Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
11 detections
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The analytic detects a PowerShell script that enumerates camera devices on the targeted host. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for commands querying Win32_PnPEntity for camera-related information. This activity is significant as it is commonly observed in DCRat malware, which collects camera data to send to its command-and-control server. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to gather sensitive visual information from the host, potentially leading to privacy breaches or further exploitation.
Detects in-memory shellcode execution chains associated with BeepRAT and DcRAT. This includes the use of TCC (Tiny C Compiler) with specific flags for in-memory execution and LuaJIT FFI calls used to invoke Windows kernel functions (VirtualAlloc/CreateThread) for shellcode injection.
This detection identifies outbound network traffic to domains, IP addresses, or a specific port known to be associated with the PHALT#BLYX campaign's infrastructure. The campaign uses these for malware delivery and DCRat command and control (C2). The rule specifically looks for connections to known malicious IPs or domains, or connections on port 3535 (used by DCRat) originating from processes associated with the malware (staxs.exe, tybd7.exe, aspnet_compiler.exe).
The analytic identifies instances where the Windows Explorer process (explorer.exe) is executed with a URL in its command line. This behavior is uncommon and suspicious, as adversaries may abuse explorer.exe to open URLs with the default browser to download and execute malicious payloads. This detection leverages process execution logs from EDR agents.
The analytic detects a PowerShell script that enumerates camera devices on the targeted host. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for commands querying Win32_PnPEntity for camera-related information. This activity is significant as it is commonly observed in DCRat malware, which collects camera data to send to its command-and-control server. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to gather sensitive visual information from the host, potentially leading to privacy breaches or further exploitation.
This query checks for specific processes and domain TLD used in the CVE-2018-4878 flash 0day exploit attack reported by KrCERT.
CVE: CVE-2018-4878.
Read more here:.
Https://www.krcert.or.kr/data/secNoticeView.do?bulletin_writing_sequence=26998.
Https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsa18-01.html.
Http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/group-123-goes-wild.html.
Http://blog.morphisec.com/flash-exploit-cve-2018-4878-spotted-in-the-wild-massive-malspam-campaign.
Tags: #exploit #CVE-2018-4878 #0day #Korea #Flash.
CVE: CVE-2018-4878.
Read more here:.
Https://www.krcert.or.kr/data/secNoticeView.do?bulletin_writing_sequence=26998.
Https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsa18-01.html.
Http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/group-123-goes-wild.html.
Http://blog.morphisec.com/flash-exploit-cve-2018-4878-spotted-in-the-wild-massive-malspam-campaign.
Tags: #exploit #CVE-2018-4878 #0day #Korea #Flash.
This query was originally published in a threat analytics report about the group known to other security researchers as APT32 or OceanLotus
This tracked activity group uses a wide array of malicious documents to conduct attacks. Some of their favorite techniques include sideloading dynamic link libraries, and disguising payloads as image files. The group has weaponized files with exploits for the following vulnerabilities:
1. CVE-2017-11882 - Software update
2. CVE-2017-0199 - Software update
The following query detects known malicious files associated with the group's campaigns.
See Detect malicious network activity associated with group known as "OceanLotus" for another query related to this group's activity.
This tracked activity group uses a wide array of malicious documents to conduct attacks. Some of their favorite techniques include sideloading dynamic link libraries, and disguising payloads as image files. The group has weaponized files with exploits for the following vulnerabilities:
1. CVE-2017-11882 - Software update
2. CVE-2017-0199 - Software update
The following query detects known malicious files associated with the group's campaigns.
See Detect malicious network activity associated with group known as "OceanLotus" for another query related to this group's activity.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Windows 7 zero-day for CVE-2019-0808
CVE-2019-0808 is a vulnerability that allows an attacker to escape the Windows security sandbox and run arbitrary code with admin privileges. This vulnerability affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2.
Exploits for CVE-2019-0808 were first observed as part of highly selective attacks using the Nufsys backdoor. Although the Nufsys-associated exploit was first described as a zero-day, the issue has since been patched.
The following query detects possible CVE-2019-0808 exploitation by finding suspicious file creation events associated with Nufsys.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0808
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0808
CVE-2019-0808 is a vulnerability that allows an attacker to escape the Windows security sandbox and run arbitrary code with admin privileges. This vulnerability affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2.
Exploits for CVE-2019-0808 were first observed as part of highly selective attacks using the Nufsys backdoor. Although the Nufsys-associated exploit was first described as a zero-day, the issue has since been patched.
The following query detects possible CVE-2019-0808 exploitation by finding suspicious file creation events associated with Nufsys.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0808
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0808
The following analytic detects the execution of a DCRat "forkbomb" payload, which spawns multiple cmd.exe processes that launch notepad.exe instances in quick succession. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on the rapid creation of cmd.exe and notepad.exe processes within a 30-second window. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential DCRat infection, a known Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with destructive capabilities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to system instability, resource exhaustion, and potential disruption of services.
The analytic identifies the use of the w32tm.exe utility with specific command-line arguments (/stripchart, /computer:localhost, /period:, /dataonly, /samples:). This combination of arguments is indicative of DCRat malware delaying its payload execution to evade detection. The detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to monitor process creation events and their associated command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to evade detection by delaying malicious actions such as C2 communication and beaconing, potentially allowing an attacker to maintain persistence and execute further malicious activities undetected.
This rule detects the execution of various known hacktools on Linux systems by monitoring process creation events and matching against a predefined list of tool names in the 'Image' field. The tools covered include C2 frameworks (e.g., Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Havoc, Merlin, Sliver), network scanners (e.g., Nmap derivatives, Nuclei, Recon-ng), web enumeration tools (e.g., Dirb, Ffuf, Gobuster), web vulnerability scanners (e.g., Nikto, WPSCan), and other exploit/post-exploitation tools (e.g., Aircrack-ng, Bloodhound-Python, Hashcat, Hydra, John, SQLMap, PEASS-ng).
