Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a specific WebSocket handshake pattern associated with the NodeSnake RAT. It specifically identifies an HTTP GET request containing a 'Sec-WebSocket-Key' header and a specific URI query parameter '?v=4|3b|', which indicates beaconing activity characteristic of this RAT's communication channel.
This rule detects DNS queries for the domain 'terezo-kb.org', which is associated with the NodeSnake Remote Access Trojan (RAT), often utilized by the INTERLOCK ransomware group for command and control (C2) communication.
PowerShell Downloading JPEG Image Possible Steganographic Payload Carrier
JadeProx proxy/tunnel binary retrieval from Alibaba OSS bucket dlrz-web with known binary naming pattern
Detects network activity associated with BlueNoroff ClickFix campaigns, specifically targeting the download of suspicious Windows PE files from typosquatted CDN/payload URIs. The rule uses session tracking to correlate the initial URI request with the subsequent retrieval of executable content.
Detects an outbound HTTP GET request containing a .jpg extension in the URI, initiated by a user agent string containing 'PowerShell'. This pattern is commonly associated with attackers downloading images intended to serve as carriers for steganographic payloads, which are then parsed or executed by malicious PowerShell scripts.
This rule detects outbound HTTP requests using the WebDAV protocol that target specific directory paths associated with the Stealth Falcon campaign staging activity. Such traffic may indicate a compromised host attempting to download tools or payloads from an adversary-controlled infrastructure.
Detects network communication associated with the Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) threat actor's use of AsyncRAT. This rule identifies DNS queries for a specific DuckDNS domain, matching TLS SNI for the same domain, and network connections to a known historic C2 IP address historically used via a shared VPN egress.
Detects network traffic originating from the internal network directed towards a specific IP range associated with known PureRAT command and control infrastructure.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests containing the word 'secret' in the request body directed to the external service 'webhook.site', which is often used by adversaries for quick data exfiltration or testing during post-exploitation activities.
This rule detects network traffic originating from the internal network directed towards a hardcoded IP address associated with the CrashStealer malware. The rule flags outbound traffic to this specific destination, which is indicative of command and control communication or data exfiltration.
Detects outbound network traffic containing the specific string 'Secret: ' using raw TCP, often indicative of data exfiltration or unauthorized command-and-control communication via tunneling tools like netcat or ngrok.
This rule monitors for a high volume of WebDAV PROPFIND HTTP requests directed toward a specific domain associated with malware staging activities. The detection threshold is set to 50 requests within a 300-second window, which is indicative of automated attempts to enumerate or download malicious content using the WebDAV protocol.
Detects outbound TCP network traffic originating from internal assets to known hardcoded IP addresses and ports associated with PureRAT and DlrtyGames RAT malware families, indicating active command and control (C2) communication.
Detects HTTP POST requests indicative of credential exfiltration associated with the Kratos phishing kit. The rule monitors for specific endpoint patterns (e.g., next.php, nex.php, n3xt.php, or officers*eur.php) commonly utilized by this kit to receive stolen credentials.
Detects HTTP traffic originating from external sources that contains response body patterns associated with a DEBULL-themed phishing lure. This rule specifically identifies content indicators related to device-code broker phishing, where a user is tricked into navigating to a malicious URL (debull.app) to authorize access or provide credentials.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host header) to the domain 'couldinstallup.com', which is associated with Command and Control (C2) activity by the threat group Mustang Panda.
Detects specific URI patterns associated with the DEBULL (also known as CloakGuard) Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. These URI paths are commonly used by attackers managing phishing campaigns, including administrative authentication or deployment script execution on compromised infrastructure acting as a phishing panel.
Detects HTTP POST requests containing 'poll_auth_broker_token' and 'device_code' parameters, which are characteristic of malicious OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flows commonly used in phishing campaigns.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to known phishing domains (frenksv.sbs, debull.app) which include specific parameters indicative of an attempt to initiate the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow ('get_auth_broker_device_code'). This pattern is associated with phishing campaigns aiming to hijack a user's session by tricking them into authorizing a malicious application, eventually leading to the theft of application access tokens.
Detects DNS queries for domains associated with Kratos Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) hosting infrastructure. This activity is indicative of a user or system attempting to resolve domains used for phishing campaigns or command and control communication.
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