Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
956 detections
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Detects anomalous, high-volume file access (creation, modification, or renaming) targeting sensitive extensions (e.g., .key, .pem, .pfx) within document directories by unsigned processes. It also detects similar high-volume file access behavior that occurs immediately following the mounting of a removable USB device, consistent with CornFlake RAT data exfiltration patterns.
Detects the download, file creation, or execution of known NirSoft credential and browser harvesting utilities (ChromePass, WebBrowserBookmarksView, Network Password Recovery, LastActivityView) from non-standard directories or identified malicious actor infrastructure.
Detects uname/whoami host-fingerprinting commands chained as child processes of a bash process spawned from a suspicious /tmp-staged script, matching XCSSET's reconnaissance-and-exfiltration pattern.
Detects XCSSET's Telegram data-theft module staging AES-encrypted configuration and chat data in ~/.tr and ~/.tr_map, correlated with the /w?tr exfiltration upload to C2.
Detects instances where processes other than common Chromium-based web browsers attempt to access sensitive files within the browser's User Data directory, such as Login Data, Cookies, or Web Data. This behavior is often indicative of credential theft or session hijacking attempts by unauthorized software or adversaries.
Detects uname/whoami host-fingerprinting commands chained as child processes of a bash process spawned from a suspicious /tmp-staged script, matching XCSSET's reconnaissance-and-exfiltration pattern.
Detects unauthorized access or staging operations on the C:\Windows\debug\NetSetup.log file. This activity is often associated with the NightLedger tool, which collects this diagnostic log alongside process listings for potential exfiltration. The rule filters out legitimate system processes that typically interact with this file during domain or workgroup join operations.
Detects XCSSET's Telegram data-theft module staging AES-encrypted configuration and chat data in ~/.tr and ~/.tr_map, correlated with the /w?tr exfiltration upload to C2.
Detects the BlueNoroff VBScript implant discovering Telegram Web session files (IndexedDB LevelDB storage) via wscript/cscript, narrowed to invocations referencing the campaign's known implant filenames or numeric-suffixed staging variables to exclude unrelated browser or automation activity.
Detects endpoint file artifacts associated with known malicious browser extension IDs in browser extension storage paths, indicating possible installation or presence of malicious browser extensions.
Detects SSH private key file access by scripting interpreters while excluding legitimate SSH/git tooling, matching the mrmustard stealer's SSH key theft behavior.
Detects unauthorized file access attempts targeting sensitive data directories such as Telegram tdata, web browser credential stores (Login Data, Cookies), cryptocurrency wallet configuration folders (Exodus, Electrum), and Foxmail data files. This rule filters out legitimate access by the corresponding applications themselves to reduce noise.
Detects unauthorized file access attempts targeting sensitive data directories such as Telegram tdata, web browser credential stores (Login Data, Cookies), cryptocurrency wallet configuration folders (Exodus, Electrum), and Foxmail data files. This rule filters out legitimate access by the corresponding applications themselves to reduce noise.
Detects the use of command-line tools employing recursive search patterns (e.g., -Recurse) targeting document file extensions (PDF, DOCX, XLSX). This activity is often associated with the staging phase of an exfiltration attempt, where an adversary identifies sensitive files across a directory structure before collection.
Detects suspicious activities associated with browser profile hijacking. It flags the use of Robocopy to mirror browser user data directories (potentially to steal session cookies) and the subsequent launch of a web browser (Chrome/Edge) with security-disabling flags such as --no-sandbox and --disable-features=RendererCodeIntegrity, which are commonly used to bypass security features and access protected browser data.
Detects suspicious activities associated with browser profile hijacking. It flags the use of Robocopy to mirror browser user data directories (potentially to steal session cookies) and the subsequent launch of a web browser (Chrome/Edge) with security-disabling flags such as --no-sandbox and --disable-features=RendererCodeIntegrity, which are commonly used to bypass security features and access protected browser data.
Detects SSH private key file access by scripting interpreters while excluding legitimate SSH/git tooling, matching the mrmustard stealer's SSH key theft behavior.
Detects TOKYOCORE via overlap of data-theft artifact strings and persistence-mechanism strings (Tier 4 cluster)
Tier 5 catch-all: flags files exhibiting a broad spread of TOKYOCORE-related strings across identity, C2, ransom-note/branding, destructive, file-operation, data-theft, and persistence clusters, regardless of which specific cluster dominates
Detects suspicious processes (PowerShell, MSHTA, WScript, CScript, or CMD) attempting to read sensitive browser or wallet files (Login Data, Cookies, Local State, etc.). This behavior is frequently associated with information stealers attempting to extract credentials and sensitive information from local endpoints.
Detects unauthorized file access events targeting the Telegram Desktop AppData directory, which is a known technique for exfiltrating messenger session data and credentials. This rule filters for file access actions and is intended to exclude legitimate access by the Telegram application process itself.
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