Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

5 detections

Detects the creation of a 'BackupFiles' directory and the subsequent copying of sensitive browser artifacts (e.g., Login Data, Web Data, Local Storage) within Chrome or Edge user data paths. This activity is indicative of credential and session theft staging, specifically associated with the ToddyCat group's Umbrij malware preparation for browser exploitation.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
4 months ago
002
Detects the ToddyCat APT group's technique of using PowerShell to connect to remote hosts via SMB admin shares (C$) and steal web browser credentials. This is associated with a variant of the TomBerBil tool and is particularly significant when observed originating from a domain controller.
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Tim Peck@timpeck
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Detections.ai Community
10 months ago
103155
Detects a potential ToddyCat APT technique where a single source remotely accesses sensitive browser or DPAPI credential files on multiple hosts via SMB. This behavior is consistent with the group's TomBerBil PowerShell script used for widespread credential harvesting.
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Tim Peck@timpeck
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Detections.ai Community
11 months ago
41100
Detects the creation of a scheduled task that launches an executable from a non-standard, writable directory, which subsequently loads a co-located DLL. This pattern is a form of DLL Sideloading used for persistence and was observed in a ToddyCat APT attack.
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Ramzi Zelfani@rzelfani
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Detections.ai Community
1 year ago
193328
Detects a process launched by the Windows Task Scheduler from a non-standard directory that immediately loads a DLL from the same directory. This is a strong indicator of DLL Sideloading for persistence, as seen in campaigns by groups like ToddyCat.
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Tim Peck@timpeck
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Detections.ai Community
1 year ago
20153