Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the presence of known Chaos ransomware samples by matching their SHA256 hashes against process execution events and file events. If a process with a matching hash is executed or a file with a matching hash is observed, an alert will be triggered.
This rule detects the presence of known Chaos ransomware samples by matching their SHA256 hashes against process execution events and file events. If a process with a matching hash is executed or a file with a matching hash is observed, an alert will be triggered.
Detects process execution events containing command-line arguments unique to Chaos ransomware execution, such as 'ignorar_arquivos_grandes' or 'work_mode'. It also includes a more generic detection for 'lkey' and 'path' arguments used together to reduce false positives.
This rule detects the presence of known Chaos ransomware samples by matching their SHA256 hashes against process execution events and file events. If a process with a matching hash is executed or a file with a matching hash is observed, an alert will be triggered.
Detects the execution of legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools, such as AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, OptiTuneAgent, and SplashtopStreamer, when initiated from non-standard directories (outside 'C:\Program Files') or by command-line shells (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe). This behavior is often abused by threat actors, including groups like Chaos RaaS, for persistence and remote access.
This analytic detects the creation of URL shortcut files (.url) outside of common, legitimate directories. Such activity is often associated with malware, including ransomware like CHAOS. Malicious .url files can be used to trick users into visiting harmful websites or, if placed in specific locations (e.g., Windows Startup folder), can achieve persistence and execute malicious code upon system reboot, leading to system compromise and data loss.
The following analytic detects the creation of files in the Windows %startup% folder, a common persistence technique. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify file creation events in this specific directory. This activity is significant because adversaries often use the startup folder to ensure their malicious code executes automatically upon system boot or user logon. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence on the host, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.
The following analytic detects the creation or dropping of executable or script files in the root directory of a removable drive. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on specific file types and their creation paths. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to spread malware, such as ransomware, via removable media. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, lateral movement, or persistence within the network, potentially compromising sensitive data and systems.
This rule detects the presence of known Chaos ransomware samples by matching their SHA256 hashes against process execution events and file events. If a process with a matching hash is executed or a file with a matching hash is observed, an alert will be triggered.
Detects Chaos C++ ransomware payloads based on known file hashes and unique embedded strings from the malware.
Detects the use of GoodSync command-line tools for data exfiltration, a TTP associated with the Chaos ransomware group. The rule looks for suspicious command-line patterns, including masquerading as wininit.exe.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell command patterns associated with the Chaos ransomware group. These commands are used for environment setup, preparing for large file downloads, and remote command execution.
The following analytic detects the execution of wbadmin.exe with flags that delete backup files, specifically targeting catalog or system state backups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by ransomware to prevent recovery by deleting system backups. If confirmed malicious, this action could severely hinder recovery efforts, leading to prolonged downtime and potential data loss.