Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
19 detections
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Detects file and process activity associated with the Hermes ransomware, specifically targeting the presence of 'SOUL.md' files, '.hermes' file paths, and the 'HERMES_DISABLE_SAFETY=1' command-line argument.
Detects potential Ryuk ransomware activity by looking for specific command-line patterns. This includes attempts to establish persistence via the Run registry key, deletion of backup files, and stopping critical services using 'net stop' commands.
The analytic detects the use of Wake-on-LAN commands associated with Ryuk ransomware. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process and command-line activities. This behavior is significant as Ryuk ransomware uses Wake-on-LAN to power on devices in a compromised network, increasing its encryption success rate. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to widespread ransomware encryption across multiple endpoints, causing significant operational disruption and data loss. Immediate isolation and thorough investigation of the affected endpoints are crucial to mitigate the impact.
The following analytic detects the creation, modification, or enabling of scheduled tasks with known suspicious or malicious task names. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, 4700, and 4702 to identify when such tasks are registered, modified, or enabled. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
The following analytic identifies processes running from %temp% directory file paths. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process paths within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant because adversaries often use unconventional file paths to execute malicious code without requiring administrative privileges. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to bypass security controls, leading to unauthorized software execution, potential system compromise, and further malicious activities within the environment.
The following analytic detects unusual Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) traffic on TCP/3389 by filtering out known RDP sources and destinations, focusing on atypical connections within the network. This detection leverages network traffic data to identify potentially unauthorized RDP access. Monitoring this activity is crucial for a SOC as unauthorized RDP access can indicate an attacker's attempt to control networked systems, leading to data theft, ransomware deployment, or further network compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in significant data breaches or complete system and network control loss.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Ryuk ransomware. There is also a related blog.
Ryuk is human-operated ransomware. Much like DoppelPaymer ransomware, Ryuk is spread manually, often on networks that are already infected with Trickbot.
During the earliest stages of a Ryuk infection, an operator downloads Cobalt Strike, a penetration testing kit that is also used by malicious actors. Cobalt Strike is used by Ryuk operators to explore the network before deploying the Ryuk payload. This malicious behavior is often obscured by Base64 encoding and other tricks.
The following query detects possible invocation of Cobalt Strike using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with Ryuk ransomware.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Ryuk&threatId=-2147232689
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://www.cobaltstrike.com/
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmi-start-page
Ryuk is human-operated ransomware. Much like DoppelPaymer ransomware, Ryuk is spread manually, often on networks that are already infected with Trickbot.
During the earliest stages of a Ryuk infection, an operator downloads Cobalt Strike, a penetration testing kit that is also used by malicious actors. Cobalt Strike is used by Ryuk operators to explore the network before deploying the Ryuk payload. This malicious behavior is often obscured by Base64 encoding and other tricks.
The following query detects possible invocation of Cobalt Strike using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with Ryuk ransomware.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Ryuk&threatId=-2147232689
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://www.cobaltstrike.com/
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmi-start-page
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Ryuk ransomware. There is also a related blog.
Ryuk is human-operated ransomware. Much like DoppelPaymer ransomware, Ryuk is spread manually, often on networks that are already infected with Trickbot.
Ryuk operators use PsExec to manually spread the ransomware to other devices.
The following query detects remote file creation events that might indicate an active attack.
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with Ryuk ransomware.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Ryuk&threatId=-2147232689
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/psexec
Ryuk is human-operated ransomware. Much like DoppelPaymer ransomware, Ryuk is spread manually, often on networks that are already infected with Trickbot.
Ryuk operators use PsExec to manually spread the ransomware to other devices.
The following query detects remote file creation events that might indicate an active attack.
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with Ryuk ransomware.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Ryuk&threatId=-2147232689
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/psexec
lazagne
KQL
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Ryuk ransomware. There is also a related blog.
Ryuk is human-operated ransomware. Much like DoppelPaymer ransomware, Ryuk is spread manually, often on networks that are already infected with Trickbot.
During a typical Ryuk campaign, an operator will use LaZagne, a credential theft tool, to access stored passwords for service accounts. The accounts are then used to jump from desktop clients to servers or domain controllers, allowing for better reconnaissance, faster movement, and a more severe impact on the target.
The following query detects credential theft by LaZagne.
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with Ryuk ransomware.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Ryuk&threatId=-2147232689
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne
Ryuk is human-operated ransomware. Much like DoppelPaymer ransomware, Ryuk is spread manually, often on networks that are already infected with Trickbot.
During a typical Ryuk campaign, an operator will use LaZagne, a credential theft tool, to access stored passwords for service accounts. The accounts are then used to jump from desktop clients to servers or domain controllers, allowing for better reconnaissance, faster movement, and a more severe impact on the target.
The following query detects credential theft by LaZagne.
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with Ryuk ransomware.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Ryuk&threatId=-2147232689
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/
https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports ransomware. This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place. The rule specifically looks for signatures containing common ransomware family names and keywords.
This analytic detects executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This behavior is significant as it is commonly used by tools like PsExec/PaExec for staging binaries before creating and starting services on remote endpoints, a technique often employed for lateral movement and remote code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially compromising additional systems within the network.
The following analytic identifies the presence of files containing the keyword "Ryuk" in any folder on the C drive, indicative of Ryuk ransomware activity. It leverages the Endpoint Filesystem data model to detect file paths matching this pattern. This activity is significant as Ryuk ransomware is known for its destructive impact, encrypting critical files and demanding ransom. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to significant data loss, operational disruption, and financial damage due to ransom payments and recovery efforts. Immediate investigation and response are crucial to mitigate potential damage.
The following analytic detects the stopping of the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) service via command-line, typically using the "net stop samss" command. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because stopping the SAM service can disrupt authentication mechanisms and is often associated with ransomware attacks like Ryuk. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential system-wide compromise.
The analytic detects the modification of the Windows Registry key "DisableAntiSpyware" being set to disable. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Ryuk ransomware infections, indicating potential malicious intent to disable Windows Defender. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to disable critical security defenses, facilitating further malicious activities such as data encryption, exfiltration, or additional system compromise.
The following analytic detects the execution of wbadmin.exe with flags that delete backup files, specifically targeting catalog or system state backups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by ransomware to prevent recovery by deleting system backups. If confirmed malicious, this action could severely hinder recovery efforts, leading to prolonged downtime and potential data loss.
Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using Net.EXE. This rule identifies attempts to enumerate local or domain groups and accounts, specifically looking for commands that list members of sensitive groups like 'domain admins' or 'enterprise admins', or general account information. It filters out commands that are used to add users or groups to reduce false positives. The rule also includes checks for common administrative group names in multiple languages.
This YARA rule detects the Ryuk ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns related to its file encryption routines, file discovery mechanisms, and remote connection capabilities. The rule looks for distinct sequences of bytes ($encrypt_files_p*, $find_files_p*, $remote_connection) that are characteristic of Ryuk's malicious operations. The rule requires all parts of the encryption and file finding patterns, as well as the remote connection pattern, to be present for a match.
Yara rule that detects Hermes ransomware.
Yara rule that detects Ryuk ransomware.