Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the execution of command-line parameters commonly associated with REVIL ransomware, such as "-nolan", "-nolocal", "-fast", and "-full". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. This activity is significant because these parameters are indicative of ransomware attempting to encrypt files on a compromised machine. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering critical files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption.
Detects specific command-line patterns and process image paths associated with the REvil ransomware group's attack on Kaseya VSA. The rule looks for execution of 'cert.exe' and 'MsMpEng.exe' from unusual paths, as well as specific file deletion commands and references to 'Kaseya VSA Agent Hot-fix' and 'agent.exe'/'agent.crt' in 'kworking' or 'kworking1' directories, which were observed during the Kaseya supply chain incident.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by WmiPrvSE.exe, which is often abused by adversaries for execution and defense evasion. The rule specifically looks for common Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBINs) and scripting interpreters being launched by WmiPrvSE, including certutil, cscript, mshta, msiexec, regsvr32, rundll32, verclsid, wscript, and cmd.exe with specific command-line arguments related to scripting or LOLBINs.
Detects the execution of the Rclone utility, which is often used by ransomware strains like REvil, Conti, and FiveHands for data exfiltration to cloud storage services. The rule looks for specific command-line arguments and image names associated with Rclone.
This rule detects suspicious execution of WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line) by Microsoft Office applications. Adversaries often leverage Office applications as an initial execution vector and then use LOLBINs (Living Off the Land Binaries) like WMIC to proxy execution, break parent-child process chains, and evade detection. Specifically, this rule looks for Office processes (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, etc.) spawning `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments indicative of process creation and execution of other suspicious LOLBINs such as `regsvr32`, `rundll32`, `msiexec`, `mshta`, `verclsid`, `wscript`, or `cscript`.
Detects the deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies using PowerShell with WMI (Get-WmiObject/Get-CimInstance) or CIM (Remove-WmiObject/Remove-CimInstance) commands. This technique is commonly employed by ransomware families like Sodinokibi/REvil to prevent system recovery.
Detects the execution of a renamed MegaSync.exe, which has been observed in use by ransomware families such as Nefilim, Sodinokibi (REvil), Pysa, and Conti. The rule specifically looks for processes where the original filename metadata is 'megasync.exe' but the executed image path does not end with '\megasync.exe', indicating a renaming event.
This YARA rule detects various versions of the GandCrab ransomware family by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its core functionalities. These functionalities include establishing remote connections, encrypting files, searching for files to encrypt, and enumerating antivirus processes to evade detection. The rule uses multiple sets of signatures to cover different versions and obfuscation techniques of GandCrab, ensuring a broad detection capability. The presence of these combined byte patterns within a Windows executable (MZ header check) indicates a high probability of GandCrab ransomware infection.
This YARA rule detects the Revil ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its file searching, encryption, remote connection, and resource enumeration functionalities. The rule looks for distinct sequences of bytes within executable files that are characteristic of Revil's operations, including functions for searching files to encrypt, performing the encryption itself, establishing remote connections (likely for command and control or data exfiltration), and enumerating system resources.
Yara rule that detects Revil ransomware.
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