Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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KQL Query from file: Sentinel All-In-One IP ThreatHunt
KQL Query from file: Entra Admin Roles Query
KQL Query from file: Tracking The Most Dangerous Entra Admin Role
KQL Query from file: Exposure Management - Slim's Metric (MaxCVSS-DAW)
Search for the CVEs that should be prioritized and resolved to reduce the success of the FireEye Red Team tools compromised by the Nobelium activity group.
See red_team_tool_countermeasures on the official FireEye repo.
References:
https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/CVEs_red_team_tools.md
https://github.com/fireeye
See red_team_tool_countermeasures on the official FireEye repo.
References:
https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/CVEs_red_team_tools.md
https://github.com/fireeye
Attackers can use Adfind which is administrative tool to gather information about Domain controllers, ADFS Servers. They may also rename executables with other benign tools on the system.
Below query will look for adfind usage in commandline arguments irrespective of executable name in short span of time. You can limit query this to your DC and ADFS servers.
Below references talk about suspicious use of adfind by adversaries.
- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Below query will look for adfind usage in commandline arguments irrespective of executable name in short span of time. You can limit query this to your DC and ADFS servers.
Below references talk about suspicious use of adfind by adversaries.
- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Attackers can use Adfind which is administrative tool to gather information about domain controllers or ADFS servers. They may also rename executables with other benign tools on the system.
The below query will look for Adfind usage in command line arguments irrespective of executable name in short span of time. You can limit query this to your DC and ADFS servers.
Below references talk about suspicious use of adfind by adversaries.
1. AdFind Recon
2. Navigating the MAZE: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Associated With MAZE Ransomware Incidents
3. Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers
This query is inspired by a Azure Sentinel detection.
The below query will look for Adfind usage in command line arguments irrespective of executable name in short span of time. You can limit query this to your DC and ADFS servers.
Below references talk about suspicious use of adfind by adversaries.
1. AdFind Recon
2. Navigating the MAZE: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Associated With MAZE Ransomware Incidents
3. Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers
This query is inspired by a Azure Sentinel detection.
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
