Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects attempts to modify a user's logon script via remote registry access. Specifically, it looks for TCP traffic on port 445 (SMB/CIFS, often used for remote registry) where the content "UserInitMprLogonScript" is present, indicating an attempt to alter this specific registry key. This activity is often associated with persistence techniques used by attackers to maintain access to a system.
This rule detects a port knocking sequence on closed ports. It triggers an alert when four TCP SYN packets are observed from the same source IP address within a 5-second window, targeting any port on the home network. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to perform port knocking to open a hidden port or service.
Botnet C2 Panel Access Detected
Suricata
This rule detects potential access to a botnet command and control (C2) panel. It triggers when HTTP URI requests contain both 'panel' and 'bot' (case-insensitive) within the URI. A threshold of 5 such requests from the same source within 60 seconds is set to reduce false positives.
This rule detects a brute-force attack against an SSH service on a network device management port. It triggers an alert if 15 or more TCP SYN packets are observed from a single source IP address to destination port 22 (SSH) within a 30-second window, indicating an attempt to establish multiple connections, characteristic of a brute-force attempt.
This rule detects attempts to register a Netsh helper DLL for persistence. Netsh (Network Shell) is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to display or modify the network configuration of a locally running computer. Attackers can abuse the 'add helper' command to register a malicious DLL, which will then be loaded by Netsh whenever it runs, providing a persistence mechanism. The rule specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 445 (SMB) containing the strings "netsh" and "add helper" in a case-insensitive manner, indicating an attempt to use this technique.
This rule detects the use of the 'trap' command with 'EXIT' in TCP traffic, which is a common technique used for persistence on Unix-like systems. Attackers can use the 'trap' command to execute arbitrary commands when a shell exits, ensuring their malicious code runs even after a session is closed.
This rule detects network traffic patterns indicative of an attempt to use the 'Active Setup' registry key for persistence. Specifically, it looks for TCP traffic on port 445 (commonly used for SMB/CIFS) directed to the home network, containing the strings 'Active Setup' and 'StubPath' (case-insensitive). This combination suggests an attacker might be trying to establish persistence by modifying the 'StubPath' value within an 'Active Setup' registry key, which Windows uses to run commands during user logon.
This rule detects network traffic containing the string "HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID" on TCP port 135 (DCE/RPC) directed towards the home network. This pattern is indicative of an attempt to modify registry keys related to COM objects, which can be used for persistence or privilege escalation by hijacking COM object execution.
This rule detects network traffic indicating that reversible password encryption might be enabled in Active Directory. It specifically looks for the string "AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption" in TCP traffic destined for port 389 (LDAP). Enabling reversible password encryption stores passwords in a format that can be easily decrypted, making them vulnerable to theft if the system is compromised.
This rule detects a potential network device authentication bypass attempt via SSH. Specifically, it looks for SSH traffic (port 22) directed to the home network that contains the strings "aaa authentication" and "none" (case-insensitive). This combination suggests a configuration where authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) is set to 'none', which could allow unauthorized access.
This rule detects network traffic on TCP port 445 (SMB) containing the string "Notification Packages" in a case-insensitive manner, flowing to the server. This pattern is indicative of an attempt to install a password filter DLL for credential harvesting, a technique used by attackers to capture user credentials.
This rule detects attempts to modify login scripts, specifically '.profile', on a remote host via SSH. The detection is based on observing the string ".profile" within TCP traffic destined for port 22 (SSH) on the home network. This activity could indicate an attacker establishing persistence by modifying user login scripts to execute malicious commands upon subsequent logins.
This rule detects the writing of a file containing both the string "Startup" (case-insensitive) and the string ".bat" (case-insensitive) to a remote host via the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol on port 445. This activity is indicative of an attempt to establish persistence by creating a startup script on a remote system.
This rule detects network traffic on TCP port 445 (SMB) containing the strings "system32" and "msv1_0.dll" in a case-insensitive manner. This pattern is indicative of an attempt to replace the authentication DLL (msv1_0.dll) on a remote Windows host, which is a known technique for persistence and credential manipulation.
This rule detects attempts to modify authentication configuration via LDAP by looking for the string "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes" in TCP traffic destined for port 389 (LDAP). This string is associated with changes to supported encryption types in Active Directory, which could be an indicator of persistence or privilege escalation.
This rule detects attempts to add an autostart entry via a remote registry write operation targeting TCP port 445 (SMB). It specifically looks for network traffic containing the strings "Run", "HKCU" (HKEY_CURRENT_USER), and "\Software\Microsoft\Windows", indicating a modification to the current user's run keys for persistence. This activity is often associated with malware or adversaries establishing persistence on a compromised Windows system.
Stealth FIN Scan Port Probe
Suricata
This rule detects a stealth FIN scan port probe. A FIN scan is a type of port scan that sends TCP segments with only the FIN flag set. If the target port is closed, it should respond with an RST segment. If the port is open, it should ignore the FIN segment. This rule triggers if 10 such FIN packets are observed from a single source within a 30-second window, indicating a potential port scan attempt.
This rule detects WMI DCOM port reconnaissance activity targeting the Endpoint Mapper service on port 135. It triggers an alert when a source IP initiates 10 or more TCP SYN packets to port 135 on the HOME_NET within a 30-second window, indicating a potential network scan.
This rule detects an attempted pre-authentication Remote Code Execution (RCE) exploit against the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) service, commonly known as 'BlueKeep'. It specifically looks for a sequence of bytes within the RDP traffic on port 3389, indicating a potential exploit attempt.
This rule detects attempts to remotely shut down a system using the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. It specifically looks for the string "InitiateSystemShutdown" within TCP traffic destined for port 445 (SMB). This activity can be indicative of an attacker attempting to disrupt services or systems.
This rule detects RDP access attempts from external IP addresses to the internal network ($HOME_NET) on port 3389. It uses a threshold of 3 connection attempts within 300 seconds from the same source IP to trigger an alert, indicating potential brute-force or reconnaissance activity targeting RDP services. The rule is classified under the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1133, which involves 'Remote Desktop Protocol' for initial access.
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