Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects consecutive TLS application data records with 32-byte encrypted payloads. This specific record pattern has been observed during AsyncRAT encrypted communication. The rule is port-independent and serves as a supporting indicator for AsyncRAT activity, rather than a standalone high-confidence signature.
This rule detects potential domain fronting activity used to hide Command and Control (C2) servers. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic where the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) or HTTP Host header contains known domain fronting providers like cloudfront.net or azureedge.net, combined with a suspicious pattern in the HTTP Host header that includes an 8 or more character alphanumeric string followed by a top-level domain commonly associated with malicious activity (xyz, top, club, icu). This combination suggests an attempt to disguise C2 communications by routing them through legitimate content delivery networks.
This rule detects a multi-stage command and control (C2) domain rotation pattern by identifying DNS queries for domains that match a specific regular expression. The pattern looks for domains consisting of 6 to 12 lowercase alphanumeric characters followed by one of several top-level domains (xyz, top, icu, club, online). A threshold of 5 such queries from the same source within 60 seconds is used to trigger the alert, indicating potential malicious activity like fast flux or domain generation algorithms (DGAs) used by malware for C2 communication.
This rule detects the use of TLS protocol on port 443 with a specific content signature, indicating potential Command and Control (C2) activity. It triggers an alert if 20 such connections are observed from the same source within 60 seconds.
This rule detects attempts to overwrite the Master Boot Record (MBR) or disk structure using the 'dd' command via a remote SSH connection. Specifically, it looks for the string 'dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda' within TCP traffic on port 22 (SSH). This command, if executed, would wipe the primary disk, leading to system destruction.
This rule detects HTTP traffic to specific Visual Studio Code (VS Code) remote tunnel domains, specifically 'tunnels.api.visualstudio.com' or 'vscode.dev'. A high frequency of such connections (10 times within 60 seconds from the same source) is flagged as potential command and control (C2) activity, indicating the use of VS Code Remote Tunnels as a C2 channel.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the client body contains a long string (100 or more characters) composed exclusively of uppercase letters and digits 2-7, potentially followed by padding characters. This pattern is indicative of custom alphabet base encoding, often used in Command and Control (C2) communications to obfuscate data.
This rule detects the delivery of a payload associated with the 'Incognito Token Theft Tool'. It specifically looks for the case-insensitive string 'list_tokens' within HTTP response body content flowing from a server to a client. This string is indicative of the tool's functionality, which often involves listing tokens for exfiltration or further abuse, suggesting an attempt at privilege escalation or credential access.
This rule detects NBT-NS (NetBIOS Name Service) poisoning responses. NBT-NS poisoning is a technique used by attackers to intercept network traffic by responding to NetBIOS name queries with their own IP address, effectively redirecting traffic. The rule specifically looks for UDP traffic on port 137 (NetBIOS Name Service) destined for the home network, containing the byte sequence '|85 00|' at a depth of 4 bytes, which is indicative of a NetBIOS Name Service response. A threshold of 5 such responses within 10 seconds from the same source IP triggers the alert, aiming to reduce false positives from legitimate, but infrequent, NBT-NS responses.
This rule detects attempts to disable AWS CloudTrail logging via the AWS API. It specifically looks for HTTP requests to 'cloudtrail.amazonaws.com' with 'StopLogging' in the URI, indicating an attempt to stop CloudTrail from recording API activity.
This rule detects a Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) poisoning response from a rogue host. It specifically looks for UDP traffic on port 5355 (LLMNR) where the content contains the byte sequence '|80 00|' at a depth of 4 bytes. A threshold is applied to trigger an alert if 5 such responses are observed from the same source IP within 10 seconds, indicating potential malicious activity like credential harvesting.
This rule detects the delivery of a malicious XSL (Extensible Stylesheet Language) script via HTTP to a client. The detection is based on the HTTP URI containing ".xsl" (case-insensitive) and the file data containing "<msxsl:script" (case-insensitive). This pattern is indicative of an attempt to use XSLT for proxy execution, often associated with techniques like WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line) for defense evasion.
This rule detects attempts to bypass macOS Gatekeeper by removing the 'com.apple.quarantine' extended attribute from downloaded files. It specifically looks for HTTP responses containing the string 'com.apple.quarantine' in the file data, indicating a potential attempt to modify or remove this attribute during or after a download.
This rule detects the use of the 'chattr +i' command over a network connection to port 22 (SSH). The 'chattr +i' command on Linux is used to make a file immutable, meaning it cannot be modified, deleted, or renamed, even by the root user. This behavior can be indicative of an attacker attempting to prevent forensic analysis or hinder system recovery by protecting their malicious files or modifying critical system files.
This rule detects attempts to copy the /etc/shadow file, which contains hashed user passwords, for offline password cracking. It specifically looks for the string "cat /etc/shadow" in TCP traffic destined for the home network on any port, indicating a potential exfiltration attempt or preparation for credential access. The rule is designed to alert on established connections where this specific command is observed.
This rule detects HTTP traffic containing the string "KerberosRequestorSecurityToken" in the file data, indicating a potential Kerberos exploit for credential theft delivery. The detection is focused on traffic flowing from the server to the client.
This rule detects the execution of the 'dd if=/dev/zero' command over an SSH connection. This command is commonly used to wipe disk content by overwriting it with zeros, which can be an indicator of malicious activity aimed at destroying data or hindering forensic analysis. The rule specifically looks for this string within TCP traffic directed to port 22 (SSH).
This rule detects the use of a SOCKS proxy as an external Command and Control (C2) relay. Specifically, it looks for TCP traffic on port 1080 (a common SOCKS proxy port) from the home network to any destination, and checks for the SOCKS version 5 handshake initiation sequence (05 01 00) at the beginning of the payload. This pattern indicates a client attempting to establish a SOCKSv5 connection, which can be used by malware for C2 communication to evade detection and bypass network restrictions.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication where data is hidden within image files using steganography. It specifically looks for HTTP responses (flow:to_client) containing JPEG image headers ('FF D8 FF') within the first 3 bytes, with a file size greater than 500,000 bytes. A threshold is applied to trigger an alert if 5 such events occur from the same destination within 60 seconds, indicating a potential high volume of large steganographic image transfers.
This rule detects the use of self-signed TLS certificates where both the issuer and subject Common Name (CN) match a suspicious pattern. The pattern specifically looks for CNs that are 5 to 20 alphanumeric characters or hyphens, followed by one of several top-level domains (TLDs) commonly associated with malicious activity: .xyz, .top, .club, .icu, or .pw. This combination of self-signed certificates and suspicious TLDs is often indicative of command and control (C2) communication from malware.
This rule detects when a file with the '.docm' extension is written to a network share via SMB. The presence of '.docm' suggests a macro-enabled Office document, which is often used in malicious campaigns. The rule specifically looks for the content '.docm' and a backslash character ('\') within the SMB traffic, indicating a file path or content related to a document.
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