Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
21 detections
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The following analytic detects attempts to access or dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files on Linux systems. It leverages data from Linux Auditd, focusing on processes like 'cat', 'nano', 'vim', and 'vi' accessing these files. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential dumping, a technique used by adversaries to gain persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, privileges. If confirmed malicious, attackers could obtain hashed passwords for offline cracking, leading to unauthorized access and potential system compromise.
Detects processes attempting to access sensitive Linux system files (/etc/passwd or /etc/shadow) that are not typically associated with system administration, security, or identity management tasks. This behavior may indicate an attempt by an unauthorized user or process to gather credentials or system configuration information.
Detects a network-connected Linux process exhibiting beaconing behavior (high-frequency external connections) that is subsequently correlated with unauthorized file access to sensitive Linux configuration files (/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, or authorized_keys). This rule filters out common system processes and standard management binaries, targeting suspicious command-and-control activity combined with credential theft.
Detects a network-connected Linux process exhibiting beaconing behavior (high-frequency external connections) that is subsequently correlated with unauthorized file access to sensitive Linux configuration files (/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, or authorized_keys). This rule filters out common system processes and standard management binaries, targeting suspicious command-and-control activity combined with credential theft.
Detects reading of /etc/shadow file for offline password cracking
This rule detects potentially malicious activities on Linux systems involving the creation of new accounts or access to sensitive files like /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow using or referencing the string 'troot'. This pattern is often associated with adversary attempts to create backdoored accounts or perform offline password cracking by manipulating or dumping authentication files.
Detects suspicious user account creation activity or direct modification of the /etc/passwd file. The rule flags the use of 'useradd' or 'adduser' commands, as well as unauthorized attempts to inject root users into the passwd file, specifically looking for indicators like 'troot' (a common misconfiguration or backdoor username pattern).
Detects the exploited Bomgar process explicitly attempting to read sensitive credential files (like the SAM registry hive dump or /etc/shadow) to escalate privileges.
This rule detects attempts to copy the /etc/shadow file, which contains hashed user passwords, for offline password cracking. It specifically looks for the string "cat /etc/shadow" in TCP traffic destined for the home network on any port, indicating a potential exfiltration attempt or preparation for credential access. The rule is designed to alert on established connections where this specific command is observed.
This rule detects attempts to read the '/etc/shadow' file via a web shell or similar web-based attack. The rule specifically looks for the string '/etc/shadow' within the HTTP URI, indicating an attempt to access this sensitive file through a web request. This is a common technique used by attackers to exfiltrate credentials after gaining initial access to a web server.
This rule detects the execution of commands that include 'splice' in conjunction with common privilege escalation utilities such as 'su', 'sudo', or 'passwd', or attempts to access '/etc/passwd'. This privilege escalation resembles Copy Fail.
High-confidence detection for probable Copy Fail exploitation requiring AF_ALG or algif_aead references, syscall-style splice usage, and privileged binary targeting. https://github.com/theori-io/copy-fail-CVE-2026-31431/blob/main/copy_fail_exp.py https://xint.io/blog/copy-fail-linux-distributions#how-we-found-it-9
This query identifies potential post-exploitation behavior on Linux systems by monitoring for clusters of discovery and enumeration commands. Instead of alerting on single, potentially benign commands, it utilizes a behavioral scoring engine that categorizes activities such as credential hunting, privilege escalation, and network scanning.
By implementing extensive allowlists for common administrative tools (e.g., Ansible, Zabbix, Monitoring Agents) and requiring a minimum threshold of unique activity categories, the query effectively filters out "noise." It calculates a dynamic Risk Score and assigns a Severity level based on the criticality of the commands and the speed of execution (Burst Detection), making it a highly reliable tool for SOC analysts to detect active hands-on-keyboard attacks.
By implementing extensive allowlists for common administrative tools (e.g., Ansible, Zabbix, Monitoring Agents) and requiring a minimum threshold of unique activity categories, the query effectively filters out "noise." It calculates a dynamic Risk Score and assigns a Severity level based on the criticality of the commands and the speed of execution (Burst Detection), making it a highly reliable tool for SOC analysts to detect active hands-on-keyboard attacks.
This detection identifies access to sensitive system and configuration files on an ESXi host, including authentication data, service configurations, and VMware-specific management settings. Interaction with these files may indicate adversary reconnaissance, credential harvesting, or preparation for privilege escalation, lateral movement, or persistence.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Motivated miners.
Doublepulsar is a backdoor developed by the National Security Agency (NSA). First disclosed in 2017, it is now used by many malicious actors. Software patches are available.
The following query detects possible DoublePulsar execution events.
See Detect web server exploitation by DoublePulsar for a query that detects behaviors associated with campaigns that use DoublePulsar.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/DoublePulsar&threatId=-2147239036
https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/cybercrime/doublepulsar-malware-spreading-rapidly-in-the-wild-following-shadow-brokers-dump/
https://support.microsoft.com/help/4013389/title
Doublepulsar is a backdoor developed by the National Security Agency (NSA). First disclosed in 2017, it is now used by many malicious actors. Software patches are available.
The following query detects possible DoublePulsar execution events.
See Detect web server exploitation by DoublePulsar for a query that detects behaviors associated with campaigns that use DoublePulsar.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/DoublePulsar&threatId=-2147239036
https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/cybercrime/doublepulsar-malware-spreading-rapidly-in-the-wild-following-shadow-brokers-dump/
https://support.microsoft.com/help/4013389/title
This query searches for not onboarded devices with a specific Suffix
The following analytic detects potential access or modification of the /etc/sudoers file on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes like "cat," "nano," "vim," and "vi" accessing the /etc/sudoers file. This activity is significant because the sudoers file controls user permissions for executing commands with elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain persistence or escalate privileges, compromising the security of the targeted host.
The following analytic detects attempts to access or dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files on Linux systems. It leverages data from Linux Auditd, focusing on processes like 'cat', 'nano', 'vim', and 'vi' accessing these files. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential dumping, a technique used by adversaries to gain persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, attackers could obtain hashed passwords for offline cracking, leading to unauthorized access and potential system compromise.
The analytic detects attempts to access or dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files on Linux systems. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes like 'cat', 'nano', 'vim', and 'vi' accessing these files. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential dumping, a technique used by adversaries to gain persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, attackers could obtain hashed passwords for offline cracking, leading to unauthorized access and potential system compromise.
This rule detects suspicious command-line executions that attempt to create symbolic links to the `/etc/passwd` file. Attackers might do this to gain unauthorized access to user account information, potentially leading to credential dumping or privilege escalation. The rule specifically looks for `ln -s /etc/passwd` and `ln -s -f /etc/passwd` patterns in command lines.
This rule detects attempts to copy the 'passwd' or 'shadow' files from the '/tmp/' directory using the 'cp' command. This activity is highly suspicious as these files contain sensitive user account information, including password hashes (in the case of 'shadow'), and should not typically be copied to temporary directories. An adversary might do this to exfiltrate credentials for offline cracking or to move them to a location accessible for further exploitation.