Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects various methods and tools used by adversaries to access, stage, or exfiltrate the Active Directory database (ntds.dit). This includes abuse of built-in Windows utilities such as ntdsutil, vssadmin, diskshadow, esentutl, and registry commands, as well as the use of known credential dumping tools like Impacket's SecretsDump and NinjaCopy.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
Detects offreg.dll (Windows Offline Registry Library) being loaded by a process running outside the standard System32/SysWOW64 directories and that is not a known Windows registry-management host process, excluding Malwarebytes' own bundled private copy of the DLL. PrettyPrague uses this library to read the SAM/LSA hive and derive boot-key material outside normal registry API paths. Scoped to the loading process's directory and identity rather than any specific PoC binary name.
Detects direct file access attempts to critical Windows registry hive files (SAM, SECURITY, SYSTEM, SOFTWARE) on disk. These files contain sensitive system and credential information, and direct access is frequently used by adversaries to perform offline credential dumping.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
Detects access to the SAM registry hive or SAM-related LSA control keys initiated by a process associated with the Avast Sandbox component rather than LSASS or an administrative security tool. The PrettyPrague PoC abuses a vulnerability in Avast Sandbox to dump the SAM database and spawn a SYSTEM shell, so SAM hive reads originating from the sandbox component itself are anomalous.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
This rule detects instances where a process loads 'offreg.dll' (Offline Registry Library) and concurrently accesses the SAM (Security Account Manager) file. This is a common technique used by attackers to offline-extract local account hashes without using standard registry tools, potentially bypassing basic monitoring of 'reg.exe'.
khunt actor did this after confirming SYSTEM access via KhuntCmd. This one's noisier - backup software and some AV tools do reg save legitimately, so tighten it to non-backup accounts / unmanaged paths if you get FPs.
khunt actor did this after confirming SYSTEM access via KhuntCmd. This one's noisier - backup software and some AV tools do reg save legitimately, so tighten it to non-backup accounts / unmanaged paths if you get FPs.
Detects the execution of the LimeWire P2P file-sharing application within 30 minutes of the creation of sensitive files, such as LSASS memory dumps, NTDS.dit, or SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hives, on the same host. This temporal correlation suggests the potential exfiltration of sensitive credential material via P2P file-sharing.
Detects the use of the native Windows registry utility 'reg.exe' to save or export the Security Account Manager (SAM) or SYSTEM registry hives to disk. This technique is a common precursor to credential theft, where attackers dump the SAM database to perform offline password cracking. This pattern has been observed in various adversary operations, including ransomware campaigns, to facilitate privilege escalation and lateral movement.
Detects process creation events where a process reported as TiWorker.exe (a trusted Windows servicing process) carries a command line containing Invoke-Mimikatz or Mimikatz command modules, indicating the process identity has been spoofed via a Silo-Binding bind-link mapping TiWorker.exe to PowerShell to evade AV/EDR script-blocking controls.
Detects execution of QuarksDumpLocalHash, a tool used to extract local account password hashes directly from the SAM registry hive. This activity is indicative of credential dumping for offline password cracking.
Detects the use of the native Windows 'reg.exe' utility to save or export sensitive registry hives (SAM, SECURITY, or SYSTEM). This activity is a classic technique used by adversaries to perform offline credential dumping.
This rule detects the dumping of sensitive Windows Registry hives (SECURITY, SAM, and SYSTEM) using tools like reg.exe, esentutl.exe, regedit.exe, or by leveraging Volume Shadow Copy services (vssadmin/diskshadow). These hives are targeted by attackers for credential access, specifically to extract LSA secrets, local account hashes, and bootkeys required to decrypt credentials offline. The rule calculates a risk score based on the combination of hives dumped, the method used, the output destination, and the parent process context, flagging 'complete' dumps (SAM+SECURITY+SYSTEM) as critical.
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