Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound network traffic established by a client using the default self-signed TLS certificate generated by Metasploit for Meterpreter Reverse HTTPS sessions. The rule looks for the common default subject fields 'CN=metasploit' and 'O=msf' within the TLS handshake.
This rule detects outgoing HTTP POST requests containing patterns commonly associated with Emotet command-and-control (C2) communication, specifically identifying the use of an application/octet-stream content type combined with a specific, randomized URI path structure consisting of alphanumeric segments.
Detects DNS traffic patterns indicative of the Iodine DNS tunneling tool, specifically identifying version handshake queries or base32 encoded payloads commonly associated with the tool's C2 communication.
This rule detects network activity associated with lateral movement using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). It specifically looks for a DCE/RPC Bind request that targets the IWbemServices interface UUID, a common method for initializing remote WMI connections to execute commands on remote systems.
This rule monitors for HTTP POST requests to external networks containing 'gtag=' in the URI, which is a known technique used by the TrickBot malware to exfiltrate its group identifier during C2 communication.
Detects large HTTP POST requests (over 5MB) directed at external hosts that utilize multipart or chunked encoding, which are commonly used to obfuscate or stream large volumes of data during an exfiltration event.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests with specific URI patterns (/rob/ or /ins/) that are indicative of TrickBot malware command and control (C2) check-in activity.
Detects SMB authentication attempts using NTLM with a blank Lan Manager (LM) hash. This specific pattern is often associated with Pass-the-Hash attacks where tools inject malformed or blank hashes to initiate authentication, a common indicator of lateral movement attempts.
Detects the initial handshake communication pattern associated with AsyncRAT, characterized by a specific base64-encoded configuration blob sent to external non-standard ports (6606, 7707, 8808) as identified by the Snort rule logic.
Detects DNS traffic patterns indicative of the Iodine DNS tunneling tool, specifically identifying version handshake queries or base32 encoded payloads commonly associated with the tool's C2 communication.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characterized by a specific URL pattern consisting of two segments of 4-16 alphanumeric characters, typically observed in Emotet C2 traffic. The rule specifically matches requests with a Content-Type header set to application/octet-stream, which is indicative of malicious binary payload transfer or communication.
This rule detects the use of the 'msiexec.exe' utility to fetch and potentially execute an '.msi' installer package directly from a remote source via HTTP. This behavior is a known technique for bypassing application control by abusing a signed system binary to download and install malicious packages.
This rule detects POST requests to the URI '/api/device/start' which is indicative of the EvilTokens phishing kit attempting to initiate a Microsoft OAuth Device Code flow. This technique is often used in phishing campaigns to gain unauthorized access to user accounts by tricking them into authenticating through a device code.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the 'EvilTokens' phishing kit, specifically targeting Microsoft OAuth Device Code flow. It looks for HTTP POST requests to the '/api/device/start' URI on domains hosted on Cloudflare Workers ('.workers.dev'). This pattern suggests an attempt to initiate a device code phishing attack, where adversaries trick users into entering credentials or codes to grant access to malicious applications.
Detects DNS queries for 14-character alphanumeric .org domains characteristic of Bumblebee malware's Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA).
This rule detects outbound TLS connections to identified C2 infrastructure associated with the UAC-0226 threat actor and the GIFTEDCROOK malware, specifically by monitoring the certificate subject name 'NextGen Fusion'.
This rule detects DNS queries for domains that exhibit characteristics of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs). Specifically, it looks for DNS queries where the queried domain consists of a random-looking subdomain (12 to 24 lowercase alphanumeric characters) followed by common top-level domains such as .com, .net, .org, .info, or .biz. The rule uses a thresholding mechanism to trigger an alert if 10 such queries are observed from the same source IP within a 60-second window, indicating potential DGA activity often associated with botnets or malware for command and control.
This rule detects a specific typosquatting pattern used by the EvilTokens phishing kit. It looks for HTTP traffic where the host contains 'workers.dev' and matches a regular expression for 'viewdoc[a-z0-9\-]+\.workers\.dev'. This indicates an attempt to mimic legitimate Cloudflare Workers domains for phishing purposes, specifically targeting the 'viewdoc' pattern often seen in document-sharing lures.
This rule detects internal HTTP PUT requests that contain the 'MZ' header, which is indicative of an executable file. This combination suggests a possible lateral movement scenario where an attacker is transferring a tool or malware within the internal network using HTTP PUT.
This rule detects network activity associated with the Hashtopolis agent. Specifically, it looks for the string "hashtopolis" within the HTTP User-Agent header of traffic flowing from a client to a server. This activity is linked to the 'FortiBleed campaign', which involves distributed offline cracking of SHA-256 FortiGate administrator credential hashes.
This rule detects POST requests to the URI '/api/device/start' which is indicative of the EvilTokens phishing kit attempting to initiate a Microsoft OAuth Device Code flow. This technique is often used in phishing campaigns to gain unauthorized access to user accounts by tricking them into authenticating through a device code.
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