Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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'This hunting query looks for file paths/hashes related to observed activity by Dev-0228. The actor is known to use custom version of popular tool like PsExec, Procdump etc. to carry its activity.
The risk score associated with each result is based on a number of factors, hosts with higher risk events should be investigated first.
This query uses the Microsoft Sentinel Information Model - https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/normalization'
The risk score associated with each result is based on a number of factors, hosts with higher risk events should be investigated first.
This query uses the Microsoft Sentinel Information Model - https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/normalization'
'This hunting query looks for file paths/hashes related to observed activity by Dev-0228. The actor is known to use custom version of popular tool like PsExec, Procdump etc. to carry its activity.
The risk score associated with each result is based on a number of factors, hosts with higher risk events should be investigated first.'
The risk score associated with each result is based on a number of factors, hosts with higher risk events should be investigated first.'
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Qakbot blight lingers, seeds ransomware
Qakbot is malware that steals login credentials from banking and financial services. It has been deployed against small businesses as well as major corporations. Some outbreaks have involved targeted ransomware campaigns that use a similar set of techniques. Links to related queries are listed under See also.
The following query detects possible use of the system process, esentutl.exe, to look through a user's browser history and steal cookies.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/11/06/mitigating-and-eliminating-info-stealing-qakbot-and-emotet-in-corporate-networks/
Qakbot is malware that steals login credentials from banking and financial services. It has been deployed against small businesses as well as major corporations. Some outbreaks have involved targeted ransomware campaigns that use a similar set of techniques. Links to related queries are listed under See also.
The following query detects possible use of the system process, esentutl.exe, to look through a user's browser history and steal cookies.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/11/06/mitigating-and-eliminating-info-stealing-qakbot-and-emotet-in-corporate-networks/
Dragon Fly
KQL
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_dragonfly.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Detects the creation of temporary files (sam.tmp, sec.tmp, sys.tmp) in the Windows temporary directory, which are indicators of the RemoteKrbRelay SMB Relay attack module attempting to dump secrets from the Security Account Manager (SAM) and other system hives.
This rule detects attempts to access the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process memory by other processes. Specifically, it triggers when a process attempts to open lsass.exe and the accessing process's image name (full path) contains the keyword "dump". This behavior is indicative of tools used for credential dumping, such as Mimikatz or similar utilities, which often include "dump" in their filenames or paths.
Detects the creation of temporary files with specific naming conventions (8 alphanumeric characters followed by '.tmp') in the 'C:\Windows\System32\' directory, when the creating process is 'svchost.exe'. This pattern is indicative of remote credential dumping activity often associated with tools like CrackMapExec and Impacket-secretsdump, which use svchost.exe to write temporary files containing dumped credentials.
This rule detects the execution of the Mimikatz tool by looking for the string "mimikatz" (case-insensitive) in the command line of newly launched processes. Mimikatz is a well-known credential dumping tool often used by adversaries to extract plaintext passwords, hash, PIN codes, and Kerberos tickets from memory.
This rule identifies rare subscription-level operations in Azure, specifically focusing on actions that involve listing keys for various Azure resources (DocumentDB, Maps, Media, Cognitive Services, Storage) or writing snapshots and network security groups. It aims to detect when these sensitive operations are performed from a previously unseen source IP address, indicating potential unauthorized access or credential compromise.
Detects suspicious processes based on name and location that access the Windows Credential Manager and Vault. This activity can be indicative of credential stealing, such as that performed by Mimikatz's "dpapi::cred" function.
This rule detects the execution of various Windows-based hacktools by matching their import hash (imphash). This method allows for detection even if the tool's filename has been changed. The rule includes imphashes for tools such as PetitPotam, JuicyPotato, RoguePotato, Pwdump, Cobalt Strike beacons, PPLDump, NanoDump, HandleKatz, DripLoader, UACMe, WCE, Sliver Stagers, Dumpert, SysmonEnte, SysmonQuiet, ShaprEvtMute Hook, Forkatz, PPLKiller, Backstab, Forensia, EDRSandBlast, and EDRSilencer.
This rule detects the execution of 'esentutl' with the '/p' parameter. This command-line utility is used for database utilities, and its use with '/p' (repair mode) can be leveraged by adversaries to access or repair Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) databases, including the NTDS.dit file which contains Active Directory credential information. This technique has been observed in use by threat actors like Conti ransomware and Trickbot to gather credentials or other sensitive information from compromised systems.
Detects the registration of a new ODBC driver where the driver's DLL is located in a potentially suspicious or non-standard system directory. Adversaries may use this technique to establish persistence or facilitate credential access by registering malicious ODBC drivers.
Detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet 'Get-StorageDiagnosticInfo' with the '-IncludeLiveDump' parameter to dump the live memory of a Windows machine. This technique can be used by adversaries to extract sensitive information, including credentials, from memory.
This rule detects attempts by uncommon applications to access cryptocurrency wallet files. It specifically looks for file access requests to common cryptocurrency wallet paths for Ethereum, Ethereum Classic, Monero, Bitcoin, BitcoinABC, BitcoinSV, DashCore, DogeCoin, Litecoin, Ripple, and Zcash. The rule filters out access by common system processes, applications installed in standard Program Files directories, and Windows Defender components to reduce false positives. This activity could indicate an attempt to steal cryptocurrency wallets.
This rule detects attempts by uncommon processes to access sensitive files associated with Chromium-based browsers. These files typically contain user data such as cookies, browsing history, and web data, which could be leveraged for credential access or other malicious activities if exfiltrated. The rule specifically targets file paths related to Chromium's user profile data and filters out access by common system processes and known legitimate applications like Windows Defender to reduce false positives.
Detects file access requests to browser credential stores by uncommon processes. This could indicate a potential attempt at credential stealing. This rule requires heavy baselining before usage.
Identifies IPs from which users grant access to other users on azure resources and alerts when a previously unseen source IP address is used.
Detects when an account successfully recovers a Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) password from Microsoft Entra ID. This activity is logged in Azure audit logs under the 'Device' category with the activity type 'Recover device local administrator password' and additional details indicating 'Successfully recovered local credential by device id'. This event can signify an attacker attempting to gain elevated privileges or maintain persistence by obtaining local administrator credentials.
Detects usage of a PowerShell command to dump the live memory of a Windows machine
Detects the execution of different Windows based hacktools via their import hash (imphash) even if the files have been renamed
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