Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the creation of a new inbox rule via Exchange Web Services (EWS) that could be used to hide phishing replies. Specifically, it looks for HTTP traffic to '/EWS/Exchange.asmx' with 'NewInboxRule' in the client body, indicating an attempt to create a new inbox rule.
This rule detects attempts to unset the HISTFILE environment variable over a TCP connection to port 22 (SSH). Unsetting HISTFILE is a common technique used by attackers to prevent their commands from being recorded in the shell history, thereby evading detection and forensic analysis. The rule specifically looks for the string "unset HISTFILE" case-insensitively within the TCP stream.
This rule detects the delivery of a VBA stomped Office document via HTTP. It looks for specific content within the HTTP response body, indicating a Microsoft Office document that has been manipulated to hide malicious VBA macros. The rule specifically checks for the presence of "[Content_Types].xml", "vbaProject", and "PerformanceCache" within the file data, which are characteristic of Office documents containing VBA macros, with "PerformanceCache" being a potential indicator of VBA stomping.
This rule detects network traffic over SMB (port 445) that contains patterns indicative of a payload hidden within an NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS). Specifically, it looks for the string ":$DATA" followed by ".exe" (case-insensitive) in the TCP payload, which is a common technique used by malware to conceal executable files within legitimate files.
This rule detects network traffic containing the strings "SW_HIDE" and "CreateProcess" within file data in an HTTP response. This combination suggests an attempt to execute a process with a hidden window, which is a common technique used by malicious software to evade detection.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the URI contains both 'certutil' and '-decode' (case-insensitive). This pattern is indicative of an attacker using the Windows built-in 'certutil.exe' utility to decode a file downloaded via HTTP, often as part of a defense evasion or payload extraction technique. The 'flow:to_server,established' indicates that the detection is looking for this pattern in requests going from the internal network to an external server, suggesting a client-initiated download or interaction.
This rule detects attempts to move executable files (.exe) over SMB (Server Message Block) by looking for the 'MoveFile' string and the '.exe' extension in network traffic on port 445. This activity could indicate malware being relocated on a network share.
This rule detects the delivery of a malicious Control Panel (.cpl) file over HTTP. It specifically looks for HTTP responses containing a URI ending with ".cpl" (case-insensitive) and the "MZ" magic bytes at the beginning of the file data, indicating an executable file. This technique is often used for defense evasion and to execute malicious code.
This rule detects HTTP requests where the URI contains specific system script names like 'pubprn', 'syncappvpublishingserver', or 'winrm'. These scripts are known to be abused by attackers to proxy code execution, often as a defense evasion technique. The rule specifically looks for these patterns in HTTP URIs in traffic flowing to the server.
This rule detects attempts to execute commands indirectly via 'bash.exe' on Windows systems, specifically looking for HTTP requests where the URI contains both 'bash.exe' and the '-c' argument, which is commonly used to pass commands to a shell. This behavior is indicative of an attacker using Bash on Windows (e.g., Windows Subsystem for Linux or Git Bash) to execute arbitrary commands, potentially as part of a defense evasion or command and control tactic.
This rule detects attempts to leverage Regsvr32 for COM scriptlet remote execution. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic where the URI contains '.sct' (indicating a scriptlet file) and the file data contains XML content with the word 'registration', which are common characteristics of COM scriptlets used in Regsvr32 attacks.
This rule detects the delivery of a payload that uses InstallUtil for proxy execution. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic (flow:to_client,established) containing the strings "System.Configuration.Install" and "Installer" (case-insensitive) within the file data. This pattern is indicative of malicious use of InstallUtil, a legitimate Microsoft utility, to execute code, often for defense evasion.
This rule detects attempts to inject remote office templates via HTTP. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic flowing to the client that contains both 'attachedTemplate' and 'http' (case-insensitive) in the file data, indicating a potential attempt to load a remote template.
This rule detects HTTP responses containing XSL Transform with embedded JScript payloads. It specifically looks for the presence of 'language="JScript"' and 'WScript.Shell' within the file data of an HTTP response flowing to the client. This combination indicates an attempt to execute JScript code, potentially for malicious purposes, often associated with defense evasion or initial access techniques.
This rule detects attempts to harvest credentials from process memory on Linux systems. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic (flow:to_client,established) containing both the string "/proc/self/mem" and "password" (case-insensitive) within the file data. This combination suggests a tool or script is attempting to read memory for credential extraction, often associated with techniques like credential dumping.
This rule detects attempts to extract credentials from the Linux /proc filesystem over an SSH connection. Specifically, it looks for network traffic containing "/proc/", "/mem", and "ssh" (case-insensitive) within the same TCP flow to a server on port 22. This combination suggests an attacker might be trying to read sensitive memory regions or files related to SSH processes to dump credentials.
This rule detects attempts to dump NTDS.dit via the Volume Shadow Copy technique over HTTP. It specifically looks for HTTP URIs containing both 'vssadmin' and 'ntds.dit' (case-insensitive). This combination suggests an attacker is trying to exfiltrate the NTDS.dit file, which contains Active Directory database information, using the vssadmin utility to create a shadow copy and then access the file.
This rule detects attempts to read the bash history file, typically using the 'cat ~/.bash_history' command, over a TCP connection to port 22 (SSH). This activity is often associated with credential harvesting by an attacker who has gained access to a system and is looking for sensitive information, such as previously entered commands that might contain passwords or other credentials.
This rule detects attempts to steal OAuth access tokens by abusing redirect URIs. It specifically looks for HTTP requests containing both 'access_token=' and 'redirect_uri=' in the URI, which could indicate an attacker trying to capture a legitimate access token by redirecting it to a controlled URI.
This rule detects attempts to access secrets stored in Azure Key Vault via its API. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic where the host matches the Azure Key Vault domain pattern '*.vault.azure.net' and the URI contains '/secrets/'. This indicates a potential attempt to retrieve sensitive information.
This rule detects when a KeePass database file (.kdbx) is copied to a server via SMB. This could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive credential data.
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