Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects files associated with the Cl0p ransomware group's exploitation of the Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerability (CVE-2025-61882).
Detects DNS queries for domains known to be associated with Clop ransomware command and control (C2) or data leak site operations.
Detects common shell processes launching a reverse shell using the '/dev/tcp' redirection. This technique is known to be used by adversaries like the Clop ransomware group for persistence and command and control.
Detects malicious ASP.NET webshell activity associated with the CL0P Ransomware Gang exploiting CVE-2023-34362. The rule looks for specific HTTP headers used by the webshell, indicators of Azure Blob Storage interaction, or SQL injection attempts.
The following analytic detects the creation of a Windows Service with a binary path located in uncommon directories, using Windows Event ID 7045. It leverages logs from the `wineventlog_system` to identify services installed outside typical system directories. This activity is significant as adversaries, including those deploying Clop ransomware, often create malicious services for lateral movement, remote code execution, persistence, and execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code, and potentially escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
The analytic identifies a high frequency of file deletions by monitoring Sysmon EventCodes 23 and 26 for specific file extensions. This detection leverages Sysmon logs to track deleted target filenames, process names, and process IDs. Such activity is significant as it often indicates ransomware behavior, where files are encrypted and the originals are deleted. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to extensive data loss and operational disruption, as ransomware can render critical files inaccessible, demanding a ransom for their recovery.
The following analytic detects the creation of a Windows Service with a known suspicious or malicious name using Windows Event ID 7045. It leverages logs from the `wineventlog_system` to identify these services installations. This activity is significant as adversaries, including those deploying Clop ransomware, often create malicious services for lateral movement, remote code execution, persistence, and execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code, and potentially escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
This analytic identifies a process attempting to delete its own executable file using `cmd.exe` and the `del` command. This behavior is often associated with defense evasion techniques employed by malware, such as Clop ransomware, to remove its executable file after execution or under specific conditions. Detecting such activity is crucial for identifying malicious actors trying to evade detection and complicate incident response efforts.
The following analytic identifies the execution of CLOP ransomware variants using specific arguments ("runrun" or "temp.dat") to trigger their malicious activities. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it indicates potential ransomware behavior, which can lead to file encryption on network shares or local machines. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in significant data loss and operational disruption due to encrypted files, highlighting the need for immediate investigation and response.
This analytic identifies the creation of a service with a known name used by CLOP ransomware for persistence and high-privilege code execution. It detects this activity by monitoring Windows Event Logs (EventCode 7045) for specific service names ("SecurityCenterIBM", "WinCheckDRVs"). This activity is significant because the creation of such services is a common tactic used by ransomware to maintain control over infected systems. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute code with elevated privileges, maintain persistence, and potentially disrupt or encrypt critical data.
This analytic identifies the resizing of shadow storage volumes, a technique used by ransomware like CLOP to prevent the recreation of shadow volumes. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving "vssadmin.exe" with parameters related to resizing shadow storage. This activity is significant as it indicates an attempt to hinder recovery efforts by manipulating shadow copies. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to successful ransomware deployment, making data recovery difficult and increasing the potential for data loss.
Detects patterns associated with DarkSide Ransomware and its helper processes. Specifically, it looks for command-line arguments used by DarkSide, such as '=[char][byte]('0x'+' or ' -work worker0 -path ', or the execution of an image from the 'AppData\Local\Temp\' directory when the parent process is 'DllHost.exe /Processid:{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7}'.
This YARA rule detects the Clop ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns related to its file encryption routines, file discovery mechanisms, and its capability to uninstall ESET antivirus software. The rule looks for distinct sequences of bytes that are characteristic of Clop's operational methods.
Yara rule that detects Clop ransomware.
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