Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects HTTP GET requests containing specific URL patterns associated with Calisto phishing campaigns. The patterns include '/vendor/plugx/', '/wp-content/plugins/(bungs|areada|leykos)/', '/prueba/phantomrise/', or '/plugins/unite/', combined with the 'utm_refferer=' parameter in the URI. This indicates an attempt to redirect users to malicious content, likely as part of a phishing attack.
This rule detects outbound HTTP traffic where the User-Agent header contains the string 'Internet Explorer'. This has been seen used by malware, and the legitimate Internet Explorer browser uses the User-Agent string "MSIE". The MSIE browser was end-of-lifed in 2022. The rule specifically looks for this pattern in established, to_server HTTP flows.
This rule detects command and control (C2) communication associated with the Lazarus Group's ScoringMathTea Remote Access Trojan (RAT). It specifically looks for HTTP traffic where the User-Agent header matches a known string used by this malware: 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/107.0.1418.42'. This User-Agent string attempts to masquerade as a legitimate Microsoft Edge browser.
This rule detects outbound TLS connections to known temporary file sharing services, which can be indicative of data exfiltration. The rule inspects the Server Name Indication (SNI) field in TLS traffic for specific domain names associated with these services.
This rule detects Command and Control (C2) beaconing activity associated with the UNC1549 threat group and the LIGHTRAIL malware. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic with a URI containing '/news', an 'Upgrade: websocket' header, and a distinct User-Agent string 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.10136'. This combination of indicators suggests an attempt to tunnel C2 communications over HTTP, potentially masquerading as legitimate WebSocket traffic.
This rule detects TLS connections to domains associated with Gh0st RAT impersonation campaigns, specifically 'Campaign Trio' and 'Campaign Chorus'. It looks for specific strings ('i4tools', 'youdao', 'deepseek') in the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) field, combined with top-level domains like '.top' or '.vip'. This pattern indicates potential command and control (C2) communication from Gh0st RAT malware.
This rule detects network connections to external hosts exhibiting a specific JARM fingerprint (27d40d40d00040d00042d43d00041df04c41293ba84f6efe3a613b22f983e6) that has been associated with a phishing campaign, specifically targeting Harbor Freight. JARM fingerprints are used to identify unique TLS server configurations, and this particular hash indicates a known malicious infrastructure.
This rule detects Command and Control (C2) communication associated with the Amatera Stealer malware. It specifically looks for TLS traffic where the Server Name Indication (SNI) field contains the string "aether100pronotification.table.core.windows.net". This SNI is considered bogus and indicative of Amatera Stealer's C2 activity.
This rule detects network traffic to specific JSON storage services (jsonkeeper.com, jsonsilo.com, npoint.io) that have been observed to be abused by the DPRK-linked 'Contagious Interview' threat actors for malware delivery. The detection is based on TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) patterns.
This rule detects inbound HTTP requests containing the User-Agent string 'Salesforce-Multi-Org-Fetcher/1.0'. This specific User-Agent has been associated with data theft from Salesforce instances, as detailed in a Google Cloud blog post. The detection aims to identify potential malicious activity targeting web server applications, specifically Salesforce environments, where an attacker might be attempting to exfiltrate data.
This rule detects inbound HTTP requests containing the User-Agent string 'Salesforce-CLI/1.0'. This activity is considered suspicious as it may indicate reconnaissance or data theft attempts targeting Salesforce instances, potentially leveraging compromised credentials or systems. The presence of this specific User-Agent inbound to a network could be an indicator of malicious activity, as Salesforce CLI is typically used by developers and administrators for managing Salesforce organizations and is not expected to be seen in inbound traffic from external networks to internal systems.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of a Windows Shortcut Link (LNK) file containing an unusually large amount of padded whitespace in its command line arguments. This technique is often used to obfuscate malicious commands or exploit vulnerabilities like ZDI-CAN-25373, which was a zero-day exploit related to Windows shortcuts. The rule specifically looks for the LNK file header signature and then uses a PCRE to identify repeated whitespace characters (tab, newline, vertical tab, form feed, carriage return, space) within the file data, suggesting padding for obfuscation or to bypass security controls.
ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android/TrickMo.Banker POST Request
ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android/TrickMo.Banker Config Response
ET MALWARE LeakyStealer CnC Checkin
ET MALWARE TA569 Gholoader CnC Domain in DNS Lookup (secure .kasindramaharaj .com)
ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android/TrickMo.Banker GET Config Request
ET MALWARE TA569 Middleware Server Domain in DNS Lookup (sessionstorexint .com)
ET ATTACK_RESPONSE ClickFix MSHTA Command Inbound
ET MALWARE TA569 Middleware Server Domain in DNS Lookup (taskrunnersrvmod .com)
ET ATTACK_RESPONSE HTML Smuggling Powershell Payload In href
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