Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects HTTP responses containing JavaScript that attempts to redirect the user's browser to another page and executes code using 'eval()'. This combination is often used in malicious web pages to redirect users to exploit kits or phishing sites, and to obfuscate malicious JavaScript.
This rule detects HTTP responses from a web server to a client that contain JavaScript code attempting to redirect the user's browser. Specifically, it looks for the string "window.location.replace" within the HTTP response body (file.data) when the HTTP referer header indicates the request originated from Google or Bing search results. This pattern is often associated with content injection attacks where malicious code is injected into legitimate search results to redirect users to malicious sites.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts delivered via Slack messages. It triggers when HTTP traffic to 'slack.com' contains '/messages/' in the URI, indicating a Slack message context, and has a threshold of 5 occurrences within 60 seconds from the same source.
Detects unusually large HTTP POST requests which may indicate data exfiltration activity over web protocols. The rule specifically looks for HTTP POST methods and is designed for Suricata, a network intrusion detection system.
This rule detects HTTP requests to known dedicated server rental providers (ovh.com, leaseweb.com, servermania.com) where the URI contains the word 'order'. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to rent infrastructure for attack purposes, such as command and control servers, phishing sites, or other malicious operations.
This rule detects a drive-by download attempt initiated via a malicious advertisement. It specifically looks for HTTP responses to clients where the HTTP referer header contains common advertisement-related keywords (ad., ads., advert) and the response body contains the 'MZ' magic bytes, indicating an executable file download. This combination suggests a user was redirected from an advertisement to a site that then attempted to download an executable.
This rule detects potential use of a compromised Virtual Private Server (VPS) as a proxy relay. It specifically looks for HTTP CONNECT requests, which are commonly used for tunneling traffic through a proxy. A threshold of 10 CONNECT requests within 60 seconds from a single source IP is set to identify suspicious activity, indicating a high volume of proxy usage.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication originating from a compromised serverless function. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests with a body size greater than 500 bytes, targeting domains associated with serverless platforms like Vercel (.vercel.app), Netlify (.netlify.app), and Cloudflare Pages (.pages.dev). A threshold of 10 such requests within 60 seconds from the same source IP triggers the alert, indicating a possible high-volume data exfiltration or C2 activity.
This rule detects a potential account takeover attempt via a credential stuffing attack. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to a URI containing 'login' (case-insensitive) from a single destination IP address, with a high frequency (50 requests within 60 seconds). This pattern suggests an automated attempt to try multiple credentials against a login endpoint.
This rule detects multiple login attempts to social media platforms (Twitter, X, Instagram, Facebook) from a single source IP address within a short timeframe. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to URIs containing 'login' on these domains. A threshold of 10 attempts within 30 seconds triggers the alert, indicating a potential brute-force or credential stuffing attack aimed at hijacking social media accounts.
This rule detects a brute force attempt against a cloud management console. It triggers when a source IP address makes 10 or more HTTP POST requests to a URI containing 'signin' within a 30-second window. This pattern is indicative of an automated attempt to guess credentials for a login page.
This rule detects attempts to purchase code signing certificates by monitoring HTTP traffic for connections to known certificate authorities (Sectigo, Comodo, Digicert) and the presence of the term 'codesigning' in the URI. This could indicate an adversary attempting to acquire legitimate code signing certificates for malicious purposes, such as signing malware to evade detection.
This rule detects the use of a code signing certificate that is suspected to be stolen. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic where the TLS certificate subject contains an organization name matching a common corporate naming convention (e.g., 'O=Company Inc', 'O=Company LLC', 'O=Company Ltd', 'O=Company Corp') and the issuer is 'DigiCert'. This combination suggests a potentially legitimate certificate being used in an unauthorized context, possibly for signing malicious software.
This rule detects HTTP PUT requests to known remote file hosting services (transfer.sh, file.io, gofile.io, anonfiles). This activity is indicative of payload staging, where an attacker uploads malicious files or tools to a remote server for later use in an attack, often as part of the resource development phase of the attack lifecycle.
This rule detects attempts to upload executable files (specifically Windows MZ executables) to common cloud storage services like Amazon S3, Google Cloud Storage, and Azure Blob Storage. It looks for HTTP PUT requests containing the 'MZ' magic bytes at the beginning of the file data, indicating a Windows executable, with a file size greater than 100KB, directed towards known cloud storage domains.
This rule detects potential watering hole attacks by identifying HTTP responses (flow to client) that contain a combination of HTML script tags, 'document.write', and 'eval(' within the file data. This pattern is indicative of malicious JavaScript injection designed to execute code on the client side.
This rule detects network traffic to known initial access broker (IAB) market domains. It specifically looks for HTTP requests where the host matches 'exploit.in', 'xss.is', 'raidforums', or 'breachforums' and the URI contains the word 'access'. This indicates potential activity related to purchasing or selling initial access to compromised systems.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the client body contains the terms "rdp" and "buy" (case-insensitive). This combination suggests a potential attempt to purchase RDP access, possibly on an underground forum, which is a policy violation.
This rule detects suspicious access to domain registration services by monitoring HTTP traffic for requests to known domain registrars (namecheap.com, godaddy.com, porkbun.com) with a URI containing 'register'. A threshold of 5 such requests within 60 seconds from the same source IP triggers an alert, indicating potential resource development activity such as bulk domain registration.
This rule detects potential staff directory scraping by monitoring HTTP GET requests to URIs containing the word "staff". It triggers an alert if more than 20 such requests are observed from a single source IP within a 30-second window, indicating automated or rapid enumeration attempts.
This rule detects potential credential harvesting attempts by monitoring HTTP POST requests that contain both 'password' and 'email' in the client body. It specifically looks for these keywords in a case-insensitive manner within the HTTP client body and requires the body size to be greater than 50 bytes. This indicates a form submission likely containing sensitive user credentials.
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