Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the creation or modification of adsource.dll or other staging files with the name adsource_*.dll within the SCCM SMS Provider bin directory, consistent with exploitation of CVE-2026-47301.
This abuses a DLL side-loading vulnerability in the Microsoft Configuration Manager SMS Provider component.
An attacker can plant a malicious adsource.dll in the SCCMProvider bin\X64 path, causing the SMS Provider service to load the attacker-controlled library in a privileged context.
The presence of renamed dlls alongside adsource.dll is a strong indicator of the classic DLL hijacking pattern where the legitimate library has been renamed so the malicious replacement can proxy calls to it.
If confirmed malicious, this activity represents a privilege escalation vector that can result in SYSTEM-level code execution on any host running the SCCM SMS Provider role.
This abuses a DLL side-loading vulnerability in the Microsoft Configuration Manager SMS Provider component.
An attacker can plant a malicious adsource.dll in the SCCMProvider bin\X64 path, causing the SMS Provider service to load the attacker-controlled library in a privileged context.
The presence of renamed dlls alongside adsource.dll is a strong indicator of the classic DLL hijacking pattern where the legitimate library has been renamed so the malicious replacement can proxy calls to it.
If confirmed malicious, this activity represents a privilege escalation vector that can result in SYSTEM-level code execution on any host running the SCCM SMS Provider role.
The following analytic detects renaming of Windows built-in accounts via Event ID 4781.
It identifies renames targeting accounts with well-known reserved RIDs (500-504): Administrator, Guest, krbtgt, DefaultAccount, and WDAGUtilityAccount, by matching the TargetSid field against the S-1-5-21-*-50[0-4] pattern.
Attackers commonly rename the built-in Administrator account to evade detections that alert on the literal account name, while retaining the full privileges of the RID-500 account.
Renaming Guest, krbtgt, or other reserved accounts is highly unusual in any legitimate environment.
It identifies renames targeting accounts with well-known reserved RIDs (500-504): Administrator, Guest, krbtgt, DefaultAccount, and WDAGUtilityAccount, by matching the TargetSid field against the S-1-5-21-*-50[0-4] pattern.
Attackers commonly rename the built-in Administrator account to evade detections that alert on the literal account name, while retaining the full privileges of the RID-500 account.
Renaming Guest, krbtgt, or other reserved accounts is highly unusual in any legitimate environment.
The following analytic detects shells, scripting engines, and common post-exploitation utilities spawned as child processes of smsexec.exe.
smsexec.exe is the core SCCM SMS Executive service process and has no legitimate reason to launch interactive shells or scripting interpreters.
An attacker who plants a malicious adsource.dll in the SCCMProvider bin\X64 directory will obtain code execution in the SCCM service context, typically resulting in a SYSTEM-level child process being spawned under smsexec.exe.
If confirmed malicious, this activity represents successful exploitation of the SCCM SMS Executive service and should be treated as a full host compromise.
smsexec.exe is the core SCCM SMS Executive service process and has no legitimate reason to launch interactive shells or scripting interpreters.
An attacker who plants a malicious adsource.dll in the SCCMProvider bin\X64 directory will obtain code execution in the SCCM service context, typically resulting in a SYSTEM-level child process being spawned under smsexec.exe.
If confirmed malicious, this activity represents successful exploitation of the SCCM SMS Executive service and should be treated as a full host compromise.
The following analytic detects .cab files being written to disk.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on events where the file name is '*.cab' and the action is 'write'.
This activity can be significant as .cab files can be used to deliver malicious payloads, including embedded .url files that execute harmful code.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution and potential system compromise.
Analysts should review the file path and associated artifacts for further investigation.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on events where the file name is '*.cab' and the action is 'write'.
This activity can be significant as .cab files can be used to deliver malicious payloads, including embedded .url files that execute harmful code.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution and potential system compromise.
Analysts should review the file path and associated artifacts for further investigation.