Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects DNS queries for domains matching a specific typosquatting pattern ('[a-z]{3,20}business.com') associated with the Montana Empire campaign, likely used for corporate banking credential harvesting.
Detects HTTP GET requests to a specific file path (docs.zip) on the Ukrainian government website (drs.gov.ua), identified as an activity associated with the Turla threat group's STOCKSTAY malware component.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of PsExec lateral movement, specifically identifying the authentication or access to the hidden 'ADMIN$' network share followed by the transfer or execution of the 'PSEXESVC' service binary, a hallmark of the PsExec tool.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests with specific URI patterns (/rob/ or /ins/) that are indicative of TrickBot malware command and control (C2) check-in activity.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns characteristic of Emotet malware command and control (C2) beaconing, specifically looking for POST requests with random alphanumeric URIs (4-16 characters) and a specific Accept-Encoding header (gzip, deflate).
Detects remote attempts to stop sensitive security, database, and system services using the SMB SVCCTL (Service Control Manager) interface. This is often associated with adversary attempts to disable defensive tools or prepare for destructive operations.
Detects HTTP traffic initiating a WebSocket protocol upgrade with a specific 'binary' subprotocol header, characteristic of the Brickstorm backdoor used by the UNC5221 threat actor for command and control (C2) communication.
Detects network traffic associated with the Turla group's STOCKSTAY malware, specifically identifying outbound WebSocket upgrade requests directed to the known command-and-control domain weatherdataai.theworkpc.com.
Detects SMTP traffic containing XLSX file attachments, specifically looking for base64 encoded content that matches the criteria for CVE-2025-60727. This rule monitors network traffic for the delivery of potential malicious Office documents.
Detects HTTP response bodies containing common PE/Shellcode magic headers (MZ, PE, or NOP sleds) which are associated with the delivery of payloads designed to exploit or utilize the Windows KernelCallbackTable for process injection. The detection focuses on suspicious content delivered over HTTP connections.
Detects HTTP requests where the referrer is a major LLM service (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) but the destination host uses keywords indicative of phantom squatting (e.g., parcel, delivery, login) suggesting an attempt to use LLM-generated content or platforms to facilitate malicious redirects or phishing.
This rule detects outbound HTTP traffic generated by the WinHTTP library, specifically when the User-Agent identifies as WinHttp.WinHttpRequest. This pattern is indicative of potential post-exploitation activity, such as command-and-control communication or data exfiltration, originating from a process associated with an exploited Excel document (CVE-2025-60727).
Detects SMTP traffic containing XLSX file attachments, specifically looking for base64 encoded content that matches the criteria for CVE-2025-60727. This rule monitors network traffic for the delivery of potential malicious Office documents.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns characteristic of the Mimikatz 'lsadump' module performing a DCSync attack. The rule monitors for DRSUAPI (Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol) RPC requests, specifically the DsGetNCChanges operation, which is abused to synchronize Active Directory data including sensitive password hashes.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity leveraging the Windows Remote Management (WinRM) protocol over HTTP (ports 5985/5986). It specifically monitors for POST requests to the '/wsman' URI that contain the string 'powershell' in the request body, which is indicative of remote command execution via WinRM using PowerShell.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to suspicious URIs and subsequent inbound responses containing executable binary (PE) signatures, characteristic of Emotet malware command-and-control (C2) activity.
Detects remote execution of WMI commands over DCOM by identifying the specific IWbemServices UUID (8BC3F05E-D86B-11D0-A075-00C04FB68820) in RPC traffic. The rule triggers on inbound TCP traffic on port 135 where the payload size exceeds 500 bytes, which is consistent with the initiation of WMI remote process creation.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns characteristic of Emotet malware command and control (C2) beaconing, specifically looking for POST requests with random alphanumeric URIs (4-16 characters) and a specific Accept-Encoding header (gzip, deflate).
Detects remote execution of WMI commands over DCOM by identifying the specific IWbemServices UUID (8BC3F05E-D86B-11D0-A075-00C04FB68820) in RPC traffic. The rule triggers on inbound TCP traffic on port 135 where the payload size exceeds 500 bytes, which is consistent with the initiation of WMI remote process creation.
This rule detects potential lateral movement attempts using DCOM-based WMI calls to the remote OXID Resolver on port 135. Attackers often abuse DCOM to remotely trigger WMI methods, enabling remote code execution, discovery, or other malicious activities. The rule triggers on the characteristic DCOM OXID Resolve packet structure associated with this activity.
This rule detects HTTP responses that return an Android Package (APK) file (application/vnd.android.package-archive) to a client. This is indicative of potential mobile malware delivery or unauthorized application distribution.
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