Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
15 detections
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Detects network traffic patterns characteristic of the EternalBlue (MS17-010) exploit targeting the SMBv1 protocol. Specifically, it monitors for a malformed SESSION_SETUP request containing an unusually large payload, which is indicative of an attempt to trigger a buffer overflow in the SMB service.
Detects network traffic attempting to exploit the SMBv1 vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144), commonly known as EternalBlue. The rule monitors for specific SMB Trans2 SESSION_SETUP packet structures associated with this remote code execution exploit.
Detects network exploitation attempts targeting the SMBv1 protocol using the EternalBlue vulnerability (MS17-010). This vulnerability was famously exploited by the WannaCry and NotPetya ransomware to propagate across networks.
Detects network exploitation attempts targeting the SMBv1 protocol using the EternalBlue vulnerability (MS17-010). This vulnerability was famously exploited by the WannaCry and NotPetya ransomware to propagate across networks.
Detects network traffic attempting to exploit the SMBv1 vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144), commonly known as EternalBlue. The rule monitors for specific SMB Trans2 SESSION_SETUP packet structures associated with this remote code execution exploit.
Detects network traffic indicative of the EternalBlue (MS17-010) exploit attempt against SMBv1 services. The rule specifically looks for SMB packets with transaction command patterns associated with this exploit, which was commonly used by the WannaCry ransomware.
Detects network traffic indicative of the EternalBlue (MS17-010) exploit attempt against SMBv1 services. The rule specifically looks for SMB packets with transaction command patterns associated with this exploit, which was commonly used by the WannaCry ransomware.
EternalBlue SMB Exploit Attempt
Suricata
This rule detects attempts to exploit the EternalBlue vulnerability over SMB (Server Message Block) protocol. It specifically looks for a sequence of bytes indicative of the exploit payload within the SMB traffic.
This rule detects activity associated with the WannaCry ransomware. It specifically looks for the creation of processes with image names commonly used by WannaCry variants (e.g., 'tasksche.exe', 'mssecsvc.exe', 'WanaDecryptor' in the image path) or command lines containing the WannaCry ransom note filename ('@Please_Read_Me@.txt').
KQL Query from file: Hunting Rogue Endpoints via SMB Detection
Snip3 is a family of related remote access trojans. Although the malware in this family contain numerous small variations, they all exhibit similar behaviors and techniques.
The following query looks for a function call to a method named DetectSandboxie. This method is used in RevengeRAT and AsyncRAT instances involved in a campaign targeting the aviation industry, first observed in 2021. It has also been associated in the past other malware, such as WannaCry and QuasarRAT. Individual PowerShell functions can be detected in the same way in some instances, though care should be taken to ensure that the command name is unique -- otherwise, this query may return many false positives.
The following query looks for a function call to a method named DetectSandboxie. This method is used in RevengeRAT and AsyncRAT instances involved in a campaign targeting the aviation industry, first observed in 2021. It has also been associated in the past other malware, such as WannaCry and QuasarRAT. Individual PowerShell functions can be detected in the same way in some instances, though care should be taken to ensure that the command name is unique -- otherwise, this query may return many false positives.
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports ransomware. This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place. The rule specifically looks for signatures containing common ransomware family names and keywords.
This rule detects DNS queries for specific domains associated with the WannaCry ransomware killswitch. The presence of these queries indicates a potential WannaCry infection attempting to resolve its killswitch domain. If the domain resolves, the ransomware may cease its encryption activities.
This rule detects the WannaCry ransomware based on specific byte patterns found within the executable. It checks for a valid PE header and then matches a combination of byte sequences at the entry point and various other locations within the binary, indicative of WannaCry's code.
Yara rule that detects WannaCry ransomware.