Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous SMB NTLM authentication traffic indicative of relay attacks, where an attacker intercepts an authentication request and relays it to another SMB service.
Detects HTTP POST requests characteristic of Emotet Epoch 4 and 5 C2 communication. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns, the presence of a 'Cookie' header, and a base64-encoded request body exceeding 80 characters, which are indicative of Emotet malware beaconing activity.
Detects the initial handshake communication pattern associated with AsyncRAT, characterized by a specific base64-encoded configuration blob sent to external non-standard ports (6606, 7707, 8808) as identified by the Snort rule logic.
Detects network traffic associated with PsExec lateral movement activity, specifically looking for the creation of the PSEXESVC named pipe over SMB/ADMIN$ shares, which is commonly used by PsExec to remotely execute services and commands on target systems.
Detects network traffic associated with PsExec lateral movement activity, specifically looking for the creation of the PSEXESVC named pipe over SMB/ADMIN$ shares, which is commonly used by PsExec to remotely execute services and commands on target systems.
This rule detects the use of the PSEXESVC named pipe during a write operation over the SMB protocol, which is indicative of lateral movement using the PsExec tool.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to external networks that match a known Emotet C2 traffic pattern. The rule specifically looks for HTTP POST requests using an 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' Content-Type and a URI structure consisting of randomized alphanumeric segments (4-20 characters long). This structure is characteristic of Emotet's communication with its command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characteristic of QakBot malware command and control (C2) activity. The rule identifies a specific combination of a hardcoded User-Agent string ('Trident/7.0') and a URI pattern consisting of 4 to 32 alphanumeric characters ending in .php.
Detects HTTP GET requests originating from internal network hosts to external destinations that match known Emotet C2 communication patterns, specifically those using hardcoded URI paths such as '/wp-content/', '/wp-admin/', or '/tmp/' combined with the 'Accept-Encoding: identity' header.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of PsExec lateral movement, specifically identifying the authentication or access to the hidden 'ADMIN$' network share followed by the transfer or execution of the 'PSEXESVC' service binary, a hallmark of the PsExec tool.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS/HTTPS) communicating with the secondary hosting domain 'fileget.loseyourip.com' specifically attempting to retrieve potential payloads mimicking legitimate software (e.g., OBS Studio installer).
Detects the transmission of a Metasploit Meterpreter stage over HTTP, identified by an application/octet-stream response containing the DOS MZ header signature.
This rule monitors network traffic over the Telnet protocol (TCP port 23) for patterns indicative of Mirai botnet propagation. It identifies sequences of characters commonly used in Mirai brute-force attempts to guess default credentials (e.g., 'admin' followed by 'password'). The rule utilizes a threshold-based detection filter to trigger only when multiple such attempts are observed from a single source within a 60-second window, helping to filter out individual noise and focus on active scanning behavior.
Detects suspicious network activity originating from the InstallUtil.exe process. InstallUtil is a legitimate Windows .NET utility that can be abused as a LOLBin (Living-off-the-Land Binary) to proxy the execution of malicious payloads, potentially bypassing application control mechanisms.
This rule detects potential lateral movement attempts using Windows Remote Management (WinRM) by monitoring for specific WSMan SOAP protocol headers in HTTP traffic. It specifically looks for POST requests to the WSMan endpoint that contain suspicious keywords like 'winrs', 'MSRPC', or 's:Envelope', which are commonly associated with remote command execution via winrs or PSSession.
Detects HTTP GET requests for .msc (Microsoft Management Console) files, which can be leveraged as part of an attack chain to abuse the mmc.exe binary for proxy execution of malicious configurations.
Detects the transmission of a Portable Executable (PE) file header ('MZ' and 'PE' magic bytes) within an HTTP response stream, which is a common indicator of a staged file download or process injection payload being delivered over the network.
Detects remote system shutdown attempts initiated via the MSRPC winreg named pipe over SMB. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to shut down or reboot a target system remotely to interrupt availability, often as a prelude to or consequence of destructive actions.
This rule detects outbound POST requests to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) originating from internal network hosts. The detection specifically looks for requests containing the 'sendMessage' path, which is characteristic of bots transmitting stolen data (such as credentials) or command-and-control communication. It focuses on traffic initiated by common command-line tools like 'python-requests' or 'curl', which are frequently abused by automated malware scripts.
This rule detects the use of TLS protocol on port 443 with a specific content signature, indicating potential Command and Control (C2) activity. It triggers an alert if 20 such connections are observed from the same source within 60 seconds.
Detects HTTP GET requests to known malicious infrastructure used in SEO poisoning campaigns to distribute the Bumblebee malware loader. The rule monitors for specific URL paths and hostnames associated with lookalike domains delivering trojanized MSI files.
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