Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
68 detections
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Detects the execution of S3 Browser or Office installation executables, followed by network traffic from the same host to known cloud storage or file-sharing sites within a short time window. This behavior aligns with Muddled Libra's method of staging and exfiltrating sensitive data, such as PST files, to adversary-controlled cloud buckets.
Detects DNS queries to domains associated with tunneling tools (Ngrok, Tailscale) and Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools (FleetDeck, TacticalRMM, Level.io, Pulseway, ScreenConnect, Splashtop, RustDesk, Atera, Remcos) known to be used by threat actors like Scattered Spider/Muddled Libra for covert persistent connectivity, remote access, and lateral movement.
Detects the execution of S3 Browser or Office installation executables, followed by network traffic from the same host to known cloud storage or file-sharing sites within a short time window. This behavior aligns with Muddled Libra's method of staging and exfiltrating sensitive data, such as PST files, to attacker-controlled cloud buckets.
Detects the execution or presence of files associated with the Muddled Libra threat actor's toolkit. This includes tools for tunneling (Chisel), Active Directory reconnaissance (ADRecon, ADExplorer), and the initial tool archive (goon.zip). The rule identifies process execution by hash, filename, or command line arguments, and file creation events for specific hashes.
Detects access to VMware virtual disk files (.vmdk). This technique was
observed being used by the Muddled Libra (Scattered Spider) threat group,
where they would power down Domain Controllers, mount their disks to a rogue
VM, and steal the NTDS.dit and SYSTEM hives for offline credential extraction.
This method bypasses security monitoring that would typically occur on the
Domain Controller itself.
observed being used by the Muddled Libra (Scattered Spider) threat group,
where they would power down Domain Controllers, mount their disks to a rogue
VM, and steal the NTDS.dit and SYSTEM hives for offline credential extraction.
This method bypasses security monitoring that would typically occur on the
Domain Controller itself.
Detects the execution of S3 Browser or Office installation executables, followed by network traffic from the same host to known cloud storage or file-sharing sites within a short time window. This behavior aligns with Muddled Libra's method of staging and exfiltrating sensitive data, such as PST files, to attacker-controlled cloud buckets.
Detects the creation of specific files ('result', 'result.kerb') in common user folders. These filenames are known artifacts of tools like GoSecretsDump used to decrypt the NTDS.dit database, a technique observed in Muddled Libra's playbook after they exfiltrate the database from a Domain Controller.
Detects the attachment of a virtual disk (.vmdk) likely belonging to a Domain Controller to another virtual machine. This technique is used by threat actors like SCATTERED SPIDER to access the Active Directory database (ntds.dit) for offline credential dumping. This is often done on a newly created, attacker-controlled VM.
Detects a user authorizing a Salesforce application via the '/setup/connect' page. This specific TTP is associated with ShinyHunters vishing campaigns where attackers impersonate IT staff and trick employees into entering a connection code, thereby granting a malicious application access to the organization's Salesforce environment.
This analytic detects the execution of tools commonly exploited by cybercriminals, such as those used for unauthorized access, network scanning, or data exfiltration. It leverages process activity data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on known attacker tool names. This activity is significant because it serves as an early warning system for potential security incidents, enabling prompt response. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further network compromise, posing a severe threat to the organization's security infrastructure.
Detects a user self-assigning access to a large number of applications in Okta within a short time frame. This behavior is associated with the threat group UNC3944 (Scattered Spider) for privilege escalation and lateral movement across SaaS applications.
Detects the execution of remote access, tunneling, and credential access tools from suspicious directories. This rule specifically targets tools commonly abused by threat actors like Scattered Spider, such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ngrok, Teleport, Tailscale, and Mimikatz, when executed from user-writable or temporary folders. It excludes legitimate installations in standard Program Files directories to reduce false positives.
MFA Fatigue Attack
Sigma
Detects a high number of failed or denied Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) attempts followed by a success for the same user account within a short time frame. This pattern, known as MFA fatigue or push bombing, is a technique actively used by threat actors like Scattered Spider to overwhelm a user with push notifications until they approve one, granting the attacker access.
Detects when a user's phone authentication method is changed or added, followed shortly by a successful MFA-based sign-in for that same user. This pattern can indicate a SIM swap attack where an adversary socially engineers a helpdesk or convinces a mobile carrier to port a user's number to an adversary-controlled SIM card. This allows the adversary to intercept MFA codes sent via SMS or phone call and gain unauthorized access.
This analytic detects DNS queries to domains associated with known remote access software such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. This detection is crucial as adversaries often use these tools to maintain access and control over compromised environments. Identifying such behavior is vital for a Security Operations Center (SOC) because unauthorized remote access can lead to data breaches, ransomware attacks, and other severe impacts if these threats are not mitigated promptly.
This analytic detects network traffic associated with known remote access software applications, such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer, as identified by Cisco Secure Firewall Application Detectors. It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Connection Events. This activity is significant because adversaries often use remote access tools to maintain unauthorized access to compromised environments. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
The analytic identifies the execution of the native mimikatz.exe binary on Windows systems, including instances where the binary is renamed. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names. This activity is significant because Mimikatz is a widely used tool for extracting authentication credentials, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to obtain sensitive credentials, escalate privileges, and move laterally within the network, leading to potential data breaches and system compromise.
Detects network communication patterns associated with Scattered Spider threat group, including known C2 domains, IP addresses, and characteristic domain patterns used for phishing and command and control operations.
The following analytic identifies command-line activity that searches for files related to password manager software, such as "*.kdbx*" and "*credential*". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant because attackers often target password manager databases to extract stored credentials, which can be used for further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, enabling attackers to escalate privileges, move laterally, or exfiltrate critical data.
KQL Query from file: Sniffing Out UNC3944 on Teams
KQL Query from file: Threat Hunting BYOVD Scenarios
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