Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic identifies the execution of the Windows built-in tool FSUTIL with the "FSINFO" or "Volume" parameters, in order to discover file system and disk information. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. Monitoring this activity is significant because FSUTIL can be abused by adversaries to gather detailed information about the file system, aiding in further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to map the file system, identify valuable data, and plan subsequent actions such as privilege escalation or persistence.
'The query looks for source code files being modified immediately after a build process is started. The purpose of this is to look for malicious code injection during the build process.
More details: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/monitoring-the-software-supply-chain-with-azure-sentinel/ba-p/2176463'
More details: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure-sentinel/monitoring-the-software-supply-chain-with-azure-sentinel/ba-p/2176463'
'This query detects instances where an attacker has gained the ability to execute code on an ADFS Server through remote WMI Execution.
In order to use this query you need to be collecting Sysmon EventIDs 19, 20, and 21.
If you do not have Sysmon data in your workspace this query will raise an error stating:
Failed to resolve scalar expression named "[@Name]"
For more on how WMI was used in Solorigate see https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/.
The query contains some features from the following detections to look for potentially malicious ADFS activity. See them for more details.
- ADFS Key Export (Sysmon): https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/ADFSKeyExportSysmon.yaml
- ADFS DKM Master Key Export: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/ADFS-DKM-MasterKey-Export.yaml'
In order to use this query you need to be collecting Sysmon EventIDs 19, 20, and 21.
If you do not have Sysmon data in your workspace this query will raise an error stating:
Failed to resolve scalar expression named "[@Name]"
For more on how WMI was used in Solorigate see https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/.
The query contains some features from the following detections to look for potentially malicious ADFS activity. See them for more details.
- ADFS Key Export (Sysmon): https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/ADFSKeyExportSysmon.yaml
- ADFS DKM Master Key Export: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/ADFS-DKM-MasterKey-Export.yaml'
Attackers can use Adfind which is administrative tool to gather information about Domain controllers, ADFS Servers. They may also rename executables with other benign tools on the system.
Below query will look for adfind usage in commandline arguments irrespective of executable name in short span of time. You can limit query this to your DC and ADFS servers.
Below references talk about suspicious use of adfind by adversaries.
- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Below query will look for adfind usage in commandline arguments irrespective of executable name in short span of time. You can limit query this to your DC and ADFS servers.
Below references talk about suspicious use of adfind by adversaries.
- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
This query will show rare firewall rule changes using netsh utility by comparing rule names and program names from the previous day
with those from the historical chosen time frame.
- This technique was seen in relation to Solarigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
- The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but
if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it.
- Note also that the queries use the KQL "has_all" operator, which hasn't yet been documented officially, but will be soon.
In short, "has_all" will only match when the referenced field has all strings in the list.
Refer to netsh syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/netsh
Refer to our Microsoft Defender XDR blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
with those from the historical chosen time frame.
- This technique was seen in relation to Solarigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
- The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but
if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it.
- Note also that the queries use the KQL "has_all" operator, which hasn't yet been documented officially, but will be soon.
In short, "has_all" will only match when the referenced field has all strings in the list.
Refer to netsh syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/netsh
Refer to our Microsoft Defender XDR blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
This detects attempts to manipulate audit policies using auditpol command.
This technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it.
Refer to auditpol syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol
Refer to our M365 blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
This technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it.
Refer to auditpol syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol
Refer to our M365 blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
This hunting query looks for hosts exporting a mailbox from an on-prem Exchange server, followed by
that same host removing the export within a short time window. This pattern has been observed by attackers
when exfiltrating emails from a target environment. A Mailbox export is unlikely to be a common command run so look for
activity from unexpected hosts and accounts.
Reference: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
Query insprired by Azure Sentinel detection https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/SecurityEvent/HostExportingMailboxAndRemovingExport.yaml
that same host removing the export within a short time window. This pattern has been observed by attackers
when exfiltrating emails from a target environment. A Mailbox export is unlikely to be a common command run so look for
activity from unexpected hosts and accounts.
Reference: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
Query insprired by Azure Sentinel detection https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/SecurityEvent/HostExportingMailboxAndRemovingExport.yaml
This analytic detects excessive usage of the nslookup application, which may indicate potential DNS exfiltration attempts. It monitors process executions, specifically focusing on nslookup.exe, and identifies outliers by comparing the frequency of nslookup executions against a calculated threshold. This activity is significant as it can reveal attempts by malware or APT groups to exfiltrate data via DNS queries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to stealthily transfer sensitive information out of the network, bypassing traditional data exfiltration defenses.