Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
175 detections
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Detects msiexec.exe process interacting with Windows Registry keys associated with Chrome or Edge browser installation directories. This behavior is indicative of browser discovery activities often performed by malware, such as msaRAT, prior to establishing a headless CDP (Chrome DevTools Protocol) session for C2 communication.
Detects the execution of GigaWiper malware registry modules. The rule monitors command-line activity for specific binary names associated with the GigaWiper malware family that perform registry modifications, such as key creation or deletion.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands that query the Windows SecurityCenter2 WMI namespace for installed AntiVirus products and format the output as JSON. This behavior is indicative of reconnaissance activity by the GigaWiper malware to identify and potentially disable or circumvent security protections.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands that query the Windows SecurityCenter2 WMI namespace for installed AntiVirus products and format the output as JSON. This behavior is indicative of reconnaissance activity by the GigaWiper malware to identify and potentially disable or circumvent security protections.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands that query the Windows SecurityCenter2 WMI namespace for installed AntiVirus products and format the output as JSON. This behavior is indicative of reconnaissance activity by the GigaWiper malware to identify and potentially disable or circumvent security protections.
Detects the execution of GigaWiper malware registry modules. The rule monitors command-line activity for specific binary names associated with the GigaWiper malware family that perform registry modifications, such as key creation or deletion.
Detects the execution of GigaWiper malware registry modules. The rule monitors command-line activity for specific binary names associated with the GigaWiper malware family that perform registry modifications, such as key creation or deletion.
This rule detects the dumping of sensitive Windows Registry hives (SECURITY, SAM, and SYSTEM) using tools like reg.exe, esentutl.exe, regedit.exe, or by leveraging Volume Shadow Copy services (vssadmin/diskshadow). These hives are targeted by attackers for credential access, specifically to extract LSA secrets, local account hashes, and bootkeys required to decrypt credentials offline. The rule calculates a risk score based on the combination of hives dumped, the method used, the output destination, and the parent process context, flagging 'complete' dumps (SAM+SECURITY+SYSTEM) as critical.
This rule detects the dumping of sensitive Windows Registry hives (SECURITY, SAM, and SYSTEM) using tools like reg.exe, esentutl.exe, regedit.exe, or by leveraging Volume Shadow Copy services (vssadmin/diskshadow). These hives are targeted by attackers for credential access, specifically to extract LSA secrets, local account hashes, and bootkeys required to decrypt credentials offline. The rule calculates a risk score based on the combination of hives dumped, the method used, the output destination, and the parent process context, flagging 'complete' dumps (SAM+SECURITY+SYSTEM) as critical.
This rule detects potential security software discovery attempts by monitoring for access to Windows Registry keys associated with installed software (Uninstall keys) and Windows Defender configurations. Adversaries often query these registry locations to identify security products installed on a host to determine if they need to disable them, avoid them, or modify their behavior to evade detection.
Detects reads of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SystemStartOptions, the value
that stores boot parameters (e.g. NOEXECUTE=OPTIN vs SAFEBOOT:MINIMAL). Ransomware
including Snatch and Qilin query this key to determine whether the host is already in
Safe Mode before forcing a reboot and encrypting with AV/EDR unloaded.
Treat as a high-interest hunting lead when paired within minutes with Safe Mode staging:
bcdedit /set safeboot, reg add under SafeBoot\Minimal or SafeBoot\Network, or
shutdown /r.
that stores boot parameters (e.g. NOEXECUTE=OPTIN vs SAFEBOOT:MINIMAL). Ransomware
including Snatch and Qilin query this key to determine whether the host is already in
Safe Mode before forcing a reboot and encrypting with AV/EDR unloaded.
Treat as a high-interest hunting lead when paired within minutes with Safe Mode staging:
bcdedit /set safeboot, reg add under SafeBoot\Minimal or SafeBoot\Network, or
shutdown /r.
Detects registry enumeration activities targeting HKLM software keys related to Windows versioning and system configuration. This pattern is characteristic of BeepRAT post-compromise reconnaissance, where an adversary attempts to gather system information to profile the environment.
Detects unauthorized processes querying specific Internet Explorer security registry keys that are typically only accessed by legitimate web browsers. LegionLoader and similar malware strains use these registry queries to identify sandbox or virtualized environments before executing malicious payloads.
Detects reads of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SystemStartOptions, the value that stores boot parameters (e.g. NOEXECUTE=OPTIN vs SAFEBOOT:MINIMAL). Ransomware including Snatch and Qilin query this key to determine whether the host is already in Safe Mode before forcing a reboot and encrypting with AV/EDR unloaded.
Treat as a high-interest hunting lead when paired within minutes with Safe Mode staging:
bcdedit /set safeboot, reg add under SafeBoot\Minimal or SafeBoot\Network, or
shutdown /r.
Treat as a high-interest hunting lead when paired within minutes with Safe Mode staging:
bcdedit /set safeboot, reg add under SafeBoot\Minimal or SafeBoot\Network, or
shutdown /r.
Detects network traffic attempting to access sensitive Windows Registry keys (SAM, SECURITY, LSA Secrets, winlogon DefaultPassword) over the SMB protocol, which is indicative of credential harvesting activities.
Detects potential malicious activity where a process enumerates installed software by querying the Windows Uninstall registry key (HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall) for application details such as DisplayName, Publisher, and UninstallString. This pattern is characteristic of Remcos RAT's 'ListInstalledApplications' capability to perform reconnaissance on a compromised host.
Detects various reconnaissance and discovery commands, including process listing, registry queries, and security software enumeration, that are characteristic of the SystemBC malware's in-memory scripting behaviors. The rule identifies suspicious process parent-child relationships, unauthorized registry queries of sensitive security paths, and the use of command-line tools like WMIC, Tasklist, and PowerShell for environment discovery without disk-based script artifacts.
This rule detects known evasion techniques used by the Pay2Key and Grixba malware families. It identifies timing-based delays triggered by malicious 'ping.exe' commands targeting invalid IP addresses and locale-based geofencing checks performed via registry queries for custom locale settings.
Detects the NUKESPED backdoor (zlrenu8.exe) performing post-compromise system information discovery. The rule monitors for registry key enumeration within HKLM/HKCU SOFTWARE hives and the execution of the systeminfo.exe utility.
Detects the use of the Windows registry utility 'reg.exe' to query sensitive registry keys (SYSTEM, SOFTWARE, RUN keys) when executed by suspicious parent processes commonly used for script execution or living-off-the-land techniques (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, fltMC.exe, mshta.exe). This pattern is often indicative of automated discovery or credential harvesting behaviors.
Detects reads of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SystemStartOptions, the value that stores boot parameters (e.g. NOEXECUTE=OPTIN vs SAFEBOOT:MINIMAL). Ransomware including Snatch and Qilin query this key to determine whether the host is already in Safe Mode before forcing a reboot and encrypting with AV/EDR unloaded.
Treat as a high-interest hunting lead when paired within minutes with Safe Mode staging:
bcdedit /set safeboot, reg add under SafeBoot\Minimal or SafeBoot\Network, or
shutdown /r.
Treat as a high-interest hunting lead when paired within minutes with Safe Mode staging:
bcdedit /set safeboot, reg add under SafeBoot\Minimal or SafeBoot\Network, or
shutdown /r.
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