Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
509 detections
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Detects high-frequency outbound TCP connection attempts from a WSO2 API Gateway or Traffic Manager host to multiple sensitive internal management and administrative ports (22, 445, 3389, 5985, 5986). This behavior is indicative of a compromised gateway being used for lateral movement across the network.
Detects anomalous post-exploitation behaviors such as mass file modifications, lateral movement (SMB/RDP), or persistence mechanisms (scheduled tasks/services) following ScreenConnect client session activity. This behavior is indicative of potential exploitation of ScreenConnect to deploy ransomware or move laterally within the network.
Detects the use of the 'net.exe' command-line utility to connect to the hidden IPC$ administrative share on a remote system, which is a common technique used for lateral movement and remote reconnaissance.
Detects high-frequency outbound TCP connection attempts from a WSO2 API Gateway or Traffic Manager host to multiple sensitive internal management and administrative ports (22, 445, 3389, 5985, 5986). This behavior is indicative of a compromised gateway being used for lateral movement across the network.
Detects high-frequency outbound TCP connection attempts from a WSO2 API Gateway or Traffic Manager host to multiple sensitive internal management and administrative ports (22, 445, 3389, 5985, 5986). This behavior is indicative of a compromised gateway being used for lateral movement across the network.
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
This rule detects command line patterns associated with common Impacket tools (wmiexec, psexec, smbexec) executed via Windows processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or via network connections to ports 445 and 135 initiated by Python processes. These tools are frequently used by adversaries for lateral movement, remote service execution, and command execution on compromised systems.
Detects high-frequency outbound TCP connection attempts from a WSO2 API Gateway or Traffic Manager host to multiple sensitive internal management and administrative ports (22, 445, 3389, 5985, 5986). This behavior is indicative of a compromised gateway being used for lateral movement across the network.
Detects the use of the Windows 'net' or 'net1' utility to connect to the hidden 'IPC$' inter-process communication share. This behavior is often associated with lateral movement, reconnaissance, or establishing authenticated sessions to remote systems for further malicious activity, such as remote command execution.
Remote Service Creation via SVCCTL RPC
Cortex XDR
Detects remote service manipulation, including service creation, starting, and deletion, using the SVCCTL RPC interface. This activity is a common method for lateral movement and remote code execution by tools like PsExec, smbexec, and CrackMapExec.
This rule detects command line patterns associated with common Impacket tools (wmiexec, psexec, smbexec) executed via Windows processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or via network connections to ports 445 and 135 initiated by Python processes. These tools are frequently used by adversaries for lateral movement, remote service execution, and command execution on compromised systems.
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
This rule detects command line patterns associated with common Impacket tools (wmiexec, psexec, smbexec) executed via Windows processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or via network connections to ports 445 and 135 initiated by Python processes. These tools are frequently used by adversaries for lateral movement, remote service execution, and command execution on compromised systems.
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying executable or script files being written to administrative shares (C$ or ADMIN$) followed by the execution of a file with the same name on the destination device within 15 minutes. It includes logic to filter out known deployment/patch management service accounts and file names to reduce noise.
Detects the execution of known offensive security tools often used for lateral movement, credential dumping, and remote code execution, such as Impacket modules and the 'Invoke-TheHash' PowerShell suite, via common command-line interpreters.
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
This rule detects command line patterns associated with common Impacket tools (wmiexec, psexec, smbexec) executed via Windows processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or via network connections to ports 445 and 135 initiated by Python processes. These tools are frequently used by adversaries for lateral movement, remote service execution, and command execution on compromised systems.
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
Detects the execution of known offensive security tools often used for lateral movement, credential dumping, and remote code execution, such as Impacket modules and the 'Invoke-TheHash' PowerShell suite, via common command-line interpreters.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying executable or script files being written to administrative shares (C$ or ADMIN$) followed by the execution of a file with the same name on the destination device within 15 minutes. It includes logic to filter out known deployment/patch management service accounts and file names to reduce noise.
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