Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic detects a suspicious process attempting to terminate the Lsass.exe process. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs to identify processes granted PROCESS_TERMINATE access to Lsass.exe. This activity is significant because Lsass.exe is a critical process responsible for enforcing security policies and handling user credentials. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to perform credential dumping, privilege escalation, or evasion of security policies, potentially leading to unauthorized access and persistence within the environment.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by web servers, indicating potential webshell activity used for credential dumping, exfiltration, or other post-exploitation actions. The rule looks for specific command-line patterns and executables commonly associated with these malicious activities originating from known web server processes.
Detects the use of 'wbadmin.exe' to recover highly sensitive files such as 'NTDS.DIT', 'SAM', 'SECURITY', and 'SYSTEM' hives. Attackers can leverage this utility to dump sensitive files that might contain credential or other sensitive information.
This YARA rule detects the Sshdinjector backdoor on Linux systems. It identifies specific byte patterns associated with the backdoor's functionalities, including killing and restarting daemons, network communication, reading the /etc/shadow file (for credential dumping), and listing running services.
Detects a process memory dump via "comsvcs.dll" using rundll32, covering multiple different techniques (ordinal, minidump function, etc.). This technique is often used to dump LSASS memory for credential access.
Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary honeypot node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication. This indicates an adversary is attempting to authenticate against a honeypot, which is highly suspicious.
This rule detects access to the 'wceaux.dll' file, which is associated with the Windows Credential Editor (WCE) tool. This activity is indicative of an attempt to perform pass-the-hash remote command execution, often used for credential dumping and lateral movement. The rule specifically looks for Security Event IDs 4656 (A handle to an object was requested) or 4663 (An attempt was made to access an object) where the accessed object's name ends with '\wceaux.dll'.
Detects instances where a REDIS service on an OpenCanary node has had an action command attempted.
Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using SQLAuth.
Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.
Detects instances where a MySQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
Detects wceaux.dll access while WCE pass-the-hash remote command execution on source host
Connection to ADFS via named pipes that are not using specific Windows ADFS processes may be indicative of user attempting to access ADFS for suspicious purposes
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a password dumper. This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
Detects suspicious process access requests to the LSASS process using specific GrantedAccess flags. These flags are often associated with tools and techniques used for credential dumping, such as Mimikatz, by attempting to read or manipulate LSASS memory to extract credentials. The rule includes filters for common legitimate processes like antivirus software, EDRs, and system utilities to reduce false positives.
Detects attempts to dump Active Directory credentials using Impacket's secretdump tool. This rule specifically looks for Event ID 5145 (A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access) on the ADMIN$ share, combined with access to a temporary file within the SYSTEM32 directory. This pattern is indicative of secretdump's remote activity to extract credential hashes.
This rule detects the transfer of sensitive files containing credential data over network shares. It specifically looks for filenames or paths commonly associated with credential dumping, such as 'mimidrv', 'lsass', 'windows\minidump\', 'hiberfil', 'sqldmpr', 'sam', 'ntds.dit', and 'security'. This activity often indicates an attempt to exfiltrate credentials after they have been dumped from a system.
This rule detects the execution of well-known credential dumping tools by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 4697, which signifies a service creation event. The rule specifically looks for service filenames containing keywords associated with common credential dumping utilities such as 'cachedump', 'dumpsvc', 'fgexec', 'gsecdump', 'mimidrv', 'pwdump', and 'servpw'. This indicates an adversary attempting to install and run a service that can extract credentials from the system.
This rule detects the execution of well-known credential dumping tools by monitoring Windows System event logs for Service Control Manager events (EventID 7045) indicating service creation. The rule specifically looks for service image paths containing keywords associated with common credential dumping utilities such as 'cachedump', 'dumpsvc', 'fgexec', 'gsecdump', 'mimidrv', 'pwdump', and 'servpw'. This helps identify attempts to install and run these tools as services for credential theft.
This rule detects the presence of keywords commonly associated with well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks such as Mimikatz and Metasploit within PowerShell script blocks. The keywords indicate attempts to perform privileged operations like manipulating access tokens, reading process memory, or other actions typically involved in credential dumping and privilege escalation. Detection relies on PowerShell Script Block Logging being enabled to capture the script content.
Detects when a process attempts to add or modify a network provider by manipulating the Windows Registry, specifically targeting the 'NetworkProvider' key within 'System\CurrentControlSet\Services\'. This activity is indicative of potential credential dumping attempts, similar to techniques used by tools like NPPSpy, which can register a malicious network provider DLL to capture cleartext credentials during the authentication process.
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