Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects DNS queries for the Twilio TURN relay domain 'global.turn.twilio.com', which is associated with msaRAT C2 activity. This indicator is low-confidence and intended to be used as part of a correlation with other behaviors like loopback C2 traffic or suspicious DevTools usage.
Detects DNS queries targeted towards specific '2miners.com' solo mining pool subdomains (e.g., solo-zeph.2miners.com, solo-rvn.2miners.com). Such activity is often associated with unauthorized cryptocurrency mining (cryptojacking) performed on compromised systems.
Detects DNS query attempts to a known malicious IP address (179.43.166.242) associated with the CrashStealer malware campaign, indicating potential command-and-control communication.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host header) to the domain 'couldinstallup.com', which is associated with Command and Control (C2) activity by the threat group Mustang Panda.
Detects DNS queries for domains associated with Kratos Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) hosting infrastructure. This activity is indicative of a user or system attempting to resolve domains used for phishing campaigns or command and control communication.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, HTTP requests, and TLS SNI) associated with the PamStealer malware communicating with its known command and control domain maccyapp.com.
Detects DNS queries for known typosquatted domains associated with Command and Control (C2) activity. The rule monitors for queries targeting lookalike domains impersonating well-known brands such as Microsoft, Google, Facebook, and various VPN services.
Detects high-frequency DNS queries for long, random-looking subdomains that result in NXDomain responses, a behavioral indicator of malware using Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) for command-and-control beaconing.
Detects DNS query traffic with unusually long subdomains (over 100 characters) that exhibit Base64-like encoding patterns. This is a common behavioral indicator for DNS tunneling tools like iodine or dnscat2, which use DNS queries to encapsulate non-DNS protocol traffic for command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects DNS TXT query responses containing anomalously large RDATA payloads (exceeding 100 bytes). Large TXT records are frequently used in DNS tunneling or data exfiltration scenarios to smuggle data out of a network while bypassing traditional network security controls. The rule applies a threshold limit to identify persistent, potentially malicious exfiltration activity from a specific source over a 60-second window.
This rule detects DNS queries for domain names that exhibit patterns indicative of 'phantom squatting' targeting postal and courier services. These patterns often involve concatenating brand-related keywords (e.g., 'post', 'parcel', 'delivery') with service-oriented suffixes (e.g., '-login', '-verify', '-app') to create lookalike domains intended for phishing, credential harvesting, or infrastructure staging.
This rule monitors DNS query traffic for unusually long, encoded subdomain labels (50 characters or more). Such patterns are indicative of data exfiltration or command-and-control (C2) communication using DNS tunneling tools like iodine or dnscat2, which encapsulate non-DNS protocols within the DNS query structure to evade network inspection.
Detects DNS queries for domains matching a specific typosquatting pattern ('[a-z]{3,20}business.com') associated with the Montana Empire campaign, likely used for corporate banking credential harvesting.
Detects DNS queries for domains that mimic software package naming conventions (e.g., [name]-utils, [name]-api, [name]-client) that do not resolve to known legitimate registry domains. This behavior is indicative of potential dependency confusion attacks or malicious package installation attempts, where an attacker registers a domain designed to lure developers into downloading malicious code.
Detects DNS queries containing unusually long subdomains (50+ characters) encoded in Base64, which is a common technique used for command-and-control (C2) communication or data exfiltration via DNS tunneling.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity using DNS tunneling. It monitors for a high frequency of DNS TXT record queries to long subdomains (exceeding 50 characters), which is a common characteristic of tools like DNScat and iodine that encode data within DNS requests.
Detects DNS query traffic where the subdomain label length exceeds 50 characters and contains patterns consistent with Base64 or Hexadecimal encoding. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration or command-and-control communication performed over the DNS protocol by tunneling data within query labels.
This rule detects DNS queries for domains that mimic legitimate package registry domains (such as PyPI, npm, etc.) using common typosquatting or lookalike patterns often exploited for dependency confusion or supply chain attacks. It identifies when systems reach out to domains attempting to impersonate trusted package management services.
This rule detects DNS queries originating from the internal network towards the domain 'direct-download.giize.com', which has been associated with the unauthorized distribution of the ScreenConnect remote access tool. This activity is indicative of an attempt to download potentially malicious or unauthorized remote administration software.
This rule detects repeated DNS queries to known Dynamic DNS (DDNS) providers within a 24-hour window, which may indicate an infected host beaconing to a command-and-control (C2) server utilizing dynamic infrastructure. Such rotation is commonly used by malware to maintain connectivity if primary infrastructure is blocked.
This rule detects potential DNS exfiltration attempts by identifying DNS queries containing high-entropy subdomains of 51 characters or more, encoded in Base64. Adversaries may use long, encoded subdomains to tunnel data out of a network through the DNS protocol, bypassing traditional security controls.
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