for execution. The rule looks for PowerShell commands that use 'Invoke-WMIMethod win32_process -name create -argumentlist' or 'wmic /node: process call create' in conjunction with 'rundll32 c:\windows'. This pattern was observed in the SolarWinds Compromise.
Detects suspicious WMI event filter and command line event consumer based on WMI and Security Logs. This rule specifically looks for Event ID 4662, indicating an operation on an object, where the ObjectType is 'WMI Namespace' and the ObjectName contains 'subscription'. This combination is indicative of WMI persistence mechanisms being created or modified.
This rule detects attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies using PowerShell and WMI. Adversaries often delete shadow copies to prevent system recovery and hinder forensic analysis, especially in ransomware attacks. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell commands that interact with 'Win32_ShadowCopy' via 'Get-WmiObject' and then perform a 'Delete()' operation or use 'Remove-WmiObject'.
This rule detects suspicious scripting commands within WMI event consumers, which can be indicative of persistence mechanisms. Specifically, it looks for PowerShell web download commands (`new-object net.webclient .downloadstring`, `new-object net.webclient .downloadfile`), common PowerShell execution flags (`-nop`, `-noprofile`, `-decode`, `-enc`), and references to `WScript.Shell` or `System.Security.Cryptography.FromBase64Transform` within the 'Destination' field of WMI event logs. These patterns are frequently used by attackers to execute malicious scripts or download payloads via WMI persistence.
Detects suspicious WMI event filter and command line event consumer creation or modification based on WMI and Security Logs. This rule specifically looks for EventID 5861 (WMI filter to consumer binding) and EventID 5859 (WMI filter registration) in conjunction with common consumer keywords like 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer' and 'CommandLineEventConsumer'. It excludes legitimate SCM Event Provider activity.
This rule detects PowerShell scripts that query WMI for service information, specifically looking for the 'Win32_Service' class and requesting 'Name', 'DisplayName', 'PathName', and 'StartMode' properties. This activity is often associated with reconnaissance for unquoted service path vulnerabilities, a common technique used by penetration testers and attackers for privilege escalation.
Detects successful logon attempts that occur via the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) service, specifically when the WmiPrvSE.exe process is involved. This can indicate an adversary using WMI for execution or lateral movement.
Detects signs of the WMI script host process "scrcons.exe" loading scripting DLLs which could indicate WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers activity. This is a common technique for persistence and privilege escalation.
Detects the execution of an MSI file using PowerShell and the WMI Win32_Product class. This method can be used for defense evasion by leveraging a trusted system utility (PowerShell) and a legitimate WMI class to install software, potentially bypassing traditional application whitelisting or execution policies.
Detects the WMI Event Consumer service process (scrcons.exe) creating a named pipe. This activity can be indicative of WMI persistence mechanisms being used by adversaries, often in conjunction with named pipes for inter-process communication or command and control.
Page 27 of 28