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Remote registry management using REG utility from non-admin workstation
lazagne
KQL
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Ryuk ransomware. There is also a related blog.
Ryuk is human-operated ransomware. Much like DoppelPaymer ransomware, Ryuk is spread manually, often on networks that are already infected with Trickbot.
During a typical Ryuk campaign, an operator will use LaZagne, a credential theft tool, to access stored passwords for service accounts. The accounts are then used to jump from desktop clients to servers or domain controllers, allowing for better reconnaissance, faster movement, and a more severe impact on the target.
The following query detects credential theft by LaZagne.
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with Ryuk ransomware.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Ryuk&threatId=-2147232689
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne
Ryuk is human-operated ransomware. Much like DoppelPaymer ransomware, Ryuk is spread manually, often on networks that are already infected with Trickbot.
During a typical Ryuk campaign, an operator will use LaZagne, a credential theft tool, to access stored passwords for service accounts. The accounts are then used to jump from desktop clients to servers or domain controllers, allowing for better reconnaissance, faster movement, and a more severe impact on the target.
The following query detects credential theft by LaZagne.
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with Ryuk ransomware.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Ryuk&threatId=-2147232689
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne
'This composite hunting query will highlight any HTTP traffic in CommonSecurityLog web proxies (such as ZScaler) that match known patterns used by red teaming tools potentially stolen from FireEye. Most FireEye red teaming tools are designed to mimic
legitimate API activity, false positives are common. This query includes a basic check to determine how common a hostname is in you environment, and allows you to modify this threshold to remove legitimate traffic from the query results.
This query contains only a subset of potential FireEye red team tool communications, and therefore should not be relied upon alone :) .'
legitimate API activity, false positives are common. This query includes a basic check to determine how common a hostname is in you environment, and allows you to modify this threshold to remove legitimate traffic from the query results.
This query contains only a subset of potential FireEye red team tool communications, and therefore should not be relied upon alone :) .'
Use this query to locate processes executing credential theft activity, often LaZagne in ransomware compromises.
Prior to deploying Macaw ransomware in an organization, the adversary will disable several tools and functions in order to inhibit later recovery efforts.
Identifies potential service tampering related to Microsoft Defender services.
Query insprired by Azure Sentinel detection https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/MultipleDataSources/PotentialMicrosoftDefenderTampering.yaml
Query insprired by Azure Sentinel detection https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/MultipleDataSources/PotentialMicrosoftDefenderTampering.yaml
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_babyshark.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Looks for potential instances of bitlocker modifying registry settings to allow encryption, where it's executed via a .bat file.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, RDP ransomware persists as Wadhrama.
The ransomware known as Wadhrama has been used in human-operated attacks that follow a particular pattern. The attackers often use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to gain initial access to a device or network, exfiltrate credentials, and maintain persistance.
The following query checks for possible Wadhrama-related activity, by searching for attempts to establish RDP persistance via the registry.
Other techniques used by the group associated with Wadhrama are listed under See also.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Wadhrama
The ransomware known as Wadhrama has been used in human-operated attacks that follow a particular pattern. The attackers often use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to gain initial access to a device or network, exfiltrate credentials, and maintain persistance.
The following query checks for possible Wadhrama-related activity, by searching for attempts to establish RDP persistance via the registry.
Other techniques used by the group associated with Wadhrama are listed under See also.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Wadhrama
Search for processes modifying the registry to disable security features.
Identify registry modifications that is indicative of a ransom note tied to DEV-0270.
Detects the execution of `reg.exe` to modify registry keys associated with Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) settings. This includes attempts to enable/disable RDP or alter its behavior by tampering with values under `CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server`, such as those related to concurrent sessions, RDP-TCP configurations, and other connection parameters. This activity can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence, facilitate lateral movement, or otherwise manipulate RDP access.
This rule detects various system enumeration commands commonly used by adversaries for reconnaissance, as identified in a CISA "Living off the Land" report. The rule looks for the execution of utilities like `wevtutil`, `ldifde.exe`, `reg query`, `systeminfo`, `tasklist`, `whoami`, and `wmic` with specific arguments that indicate system information discovery. While these commands can be benign, their frequent or combined execution on a single host within a 15-minute window (more than 5 distinct command lines) can be indicative of malicious activity.
This rule detects suspicious command-line activity indicative of credential access or reconnaissance, as outlined in a CISA 'Living off the Land' report. Specifically, it looks for commands that attempt to list SSH known hosts, access Firefox profiles, execute Mimikatz, query OpenSSH or RealVNC registry keys, or save SAM/SYSTEM registry hives. While individual commands might be benign, their combined presence or repeated execution could signal malicious intent.
Detects the use of reg.exe to export registry paths associated with third-party credentials. Credential stealers have been known to use this technique to extract sensitive information from the registry.
The following analytic detects the use of reg.exe to modify registry keys associated with Windows services and their configurations. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to service registry keys can indicate an attempt to establish persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to control service behavior, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution or system compromise.
The following analytic detects the execution of the reg.exe process with either the "save" or "export" parameters. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because threat actors often use the "reg save" or "reg export" command to dump credentials or test registry modification capabilities on compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information stored in the registry.
The analytic detects the modification of the InProcServer32 registry key by reg.exe, indicative of potential COM hijacking. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line execution logs. COM hijacking is significant as it allows adversaries to insert malicious code that executes in place of legitimate software, providing a means for persistence. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to execute arbitrary code, disrupt legitimate system components, and maintain long-term access to the compromised environment.
This analytic identifies instances where the `reg.exe` utility is launched from a command prompt (`cmd.exe`) that was not initiated by a user, specifically when the parent process is not `explorer.exe`. This activity is significant because `reg.exe` is commonly used for registry manipulation, which can be indicative of malicious behavior such as establishing persistence mechanisms or altering system configurations. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to modify critical system settings, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access.
Detects the use of the 'reg.exe' utility to delete SafeBoot registry keys. This activity is often performed by attackers to disable security products or interfere with system recovery mechanisms, particularly in the context of defense evasion.
Detects the use of 'reg.exe' to add or copy registry keys within the 'SafeBoot' path. This activity is often associated with ransomware attempting to ensure persistence or functionality in Windows Safe Mode, potentially to bypass security products that do not operate in that mode.
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