Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
324 detections
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Detects anomalous DNS queries with high-entropy or encoded labels that exceed 40 characters in size, potentially indicating DNS tunneling used for Command and Control (C2) communication.
Detects network activity associated with NetSupport Manager remote access software, specifically targeting DNS lookups, TLS SNI connections, and direct TCP beaconing to a known-malicious infrastructure IP. This rule is designed to identify unauthorized use of legitimate remote support tools for command and control purposes.
Detects DNS queries indicative of OAST (Out-of-Band Application Security Testing) infrastructure usage by the LucidPawn dropper, specifically targeting domains associated with dnslog.ink and digimg.store. This pattern suggests potential beaconing or exfiltration attempts.
Detects DNS queries indicative of OAST (Out-of-Band Application Security Testing) infrastructure usage by the LucidPawn dropper, specifically targeting domains associated with dnslog.ink and digimg.store. This pattern suggests potential beaconing or exfiltration attempts.
Detects DNS queries indicative of OAST (Out-of-Band Application Security Testing) infrastructure usage by the LucidPawn dropper, specifically targeting domains associated with dnslog.ink and digimg.store. This pattern suggests potential beaconing or exfiltration attempts.
Detection of known Cloudflare Workers subdomains used as dead-drop resolvers for C2 communication by the QUICSILVER QUICAgent malware. The rule monitors for specific DNS queries to resolve these domains and subsequent HTTP GET requests used to retrieve C2 instructions.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) attempting to communicate with infrastructure associated with the EvilTokens Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks.
Detects DNS queries to known malicious subdomains and direct TCP connections to an IP address associated with the SilkParasite, NodeEdgeRAT, and NomadRAT malware infrastructure. The rule specifically monitors for communication with identified C2 infrastructure hosts and legacy domain registration points.
Detects specific Cloudflare name server pairs ('randy.ns.cloudflare' and 'stevie.ns.cloudflare') in DNS responses. This pattern is associated with Exvicy domain management infrastructure, which has been identified as a component in adversary C2 and domain staging operations.
Detects DNS lookup queries and HTTP POST beaconing attempts directed at known Sauron Loader C2 fallback infrastructure. The rule tracks specific domains associated with the malware's encrypted registration and command-and-control behavior.
Detects DNS lookup queries and HTTP POST beaconing attempts directed at known Sauron Loader C2 fallback infrastructure. The rule tracks specific domains associated with the malware's encrypted registration and command-and-control behavior.
Detects network communication associated with the Casbaneiro (Metamorfo) banking trojan, specifically identifying DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure.
Detects network activity associated with the SilkParasite actor's NodeEdgeRAT malware, including DNS queries, TLS SNI, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to the identified command-and-control infrastructure 'hoster-kg.com'.
This rule detects DNS queries for domains associated with the SilkParasite campaign, which leverages typosquatting to impersonate Central Asian government, energy, and telecommunications entities for potential malicious activity.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) attempting to communicate with infrastructure associated with the EvilTokens Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) attempting to communicate with infrastructure associated with the EvilTokens Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks.
Detects DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, and HTTP host headers associated with the known exfiltration domain 't.m-kosche.com' linked to the Mini Shai-Hulud malware.
Detects DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, and HTTP host headers associated with the known exfiltration domain 't.m-kosche.com' linked to the Mini Shai-Hulud malware.
Detects DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, and HTTP host headers associated with the known exfiltration domain 't.m-kosche.com' linked to the Mini Shai-Hulud malware.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP requests) associated with identified 'ShipmentsFree' scam domains. These domains are typically used in phishing or credential harvesting campaigns to trick users into visiting fake account or tracking pages.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP requests) associated with identified 'ShipmentsFree' scam domains. These domains are typically used in phishing or credential harvesting campaigns to trick users into visiting fake account or tracking pages.
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