Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
296 detections
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This rule detects rapid, successive TCP connection attempts directed to port 3389 (RDP) from a single external source IP within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of a brute force attack or automated credential guessing activity targeting remote desktop services.
Detects evidence of RustDesk session permission bypass exploitation. The rule monitors for the presence of known Proof-of-Concept (PoC) file artifacts, suspicious child processes spawned by RustDesk, use of elevated tokens by RustDesk-initiated processes, compilation of PoC tools using cargo, and outbound network connections from RustDesk to known relay ports.
Detects signs of post-infection activity from the Amadey malware, specifically the unauthorized enabling of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) via registry modifications, the use of tscon.exe for session hijacking, unusual execution of RDP-related binaries (mstsc.exe, rdpclip.exe), and the deployment of legitimate remote access tools like AnyDesk or TeamViewer for lateral movement.
This rule detects a high frequency of successful network connections from a single device to multiple unique destination IP addresses within a one-hour window. The targeted ports (445, 139, 3389, 22, 21) are commonly used for remote administrative access, file transfers, and remote shell services, which are frequently leveraged by adversaries for lateral movement. The threshold of 3 unique targets in an hour may indicate automated scanning or credential brute-forcing activity across the network.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events: the enablement of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) via registry modification, followed by the creation of a new local administrator account with password expiration disabled, potentially accompanied by a netsh firewall rule modification to allow RDP. This combination of actions is highly indicative of an adversary establishing persistent remote access and creating a backdoor account.
Detects the modification of the 'fDenyTSConnections' registry key using 'reg.exe' to force-enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on a system, followed by an immediate connection attempt to port 3389. This behavior is indicative of an adversary or RMM-based tool attempting to establish unauthorized remote access for lateral movement.
Detects simultaneous RDP connections to multiple internal hosts originating from a single compromised RedVDS gateway, indicating rapid lateral movement.
This rule detects a sequence of events indicative of ransomware deployment following a successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connection. Specifically, it looks for an inbound RDP connection (RemotePort 3389) to a device, followed within 60 minutes by the execution of known ransomware executables ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe') on the same device. This pattern suggests an attacker gaining initial access or moving laterally via RDP and then deploying ransomware.
This rule detects network connections initiated by scripting engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) or PowerShell (powershell.exe) to common Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) ports (3389, 3390, 3391). This activity can be indicative of an adversary attempting to establish or pivot RDP sessions using unexpected processes, potentially for lateral movement or persistence.
This rule detects the execution of suspicious processes ('servertool.exe' or 'encrypt.exe') within 60 minutes of an inbound RDP connection being accepted on a device. This could indicate an adversary establishing remote access and then deploying tools for further compromise, such as data exfiltration or encryption for ransomware.
This rule detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to a known malicious IP address (193.242.184.150) over port 22 (SSH). This behavior is indicative of a reverse SSH tunnel established for C2 communication and the potential exposure of internal RDP services to the attacker.
This rule detects a sequence of events indicative of ransomware deployment following a successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connection. Specifically, it looks for an inbound RDP connection (RemotePort 3389) to a device, followed within 60 minutes by the execution of known ransomware executables ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe') on the same device. This pattern suggests an attacker gaining initial access or moving laterally via RDP and then deploying ransomware.
This rule detects potential ransomware lateral movement patterns by correlating specific network connection attempts (SMB/RDP/RPC) with the observed creation of files having the '.prinzeugen' extension on the same host within a 2-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a ransomware strain propagating across the network and performing encryption.
Detects network connections over port 3389 (RDP) initiated by processes other than standard Remote Desktop clients (mstsc.exe). This rule specifically looks for suspicious indicators such as execution from non-standard or temporary file paths, or the use of common living-off-the-land binaries (like powershell.exe, cmd.exe, rundll32.exe) that might be acting as a proxy for remote access or lateral movement.
This rule detects inbound Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections (ports 3389, 3390, 3391) that are initiated by common scripting engines such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe. This behavior can be indicative of post-exploitation activity where an attacker uses scripts to establish remote access.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user initiates an outbound RDP connection using mstsc.exe on port 3389, followed shortly by the execution of a file named MicrosoftUpdateOneDrive.exe. This behavior is indicative of the Turla threat group deploying their STOCKSTAY.MARKETMAKER malware via an RDP-based phishing lure.
Detects RDP connections originating from external internet addresses
This rule detects a high frequency of successful network connections from a single device to multiple unique destination IP addresses within a one-hour window. The targeted ports (445, 139, 3389, 22, 21) are commonly used for remote administrative access, file transfers, and remote shell services, which are frequently leveraged by adversaries for lateral movement. The threshold of 3 unique targets in an hour may indicate automated scanning or credential brute-forcing activity across the network.
This rule detects connection attempts to common administrative and remote access ports (RDP, SSH, SMB, RPC) from non-internal IP address ranges. Such activity may indicate an attempt to bypass Zero-Trust network policies or unauthorized remote access attempts from external or untrusted segments.
This rule detects potential ransomware lateral movement patterns by correlating specific network connection attempts (SMB/RDP/RPC) with the observed creation of files having the '.prinzeugen' extension on the same host within a 2-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a ransomware strain propagating across the network and performing encryption.
Correlates the recent download of an .rdp file with its execution by mstsc.exe, initiating the outbound connection to the attacker's infrastructure.
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