Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
159 detections
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Matanbuchus 3.0 Scheduled Task Creation
Cortex XDR
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'Update Tracker Task' using either 'schtasks.exe' or PowerShell cmdlets ('Register-ScheduledTask', 'New-ScheduledTask'). This specific task name has been associated with matanbuchus 3.0 loader.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'WindowsHelper', which is used by Operation HumanitarianBait for persistence to launch its Python implant every 5 minutes. This rule specifically looks for command-line executions of 'schtasks.exe' or commands containing 'schtasks' that include '/create' and the task name 'WindowsHelper'.
Matanbuchus 3.0 Scheduled Task Creation
Cortex XDR
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'Update Tracker Task' using either 'schtasks.exe' or PowerShell cmdlets ('Register-ScheduledTask', 'New-ScheduledTask'). This specific task name has been associated with the Matanbuchus 3.0 loader.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdate' that leverages PowerShell to download and execute a payload. This technique was observed in an Iranian-Nexus operation against Oman's government.
This rule detects various activities associated with CloudZ and Pheno malware, including persistence mechanisms via scheduled tasks, execution of .NET loaders (regasm.exe), payload downloads using common utilities (curl, powershell, bitsadmin) from known staging patterns, reconnaissance artifacts, and network connections to known CloudZ infrastructure.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named "Recovery Diagnostics" that executes PowerShell scripts from the C:\Users\Public directory. This specific technique has been observed being used by threat actors as a persistence and execution mechanism during INC ransomware staging to trigger base64-encoded PowerShell payloads for data exfiltration.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' with specific command-line arguments that indicate an attempt to establish persistence. The rule looks for 'schtasks.exe' creating a task named 'Runtime Broker' that executes a program from a suspicious path within 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Runtime\'. This pattern is often used by adversaries to maintain access to a system.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks with names specifically identified in the Bitdefender APT36 Vibeware report. These task names are used by APT36 to maintain persistence for their malware, often disguised as legitimate system processes.
Detects the creation or modification of scheduled tasks using 'schtasks.exe' where the task is configured to run under 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM' or 'NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE' (represented as 'SYSTEM' or 'NT AUT' in the command line), but the initiating process is not a standard system process. This can indicate an attempt to establish persistence or elevate privileges.
This rule detects the creation or modification of scheduled tasks using specific names identified in the Bitdefender APT36 Vibeware report. The rule looks for `schtasks.exe` executions where the command line contains one of the following task names: "MicrosoftEdgesUpdatesTasksMachineUAs-Task", "MicrosoftEdgesUpdatesTasksMachineUAs-1234-87hy", "DateAndTimeService", "personalServiceTask", or "LuminousBackupService". This helps identify campaign-specific persistence mechanisms used by APT36 Vibeware.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task designed to execute a VBScript from a temporary or user-specific directory. This technique is used by the Dead#Vax malware to establish persistence with a layer of indirection, avoiding direct PowerShell execution from the task itself.
Detects suspicious creation of scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe using elevated accounts (Administrator, SYSTEM, NT AUTHORITY), excluding local host targets.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using 'schtasks /create' that include suspicious command-line arguments often associated with malicious activity, such as PowerShell execution, web requests (Invoke-WebRequest, curl, wget, bitsadmin), or script execution (.ps1, .vbs, .js). This rule aims to identify persistence mechanisms or initial access attempts.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility with the '/Create' argument. This can indicate an adversary establishing persistence or scheduling malicious activity.
This rule detects the presence of the 'schtasks /change' command within the HTTP response body. This could indicate an attacker modifying scheduled tasks on a compromised Windows system, potentially for persistence, privilege escalation, or lateral movement. The detection specifically looks for 'schtasks' and '/change' followed by '/tn' (task name) in a case-insensitive manner within HTTP responses with a 200 status code.
This rule detects the presence of the 'schtasks /query' command within the HTTP response body. This could indicate an attacker enumerating scheduled tasks on a compromised system, potentially as part of reconnaissance or lateral movement activities. The rule specifically looks for 'schtasks' and '/query' (case-insensitive) in HTTP responses with a 200 status code.
This rule detects the presence of the 'schtasks /create' command within the HTTP response body. This could indicate an adversary attempting to schedule tasks on a compromised system by delivering the command via an HTTP response, potentially for persistence or execution.
This rule detects the string "schtasks" followed by "/end" and then "/tn" within the HTTP response body. This pattern indicates that a client is receiving a response that contains a command to end a scheduled task using the `schtasks` utility. This could be part of a command-and-control communication or a lateral movement attempt where an adversary is managing scheduled tasks on a compromised system.
This rule detects the presence of 'schtasks' followed by '/delete' and '/tn' (task name) in the HTTP response body with a 200 status code. This could indicate an attacker attempting to delete scheduled tasks on a compromised Windows system, potentially to remove forensic evidence or disrupt legitimate operations. The detection is case-insensitive and uses a PCRE to match the specific command structure.
This rule detects HTTP responses (status code 200) that contain the string 'schtasks' followed by '/run' and '/tn' (case-insensitive) in the response body. This pattern indicates the potential for a client system to receive instructions to execute a scheduled task, which could be used for persistence, lateral movement, or other malicious activities.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks by user accounts via the "schtasks" utility.
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