Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of Azure AD applications with generic display names, often combined with the addition of delegated permissions for 'Mail.Read' or 'Mail.ReadWrite' scopes. This activity is consistent with OAuth-based consent phishing campaigns used by threat groups such as APT35 (also known as Mint Sandstorm or Charming Kitten) to gain persistent access to user email environments.
Detects inbound emails containing password-protected archives (rar, zip, 7z) from either common freemail providers or domains matching known social engineering themes (e.g., webinar, interview, research). The rule specifically flags emails where the subject or body includes password hints (e.g., 'pwd', 'extract', 'unzip') indicating an attempt to deliver malicious payloads while evading email gateway inspection.
This rule detects the creation or modification of suspicious files (extensions associated with web shells or modules, such as .aspx, .ashx, .asmx, .dll, or .config) within common Microsoft IIS and Exchange web directories. It correlates these file events with process activity initiated by common web server or management processes (e.g., w3wp.exe, powershell.exe) and filters out trusted files (Microsoft-signed), known administrative update activity, and files with a broader footprint in the environment to identify potentially malicious, low-prevalence artifacts.
Detects execution chains where archive utilities (7-Zip, WinRAR) or explorer.exe, when initiated from temporary or download directories, spawn common scripting engines (PowerShell, mshta.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe) that contain suspicious network-related or obfuscated command-line indicators.
Detects potential exploitation of the ScreenConnect SetupWizard.aspx to bypass authentication and create unauthorized administrative users. The rule monitors for the creation or modification of User.xml or Users.xml files in the ScreenConnect application directories, correlating these file events with suspicious process activity (such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe) or web requests to the SetupWizard.aspx endpoint.
This rule detects suspicious process execution chains originating from ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) service. It monitors for common living-off-the-land binaries (LolBins) or specific suspicious command-line patterns (e.g., encoded commands, credential discovery commands) being spawned by the ScreenConnect process, which is often abused by threat actors such as APT35/Magic Hound for remote access and persistence.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious registration of native Internet Information Services (IIS) modules. It monitors command-line activity involving common administrative tools used to modify IIS configurations (appcmd.exe) and manage .NET assemblies (gacutil.exe), as well as the execution of specific PowerShell cmdlets like New-WebGlobalModule. Such activities are often indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence on a web server by loading malicious modules.
Detects indicators associated with the MiniUpdate RAT deployed by the threat group Screening Serpens. This rule identifies network connections to known C2 domains, the creation of a persistence scheduled task named 'WindowsSecurityUpdate', and the dropping of specific RAT module DLLs ('UpdateChecker.dll', 'InitInstall.dll', 'Updater.dll') in common user-writable directories. The file event detection is tuned to require multiple generic DLLs or the presence of 'InitInstall.dll' to reduce false positives.
Detects command and control (C2) communication to a specific Telegram Bot API endpoint hardcoded in the LampoRAT malware. This activity is associated with the Boggy Serpens (MuddyWater) threat actor.
Detects C2 communication from Boggy Serpens (MuddyWater) backdoors like Nuso and BlackBeard, which use non-standard HTTP status codes (201, 202, 418) to receive commands from known C2 servers.
Detects potential data exfiltration by the BlackBeard backdoor, associated with Boggy Serpens (MuddyWater). The malware abuses the HTTP 'Expires' header in client requests to exfiltrate encrypted system data to its command and control server. The 'Expires' header is a standard response header, so its presence in a request is highly anomalous.
Identify prior activity from this campaign using IOCs shared by Microsoft's Threat Intelligence Center, or MSTIC.
Read more: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/
Read more: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/
Identify prior activity from this campaign using IOCs shared by Microsoft's Threat Intelligence Center, or MSTIC.
Read more: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/
Read more: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/
Identify prior activity from this campaign using IOCs shared by Microsoft's Threat Intelligence Center, or MSTIC.
Read more: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/
Read more: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/
Detects suspicious manipulations of default accounts such as 'administrator' and 'guest' using `net.exe` or `net1.exe`. This includes actions like enabling/disabling accounts or changing passwords, which are often performed by adversaries for persistence or impact.
This rule detects the installation of a root certificate from suspicious locations using PowerShell's `Import-Certificate` cmdlet. Adversaries may install root certificates to bypass security warnings when connecting to their controlled web servers, facilitating man-in-the-middle attacks or credential harvesting. The rule specifically looks for the `Import-Certificate` cmdlet targeting `Cert:\LocalMachine\Root` and originating from common temporary or user-writable directories like `AppData\Local\Temp\`, `Windows\TEMP\`, `Desktop\`, `Downloads\`, `Perflogs\`, or `Users\Public\`.