Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
509 detections
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Detects the use of Mimikatz 'sekurlsa::pth' command for credential manipulation, or the occurrence of SMB/Windows administrative share access (ADMIN$, C$) potentially indicating lateral movement activities.
Detects lateral movement via PsExec (PSEXESVC) followed by mass file encryption/rename activities and the creation of ransom note files, characteristic of Wizard Spider's deployment of Conti ransomware.
Detects the creation or writing of executable binary files (e.g., .exe, .dll, .bat, .ps1, .vbs, .scr) to sensitive Windows administrative shares (ADMIN$, C$, IPC$) via SMB. This behavior is indicative of lateral movement where an attacker attempts to stage tools or scripts on a remote system for subsequent execution.
Detects instances of potential lateral movement using PsExec or WMI following an alert related to credential compromise, infostealers, or session hijacking, where the same user account is involved in both events.
This rule monitors for known suspicious RPC interface and function calls indicative of post-exploitation activities. It specifically targets RPC patterns used for lateral movement (e.g., PsExec, wmiexec, dcomexec), authentication coercion (e.g., PetitPotam, PrinterBug), and credential theft (e.g., DCSync, SAMR enumeration) by filtering on specific interface UUIDs and operation numbers.
Detects Impacket-style hands-on-keyboard staging: a NeedyMantis bundle file dropped by cmd.exe/wmiprvse.exe/services.exe carrying the distinctive remote-execution fingerprint (ADMIN$ share reference, %COMSPEC% invocation, or 2>&1 output redirection used by wmiexec/smbexec/atexec), followed within 15 minutes by execution referencing the same bundle folder with the same fingerprint. Requiring the ADMIN$/%COMSPEC%/redirection fingerprint on both the copy and the execution -- rather than just matching on common process names like cmd.exe or svchost.exe -- removes the bulk of ordinary software installation and update activity that also uses cmd.exe to stage files.
Detects Impacket-style hands-on-keyboard staging: a NeedyMantis bundle file dropped by cmd.exe/wmiprvse.exe/services.exe carrying the distinctive remote-execution fingerprint (ADMIN$ share reference, %COMSPEC% invocation, or 2>&1 output redirection used by wmiexec/smbexec/atexec), followed within 15 minutes by execution referencing the same bundle folder with the same fingerprint. Requiring the ADMIN$/%COMSPEC%/redirection fingerprint on both the copy and the execution -- rather than just matching on common process names like cmd.exe or svchost.exe -- removes the bulk of ordinary software installation and update activity that also uses cmd.exe to stage files.
This rule detects a high frequency of SMB (port 445) connection attempts from a single internal source host to a large number of distinct internal destination hosts within a short timespan. This activity is indicative of internal network scanning, host discovery, or automated lateral movement attempts using SMB.
Detects potential lateral movement by identifying NTLM authentication (Logon Type 3) to administrative network shares (ADMIN$, C$, IPC$) or high-frequency access to multiple hosts by the same user, which may indicate credential abuse or lateral movement attempts.
Detects the execution of PsExec by identifying the creation of the PSEXESVC remote service or its associated named pipe. It also identifies renamed or masqueraded PsExec binaries by checking file metadata and provides a mechanism to flag unusual source-to-target host account pairings often associated with lateral movement via SMB/Admin Shares.
Correlates a sequence of suspicious activities on a single host within 90 minutes: LSASS memory access consistent with credential dumping, followed by remote service or WMI-based lateral movement, and finishing with mass file renames or modifications characteristic of ransomware encryption.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying a single user account authenticating to three or more distinct hosts using NTLM via network (LogonType 3) or impersonation (LogonType 9) logons, which is characteristic of credential-based movement across a network.
Detects the creation of suspicious services that are preceded by an administrative SMB share (ADMIN$) connection and a network logon event (Type 3) from the same source. This pattern is commonly used by lateral movement tools (like PsExec) to execute payloads remotely by installing a service, accessing the administrative share to drop the binary, and executing the service.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying the execution of PsExec service components or common lateral movement tools (PsExec, WMIC, CMD) interacting with Windows administrative shares (via UNC paths or specific network ports 135, 139, 445). It specifically looks for process creation events associated with these tools and network activity indicative of remote administration. Legitimate administrative tools signed by Microsoft or known management software (SolarWinds, Tanium, Ivanti, IBM BigFix) are explicitly excluded.
Detects NTLM authentication attempts targeting administrative network shares (ADMIN$ or C$) over the SMB protocol. This behavior is a common indicator of lateral movement techniques such as Pass-the-Hash, where an adversary uses captured NTLM hashes to authenticate to remote systems.
Detects network traffic permitted from zones typically associated with NetScaler appliances (DMZ, perimeter, VPN, gateway) to sensitive internal zones (internal, trust, LAN, corp) using common administrative or lateral movement protocols (SMB, RDP, WinRM, RPC, LDAP). This behavior is indicative of potential lateral movement or exploitation originating from a compromised edge appliance.
This rule detects the creation of new Windows services that are characteristic of lateral movement tools like PsExec. It looks for services with names typical of PsExec/PAExec, the use of administrative shares (ADMIN$) in image paths, or services with randomly generated names executing from temporary directories (e.g., Windows\Temp, Users\Public). Legitimate administrative tools such as svchost.exe or those within Program Files are excluded.
Detects a burst of lateral movement activity characterized by the use of administrative tools like PsExec or NetExec/CrackMapExec to execute commands or services on multiple distinct target hosts from a single source host within a short window. This pattern is commonly associated with ransomware affiliates or threat actors performing reconnaissance and mass deployment of malicious payloads prior to encryption.
Detects remote command execution patterns associated with the Impacket suite (e.g., wmiexec.py, atexec.py, smbexec.py). The detection identifies cmd.exe processes spawned by WmiPrvSE.exe or svchost.exe that contain specific command-line arguments indicative of Impacket's remote execution behavior, such as output redirection to hidden administrative shares or temporary files.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that exhibit behaviors associated with common remote execution tools (e.g., Impacket's atexec.py) or staging from insecure directories like Temp, ProgramData, or network shares. These patterns are frequently used by threat actors, including INC Ransom, for lateral movement and remote execution of malicious payloads.
Detects sequential suspicious SMB activity characteristic of PsExec lateral movement: connection to ADMIN$ or C$ administrative shares, followed by the upload of an executable or batch file to the share, and subsequently the usage of SVCCTL (CreateServiceW/StartServiceW) to execute the uploaded binary.
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