Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic detects the execution of the ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command via PowerShell Script Block Logging.
The ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command is part of the AADInternals toolkit, which is used primarily for security testing and administrative tasks in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) environments.
This particular command is designed to create a "backdoor" in a federated Azure AD domain.
When executed, ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor modifies the federation settings of a domain by adding or changing the federation configuration to allow an attacker to control the authentication process.
This manipulation enables the creation of security tokens that can impersonate any user within the Azure AD tenant.
Consequently, this allows an attacker to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), escalate privileges, and maintain persistent access to the Azure AD environment.
The ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command is part of the AADInternals toolkit, which is used primarily for security testing and administrative tasks in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) environments.
This particular command is designed to create a "backdoor" in a federated Azure AD domain.
When executed, ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor modifies the federation settings of a domain by adding or changing the federation configuration to allow an attacker to control the authentication process.
This manipulation enables the creation of security tokens that can impersonate any user within the Azure AD tenant.
Consequently, this allows an attacker to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), escalate privileges, and maintain persistent access to the Azure AD environment.
Detects the execution of AADInternals PowerShell toolkit commands. AADInternals is a known framework used for administration, enumeration, and exploitation of Azure Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID, including the creation of backdoors and manipulation of federation settings.
Detects the use of the AADInternals PowerShell module for suspicious device registration activities, such as phantom device creation and Primary Refresh Token (PRT) manipulation, which are common techniques used to bypass Conditional Access policies. The rule correlates PowerShell command execution containing AADInternals cmdlets with subsequent Azure AD device registration events originating from the same host within a 15-minute window.
Detects anomalous device registration in Azure AD where a device code flow is used to authenticate to the Device Registration Service (DRS) and the resulting device is registered with an 'Unknown' or 'Linux' operating system. This behavior is indicative of an adversary, such as Storm-2372, using tools like AADInternals to perform phantom device registration to bypass conditional access policies by simulating a device without TPM attestation.
Detects anomalous Azure AD device registration events where device metadata is inconsistent, suggesting impersonation. The rule flags Linux hosts masquerading as Windows, non-Windows devices claiming AzureAD trust type, or the use of zeroed OS versions (0.0.0.0). High-frequency registrations (3+ devices per user in 30 minutes) correlate with known AADInternals-based attacks used by threat actor Storm-2372 to bypass Conditional Access policies.
EchoCreep Decodes AES-CBC Base64 Command
Cortex XDR
Detects a non-browser process combining base64 decoding with AES-CBC processing before launching shell commands. This behavior is indicative of the EchoCreep malware, which uses sophisticated obfuscation techniques to hide its command and control communications.
This rule detects suspicious user-agent strings in Microsoft Graph activity logs that are commonly associated with reconnaissance and attack tools targeting Azure AD and Microsoft 365 environments. These tools include BloodHound, ROADtools, AADInternals, and various other utilities used for enumeration, credential spraying, and other malicious activities.
Detects the use of the AADInternals PowerShell module, a tool used by threat actors like MERCURY and DEV-1084 for credential theft and privilege escalation in Azure AD environments.
KQL Query from file: EntraFalcon Detection
KQL Query from file: Detecting GOLDEN SAML Attack
'This detection uses Windows security events to look for users reading the local Device Identity Key (Machine Key).
This information can be correlated with other events for additional context and get to use-cases where a
machine key with a transport key together can be used to impersonate an Entra ID joined or registered machine.
Reference: https://o365blog.com/post/deviceidentity/'
This information can be correlated with other events for additional context and get to use-cases where a
machine key with a transport key together can be used to impersonate an Entra ID joined or registered machine.
Reference: https://o365blog.com/post/deviceidentity/'
Detects the execution of AADInternals PowerShell cmdlets. AADInternals is a tool used for administering Azure AD and Office 365, which can be abused by threat actors for various attacks including reconnaissance, credential access, and impact within Azure AD or Office 365 environments. The rule specifically looks for the unique "-AADInt" string prefix in cmdlet names.
Detects the execution of AADInternals PowerShell cmdlets. AADInternals is a tool for administering Azure AD and Office 365, which can be abused by threat actors to attack these services. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell processes executing commands containing the unique string "-AADInt" followed by various cmdlet actions like Add, ConvertTo, Disable, Enable, Export, Find, Get, Grant, Initialize, Install, Invoke, Join, New, Open, Read, Register, Remove, Reset, Resolve, Restore, Save, Search, Send, Set, Start, Unprotect, or Update.