Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
35 detections
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Detects malicious LNK files associated with the Transparent Tribe (APT36) campaign, which are designed to execute concealed batch scripts (e.g., doxc.bat, config.bat) via cmd.exe. These files are typically disguised as documents (resumes, details) to facilitate the deployment of secondary payloads like CrimsonRAT.
This rule detects network traffic patterns indicative of the Transparent Tribe threat group using the GitHub API for command-and-control (C2) operations. It specifically identifies HTTP requests to GitHub's content API that attempt to access or exchange files named 'command.txt', 'results.txt', 'heartbeat.txt', or 'screenshot.png', which are known indicators of this actor's C2 communication strategy.
Detects execution of APT36's RUSTYSHADE backdoor, typically delivered via a DriverInstaller executable or zip file, and specifically tracks downloads from Backblaze B2 storage buckets using PowerShell.
Detects potential CrimsonRAT backdoor binaries on Windows systems by identifying characteristic obfuscated ASISFH command tokens, embedded C2 infrastructure strings, and specific dropper file artifacts associated with Transparent Tribe (APT36).
Detects malicious scheduled task creation using names intended to mimic Microsoft Edge update tasks. The rule identifies suspicious process activity including the spawning of conhost.exe with headless flags, PowerShell commands with encoded arguments, and attempts to fetch external scripts from the known malicious typosquatted domain indiatodays.org, all of which are characteristic of APT36 (Transparent Tribe) activity.
Detects a Golang-based remote access trojan (RAT) attributed to the Transparent Tribe (APT36) threat group. The rule identifies the malware based on distinctive fitness-themed C2 API endpoints, specific function names, hardcoded authentication secrets, and embedded Go runtime markers, while also monitoring for associated persistence registry keys and file paths.
Detects network activity (DNS, TLS SNI, and direct TCP connections) associated with the Transparent Tribe threat group's command-and-control infrastructure, specifically targeting the domain 'sharema128.net' and its associated IP address.
Detects ISO or ZIP archive files containing a specific combination of a LNK file named 'My Resume.pdf.lnk' and a 'doxc' directory. This specific file structure is associated with Transparent Tribe (APT36) activity used to deliver malicious payloads via social engineering lures.
Detects DNS queries, HTTP requests, and TLS connections associated with known APT36 (Transparent Tribe) malicious infrastructure, specifically targeting typosquatted news domains used for staging payloads.
This rule monitors network traffic to GitHub API endpoints and categorizes the activity based on APT36's known operational window (weekdays, 04:00-11:00 UTC). Traffic patterns deviating from this schedule are flagged as anomalous, helping to identify potential C2 communication outside of established threat actor activity windows.
Detects network connections to known C2, VPS, VPN, and Starlink IP addresses and ranges used by the Handala group (Void Manticore) for their operations.
Detects the creation of abnormally large Windows shortcut (.lnk) files. This is a known TTP of APT36 (Transparent Tribe), who embed PDF content within LNK files to inflate their size and masquerade as legitimate documents to deceive users. The rule specifically looks for .lnk files with a size greater than 1MB.
Detects the execution of a malicious Linux payload, possibly within a .desktop file, a technique used by APT36. The rule identifies a bash process executing an inline command that downloads and runs a payload, often using a combination of curl, xxd, base64, and eval.
This query will find when federation trust settings are changed for a domain or when the domain is changed from managed to federated authentication. Results will relate to when a new Active Directory Federated Service (ADFS) TrustedRealm object, such as a signing certificate, is added.
Modification to domain federation settings should be rare, so confirm the added or modified target domain/URL is legitimate administrative behavior.
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying domain trust settings to subvert existing mechanisms and cause the domain to accept authorization tokens signed with actor-owned certificates. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
To understand why an authorized user may update settings for a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune, see Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune.
For details on security realms that accept security tokens, see the ADFS Proxy Protocol (MS-ADFSPP) specification: 3.2.5.1.2.4 Security Realm Data.
For further information on AuditLogs, please see Microsoft Entra ID audit activity reference.
This query is inspired by an Azure Sentinal detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://docs.microsoft.com/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adfspp/e7b9ea73-1980-4318-96a6-da559486664b
https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
Modification to domain federation settings should be rare, so confirm the added or modified target domain/URL is legitimate administrative behavior.
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying domain trust settings to subvert existing mechanisms and cause the domain to accept authorization tokens signed with actor-owned certificates. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
To understand why an authorized user may update settings for a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune, see Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune.
For details on security realms that accept security tokens, see the ADFS Proxy Protocol (MS-ADFSPP) specification: 3.2.5.1.2.4 Security Realm Data.
For further information on AuditLogs, please see Microsoft Entra ID audit activity reference.
This query is inspired by an Azure Sentinal detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://docs.microsoft.com/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adfspp/e7b9ea73-1980-4318-96a6-da559486664b
https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
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