Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects HTTP requests where the URI contains the string "%comspec%" (case-insensitive). This pattern is often used by attackers to obfuscate command execution, specifically by referencing the command interpreter (cmd.exe) via an environment variable, as part of defense evasion tactics. The rule is specifically looking for this string within the URI of an HTTP request flowing from the internal network to an external server.
This rule detects when an executable file is embedded within an Office document that is being downloaded over HTTP. It specifically looks for the presence of both the Office document content type indicator "[Content_Types].xml" and the "MZ" magic bytes, which signify a Windows executable, within the same file data stream. This combination is a strong indicator of a malicious Office document attempting to deliver malware.
This rule detects the download of a compressed executable payload over HTTP. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic flowing to the client that contains both the GZIP magic number (1F 8B) and the Windows executable magic number (MZ) within the file data. This combination suggests a compressed executable file being delivered, which is a common technique used by malware to evade detection.
This rule detects HTTP responses containing a payload that appears to be XOR encrypted. It specifically looks for a sequence of at least 200 bytes consisting of non-printable ASCII characters (0x01-0x1f and 0x7f-0xff) within the file data of an HTTP response flowing to the client. This pattern is indicative of XOR encryption, often used by malware to obfuscate its payload.
This rule detects when an executable file is masquerading as an image file during an HTTP download. It specifically looks for HTTP responses with a 'Content-Type: image/' header, but where the file data begins with 'MZ', which is the magic number for Windows Portable Executable (PE) files. This indicates a potential attempt to bypass security controls by disguising malicious executables as benign image files.
This rule detects HTTP responses from a server to a client that contain the phrase "Your computer is infected" (case-insensitive). This is indicative of a fake security alert page, often used in social engineering attacks to trick users into downloading malware or providing credentials. The rule specifically looks for this content within the file data of an established HTTP flow directed to the client.
This rule detects the delivery of an executable file over HTTP where the filename in the URI contains a space character immediately before the file extension '.exe'. This technique is often used by attackers to obfuscate the true file type or to bypass basic file type checks, making the file appear as a non-executable or a different file type to a casual observer or some automated systems. The rule specifically looks for the pattern '.exe ' (dot, exe, space) in the HTTP URI, case-insensitive.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the URI contains the string "FromBase64String" (case-insensitive). This string is often associated with PowerShell or .NET code that decodes a Base64 encoded string, which can then be executed. This technique is commonly used by attackers for defense evasion to obfuscate malicious payloads.
This rule detects the delivery of a Microsoft Installer (MSI) package via HTTP that exhibits characteristics of a malicious file. It specifically looks for HTTP responses (flow:to_client) containing a URI with the ".msi" extension (http.uri; content:".msi"; nocase;) and the magic bytes "D0 CF 11 E0" (content:"|D0 CF 11 E0|"; depth:4;) which are indicative of an OLE2 compound document file format, commonly used by MSI files. The rule classifies this activity as 'trojan-activity'.
This rule detects the presence of anti-debugging techniques within HTTP payload data. Specifically, it looks for the strings "IsDebuggerPresent" and "ExitProcess" (case-insensitive) in the HTTP response body. The combination of these strings suggests that a malicious payload might be checking for a debugger and attempting to terminate if one is detected, a common defense evasion technique used by malware.
This rule detects the delivery of a fake GUI login prompt over HTTP, likely for credential capture. It looks for HTTP responses (flow:to_client) containing the strings "ShowDialog", "Password", and "GetWindowText" (case-insensitive) within the file data. This combination of keywords suggests an attempt to mimic a legitimate login interface to trick users into providing their credentials.
This rule detects attempts to access sensitive credential-related files (e.g., configuration files, credential files, .env files, or files containing 'secret') via HTTP requests. This pattern is often associated with web shell activity where an attacker tries to exfiltrate sensitive information from a compromised web server.
This rule detects potential MFA bypass attempts using Evilginx by looking for HTTP POST requests to the server that contain both 'session' and 'token' in the URI, with a body size greater than 100 bytes. This pattern is indicative of session token capture, a technique used by Evilginx to bypass multi-factor authentication.
This rule detects attempts at token impersonation by looking for the strings "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser" and "DuplicateTokenEx" within HTTP response bodies. This technique is often used by attackers to elevate privileges by impersonating a logged-on user's security token.
This rule detects the delivery of a token manipulation tool over HTTP. It specifically looks for the presence of the strings "AdjustTokenPrivileges" and "OpenProcessToken" (case-insensitive) within the file data of an HTTP response. These strings are associated with Windows API calls used for modifying process tokens, which is a common technique for privilege escalation.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to Microsoft Teams chat messages being scraped for credentials. Specifically, it looks for HTTP requests to 'graph.microsoft.com' with URIs containing '/chats/' and '/messages'. A threshold of 20 such requests within 60 seconds from a single source IP triggers the alert, indicating potential automated data exfiltration or credential harvesting from Teams chats.
This rule detects attempts to abuse Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) by requesting certificates through the /certsrv/ interface. Specifically, it looks for HTTP requests containing both '/certsrv/' and 'request' in the URI, indicating a certificate enrollment request. The thresholding mechanism (5 requests from the same source within 60 seconds) aims to reduce false positives and highlight potentially automated or repeated attempts to exploit AD CS.
This rule detects a potential MFA SMS code request flooding attack. It triggers when a single source IP address makes 10 or more HTTP requests containing the string "send_code" in the URI within a 60-second window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker repeatedly attempting to request MFA codes, likely in an attempt to overwhelm the user or the system, or to facilitate a SIM-swapping attack.
This rule detects potential unauthorized access attempts using forged web credentials. It specifically looks for HTTP requests containing a cookie with a long, base64-like encoded string (100 or more characters) which could indicate a forged session token or credential. A threshold of 10 such occurrences within 5 seconds from the same destination IP address triggers the alert, suggesting a brute-force or automated credential stuffing attempt.
This rule detects the download of Office template files (such as .dot, .dotm, .xlt, .xltm, .pot, .potm) that contain VBA project content. This is indicative of potentially malicious Office documents designed to execute macros, often used for initial access or persistence by attackers.
This rule detects attempts to force the installation of browser extensions via a policy page. It specifically looks for the string "ExtensionInstallForcelist" in HTTP response data flowing to the client, indicating a mechanism used to programmatically install extensions, often abused by malware or unwanted programs to maintain persistence or inject malicious functionality into browsers.
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