Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or execution of a file named 'agt.dll' within a masqueraded 'CorsairUtil' directory, a defense evasion tactic used by the Vidar Turb00 campaign. This rule monitors both file drops (DeviceFileEvents) and DLL loads (DeviceImageLoadEvents) for the specific path and filename combination.
The following analytic detects the creation or dropping of executable or script files in the root directory of a removable drive. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on specific file types and their creation paths. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to spread malware, such as ransomware, via removable media. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, lateral movement, or persistence within the network, potentially compromising sensitive data and systems.
The analytic detects a process enabling the "SeDebugPrivilege" privilege token, leveraging Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 4703. This privilege allows a process to inspect and modify the memory of other processes, which can lead to credential dumping or code injection. The rule filters out common legitimate processes to reduce false positives. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive control over system processes, enabling privilege escalation, persistence, or access to sensitive information.
The following analytic detects the use of Regsvr32.exe to register DLLs from suspicious paths such as AppData, ProgramData, or Windows Temp directories. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because Regsvr32.exe can be abused to proxy execution of malicious code, bypassing traditional security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the creation of potentially malicious unsigned DLLs in the c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64 folders. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 logs to identify unsigned DLLs with unavailable signatures loaded in these critical directories. This activity is significant as it may indicate a DLL hijacking attempt, a technique used by attackers to gain unauthorized access and execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to privilege escalation, allowing the attacker to gain elevated privileges and further compromise the target system.
This rule detects suspicious user agent strings commonly associated with various Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups and malware families. It specifically targets patterns found in proxy logs, indicating potential command and control (C2) communications or other malicious web activity. The rule includes a broad list of user agent strings linked to specific APTs like Backspace, GrizzlySteppe, Comment Crew, Naikon, Sofacy (Xtunnel, Zebrocy), Derusbi, Winnti, APT17, Bronze Butler (Daserf), TSCookie, Delphi downloader, VPNFilter, FELIXROOT, RMS, Cmstar, KerrDown, APT33 (PowerTon), Hidden Cobra, Strong Pity, Mustang Panda, BackdoorDiplomacy, SideWalk, LitePower (WRITE), ZINC, PlugX, and RedCurl.
