Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious execution of rundll32.exe by the Tomb crypter, which is known to unpack and execute malicious DLLs. The detection logic specifically looks for rundll32.exe processes where the command line ends with ",rundll" and the executable is located in common temporary or public user directories such as AppData\Local\Temp, ProgramData, or Users\Public. This pattern is indicative of the Interlock/Rhysida ransomware ecosystem.
This analytic detects intrusion events from known threat activity using Cisco Secure Firewall Intrusion Events. It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense IntrusionEvent logs to identify cases where one or multiple Snort signatures associated with a known threat or threat actor activity have been triggered within a one-hour time window. The detection uses a lookup table (cisco_snort_ids_to_threat_mapping) to map Snort signature IDs to known threat actors and their techniques. When multiple signatures associated with the same threat actor are triggered within the time window, and the count of unique signatures matches or exceeds the expected number of signatures for that threat technique, an alert is generated. This helps identify potential coordinated threat activity in your network environment by correlating related intrusion events that occur in close temporal proximity. Currently, this detection will alert on the following threat actors or malware families as defined in the cisco_snort_ids_to_threat_mapping lookup: ArcaneDoor, Static Tundra, AgentTesla, Amadey, AsyncRAT, Chafer, DCRAT, Lumma Stealer, Nobelium, Quasar, Remcos, Snake, Xworm. To add or update threat actors, update the cisco_snort_ids_to_threat_mapping.csv lookup file with new or modified threat names and associated Snort signature IDs.
Snip3 is a family of related remote access trojans. Although the malware in this family contain numerous small variations, they all exhibit similar behaviors and techniques.
The following query looks for a function call to a method named DetectSandboxie. This method is used in RevengeRAT and AsyncRAT instances involved in a campaign targeting the aviation industry, first observed in 2021. It has also been associated in the past other malware, such as WannaCry and QuasarRAT. Individual PowerShell functions can be detected in the same way in some instances, though care should be taken to ensure that the command name is unique -- otherwise, this query may return many false positives.
The following query looks for a function call to a method named DetectSandboxie. This method is used in RevengeRAT and AsyncRAT instances involved in a campaign targeting the aviation industry, first observed in 2021. It has also been associated in the past other malware, such as WannaCry and QuasarRAT. Individual PowerShell functions can be detected in the same way in some instances, though care should be taken to ensure that the command name is unique -- otherwise, this query may return many false positives.
Snip3 is a family of related remote access trojans. Although the malware in this family contain numerous small variations, they all exhibit similar behaviors and techniques.
The following query looks for keywords observed in emails involved in a Snip3-associated campaign in April and May of 2021. The emails often have an aviation theme, and the campaign primarily targets organizations involved in travel or aviation. Note that keywords may change overtime. These emails were used to send malicious legitimate hosting provider links that redirected to VBS documents hosting loaders. The loaders initiate RevengeRAT or AsyncRAT downloads that eventually establish persistence on targets and exfiltrate data.
The following query looks for keywords observed in emails involved in a Snip3-associated campaign in April and May of 2021. The emails often have an aviation theme, and the campaign primarily targets organizations involved in travel or aviation. Note that keywords may change overtime. These emails were used to send malicious legitimate hosting provider links that redirected to VBS documents hosting loaders. The loaders initiate RevengeRAT or AsyncRAT downloads that eventually establish persistence on targets and exfiltrate data.
Snip3 is a family of related remote access trojans. Although the malware in this family contain numerous small variations, they all exhibit similar behaviors and techniques.
The following query looks for the method that Snip3 malware use to obfuscate PowerShell commands with UTF8 encoding. This technique is intended to evade detection from security products, and avoids the more standard switches used for encoding in malware such as Emotet.
At present, this method of encoding is much more rare, being seen largely with loader installation of RevengeRAT, AsyncRAT and other RATs used in campaigns targeting the aviation industry.
The following query looks for the method that Snip3 malware use to obfuscate PowerShell commands with UTF8 encoding. This technique is intended to evade detection from security products, and avoids the more standard switches used for encoding in malware such as Emotet.
At present, this method of encoding is much more rare, being seen largely with loader installation of RevengeRAT, AsyncRAT and other RATs used in campaigns targeting the aviation industry.
Snip3 is a family of related remote access trojans. Although the malware in this family contain numerous small variations, they all exhibit similar behaviors and techniques.
The following query looks for potentially hollowed processes that may be used to facilitate command-and-control or exfiltration by Snip3 malware. This technique has been used in recent cases to exfiltrate data, including credentials.
The query may return additional malware or campaigns not necessarily associated with Snip3. However, Microsoft recommends triaging all non-benign results as potential malware.
The following query looks for potentially hollowed processes that may be used to facilitate command-and-control or exfiltration by Snip3 malware. This technique has been used in recent cases to exfiltrate data, including credentials.
The query may return additional malware or campaigns not necessarily associated with Snip3. However, Microsoft recommends triaging all non-benign results as potential malware.