Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
11 detections
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Correlates a successful Fortinet SSL VPN session with nltest, net, Get-AD*, AdFind, ldapsearch, WinRS, or WMIC discovery commands for the same account within forty-five minutes. This behavior can indicate an attacker establishing initial access via VPN and then performing internal reconnaissance.
Detects the creation of the XWorm specific mutex 'HOHE6S8FaZZlGf0f'. This mutex is known to be used by the XWorm malware to ensure only a single instance of itself is running on a system.
Detects the execution of 'WinSc32.exe' from the user's temporary directory (AppData\Local\Temp), which is an indicator of the XWorm malware dropper activity.
This rule detects activities associated with the XWorm LATAM campaign. It identifies network indicators such as specific C2 domains (jholycf100.ddns.com.br, voulerlivros.com.br, res.cloudinary.com), a specific IP address (152.249.17.145), and a destination port (7000). It also looks for the abuse of CasPol.exe making outbound connections to the identified C2 infrastructure. Furthermore, the rule detects PowerShell processes spawned by WMI (WmiPrvSE.exe) that attempt to fetch content from Cloudinary and load assemblies in memory, indicating potential in-memory execution. Finally, it includes a specific SHA256 file hash (7befeacf0b3480fb675d0cab7767b5b9697edc9d0e05982025a06ead0054afd5) associated with the campaign.
Detects network and endpoint activity associated with the XWorm LATAM campaign, including C2 communication, payload downloads, CasPol.exe making outbound connections, WMI-spawned PowerShell with Cloudinary fetches and Assembly.Load, and a specific file hash.
Detects a low-noise XWorm execution chain described by ANY.RUN where WmiPrvSE.exe spawns PowerShell that uses WebClient to fetch Cloudinary-hosted content and performs in-memory Assembly.Load.
Detects XWorm LATAM campaign artifacts via published SHA256 and unique network/mutex markers from ANY.RUN analysis.
Detects XWorm V6 adding update.vbs to the Run registry key in APPDATA or TEMP directories
The analytic identifies instances where the PowerShell executable has been renamed and executed under an alternate filename. This behavior is commonly associated with attempts to evade security controls or bypass logging mechanisms that monitor standard PowerShell usage. While rare in legitimate environments, renamed PowerShell binaries are frequently observed in malicious campaigns leveraging Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) and fileless malware techniques. This detection flags executions of PowerShell where the process name does not match the default powershell.exe or pwsh.exe, especially when invoked from unusual paths or accompanied by suspicious command-line arguments.
Detects outbound network connections to the Telegram API, a technique used by XWorm for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration. The rule specifically looks for connections to "api.telegram.org/bot" and "/sendMessage" paths, originating from suspicious processes like WmiPrvSE.exe or Soundman.exe, or from common user-writable locations.
Detects network connections to known XWorm Command and Control (C2) infrastructure (IPs and domains) and the creation of processes with filenames associated with XWorm malware. This rule combines network and process-based indicators to identify potential XWorm infections.