Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic identifies the execution of `adfind.exe` standalone or with specific command-line arguments related to Active Directory queries. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and parent Processes. This activity is significant because `adfind.exe` is a powerful tool often used by threat actors like Wizard Spider and FIN6 to gather sensitive AD information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the AD environment, facilitating further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.
Detects frequent execution of common Active Directory enumeration tools (such as BloodHound/SharpHound, AdFind) and suspicious LDAP attribute queries targeting sensitive AD information (e.g., group membership, service principal names). The rule triggers when an individual user performs more than three such operations within the aggregation window.
Detects reconnaissance activity targeting Active Directory infrastructure using common discovery tools such as AdFind, BloodHound/SharpHound, dsquery, nltest, and native net commands. The rule identifies suspicious patterns by correlating multiple executions or flagging the use of known adversarial enumeration binaries, monitoring for commands that specifically target domain domain-wide information, trust relationships, or domain groups.
Detects the execution of common command-line utilities (net.exe, dsquery.exe, AdFind.exe) used to query Active Directory for user information. This pattern is characteristic of adversary discovery activities targeting domain user accounts and group memberships. The rule filters out processes launched by Microsoft-signed binaries to reduce noise.
Detects the execution of common command-line utilities (net.exe, dsquery.exe, AdFind.exe) used to query Active Directory for user information. This pattern is characteristic of adversary discovery activities targeting domain user accounts and group memberships. The rule filters out processes launched by Microsoft-signed binaries to reduce noise.
Detects the execution of known Active Directory enumeration tools such as AdFind and BloodHound/SharpHound, or manual net group domain queries, executed on hosts that may lack standard EDR instrumentation. This pattern is commonly associated with adversary lateral movement and reconnaissance in ransomware affiliate operations.
Detects the execution of known Active Directory enumeration tools (BloodHound/SharpHound, AdFind) and command-line techniques (net group /domain, PowerView cmdlets) that are frequently associated with reconnaissance activities by threat actors like Akira affiliates, particularly when initiated from non-standard or unmanaged endpoints.
This rule detects post-VPN discovery or lateral movement activities by monitoring network connections initiated by specific command-line tools. It targets the use of utilities like PowerShell, cmd, net, nltest, adfind, ldapsearch, wmic, or winrs to interact with many internal systems, which could indicate an attacker performing reconnaissance or moving laterally within the network after gaining initial access, potentially via a compromised VPN.
This rule detects post-VPN discovery or lateral movement activities by monitoring network connections initiated by specific command-line tools. It targets the use of utilities like PowerShell, cmd, net, nltest, adfind, ldapsearch, wmic, or winrs to interact with many internal systems, which could indicate an attacker performing reconnaissance or moving laterally within the network after gaining initial access, potentially via a compromised VPN.
Attackers can use Adfind which is administrative tool to gather information about Domain controllers, ADFS Servers. They may also rename executables with other benign tools on the system.
Below query will look for adfind usage in commandline arguments irrespective of executable name in short span of time. You can limit query this to your DC and ADFS servers.
Below references talk about suspicious use of adfind by adversaries.
- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Below query will look for adfind usage in commandline arguments irrespective of executable name in short span of time. You can limit query this to your DC and ADFS servers.
Below references talk about suspicious use of adfind by adversaries.
- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Attackers can use Adfind which is administrative tool to gather information about domain controllers or ADFS servers. They may also rename executables with other benign tools on the system.
The below query will look for Adfind usage in command line arguments irrespective of executable name in short span of time. You can limit query this to your DC and ADFS servers.
Below references talk about suspicious use of adfind by adversaries.
1. AdFind Recon
2. Navigating the MAZE: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Associated With MAZE Ransomware Incidents
3. Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers
This query is inspired by a Azure Sentinel detection.
The below query will look for Adfind usage in command line arguments irrespective of executable name in short span of time. You can limit query this to your DC and ADFS servers.
Below references talk about suspicious use of adfind by adversaries.
1. AdFind Recon
2. Navigating the MAZE: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Associated With MAZE Ransomware Incidents
3. Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers
This query is inspired by a Azure Sentinel detection.
'Identifies the host and account that executed AdFind by hash and filename in addition to common and unique flags that are used by many threat actors in discovery.
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimProcessEvent)'
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimProcessEvent)'
Detects Active Directory enumeration activity using the AdFind tool with specific command-line flags to discover password policies, enumerate Active Directory administrators, or enumerate Exchange AD objects. This activity is often associated with reconnaissance phases of an attack.
Detects the execution of the AdFind.exe utility, which is commonly used for reconnaissance in Active Directory environments. The rule identifies AdFind.exe by its image name, original filename, and specific IMPHASH values.
Detects the execution of AdFind.exe, a legitimate command-line tool often used by adversaries for Active Directory reconnaissance. The rule specifically looks for renamed AdFind executables by checking for specific command-line arguments and known ImpHashes, while excluding executions of the original 'AdFind.exe' name.
The following analytic identifies the execution of `adfind.exe` with specific command-line arguments related to Active Directory queries. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and parent processes. This activity is significant because `adfind.exe` is a powerful tool often used by threat actors like Wizard Spider and FIN6 to gather sensitive AD information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the AD environment, facilitating further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.
This rule detects highly relevant antivirus events in the Windows Application log by looking for specific keywords associated with known virus signatures, malware, and offensive security tools. It aims to identify instances where an antivirus product has detected or quarantined malicious software or activity.
Detects the execution of AdFind with command-line flags commonly associated with reconnaissance activities during attacks. AdFind is a legitimate tool that can be abused by adversaries to gather extensive information about Active Directory environments, including domain trusts, user accounts, computer objects, and group policies.