Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
146 detections
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This rule detects potential lateral movement via WMI by identifying two distinct suspicious behaviors: WmiPrvSE.exe spawning unexpected child processes (excluding common legitimate processes) or the usage of wmic.exe and PowerShell cmdlets (Invoke-WmiMethod, Invoke-CimMethod) to execute processes on remote systems, as indicated by command line arguments specifying target nodes or computer names.
Detects network connections from workstation subnets to domain controllers using administrative protocols such as SMB (445), RPC (135), RDP (3389), or WinRM (5985/5986). This activity is indicative of lateral movement attempts by an adversary attempting to reach critical infrastructure from a compromised workstation in a flat or poorly segmented environment.
This rule monitors for two indicators of potentially malicious WinRM activity: first, the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe) originating from the Windows Remote Management host process (wsmprovhost.exe); and second, a 'fan-out' pattern where a single account establishes WinRM/PSRemoting sessions on three or more distinct hosts within a short time window, which is often indicative of automated lateral movement or credential abuse.
This rule monitors for two indicators of potentially malicious WinRM activity: first, the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe) originating from the Windows Remote Management host process (wsmprovhost.exe); and second, a 'fan-out' pattern where a single account establishes WinRM/PSRemoting sessions on three or more distinct hosts within a short time window, which is often indicative of automated lateral movement or credential abuse.
Detects successful network connections initiated by the ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe process. This binary is associated with Windows configuration remoting services and may be used for remote administrative tasks or unauthorized remote management activities.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity originating from the WinRM service host (wsmprovhost.exe). It detects when command shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) are spawned by WinRM with known malicious command-line arguments (e.g., Evil-WinRM tools), monitors for the creation of potentially malicious configuration files (e.g., config.toml), and identifies established network connections to common WinRM ports (5985/5986) to detect unauthorized remote sessions.
This rule monitors for execution patterns associated with the Evil-WinRM tool, a common post-exploitation framework used for remote command execution via WinRM. It identifies suspicious command-line arguments in PowerShell, the creation of configuration files typical of the tool, and network connections to WinRM ports initiated by common execution binaries like PowerShell or Ruby.
Detects instances where the Windows Remote Management host process (wsmprovhost.exe) is associated with the execution of specific suspicious files (config.toml, cplsupport.exe, or wtass.exe) within a short time window. This activity often indicates post-exploitation behavior or remote execution of secondary tools using WinRM.
Detects anomalous network connection attempts using DCOM (port 135) or WinRM (ports 5985/5986) that originate from external networks or exceed established internal baseline frequencies. This pattern is often indicative of lateral movement or remote administration abuse via WMI or WinRM.
Detects the execution of processes related to the 'Toy Ghouls' bird-agent tool delivery, utilizing Evil-WinRM or WinRM-fs to execute commands remotely via the WinRM service (wsmprovhost.exe).
Detects the use of offensive security tools like Evil-WinRM or winrm-fs, which are often used by threat actors for remote administration, lateral movement, or backdoor delivery via the Windows Remote Management (WinRM) protocol.
Detects the use of Evil-WinRM or WinRM-fs command-line utilities combined with network connections over the WinRM ports (TCP 5985/5986). This activity is indicative of remote administrative tools being used for potential lateral movement or agent delivery, specifically observed in the context of the Toy Ghouls threat activity involving the Bird Agent.
Detects Evil-WinRM / WinRM-fs usage or wsmprovhost.exe-spawned PowerShell tied specifically to bird-agent backdoor artifacts (cplsupport, wtass, config.toml) or encoded/download-cradle command patterns, rather than any WinRM session, reducing noise from routine remote administration.
Detects anomalous network connection attempts using DCOM (port 135) or WinRM (ports 5985/5986) that originate from external networks or exceed established internal baseline frequencies. This pattern is often indicative of lateral movement or remote administration abuse via WMI or WinRM.
Detects anomalous network connection attempts using DCOM (port 135) or WinRM (ports 5985/5986) that originate from external networks or exceed established internal baseline frequencies. This pattern is often indicative of lateral movement or remote administration abuse via WMI or WinRM.
Detects Evil-WinRM / WinRM-fs usage or wsmprovhost.exe-spawned PowerShell tied specifically to bird-agent backdoor artifacts (cplsupport, wtass, config.toml) or encoded/download-cradle command patterns, rather than any WinRM session, reducing noise from routine remote administration.
Detects instances where the Windows Remote Management host process (wsmprovhost.exe) is associated with the execution of specific suspicious files (config.toml, cplsupport.exe, or wtass.exe) within a short time window. This activity often indicates post-exploitation behavior or remote execution of secondary tools using WinRM.
Detects Evil-WinRM / WinRM-fs usage or wsmprovhost.exe-spawned PowerShell tied specifically to bird-agent backdoor artifacts (cplsupport, wtass, config.toml) or encoded/download-cradle command patterns, rather than any WinRM session, reducing noise from routine remote administration.
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Detects Evil-WinRM / WinRM-fs usage or wsmprovhost.exe-spawned PowerShell tied specifically to bird-agent backdoor artifacts (cplsupport, wtass, config.toml) or encoded/download-cradle command patterns, rather than any WinRM session, reducing noise from routine remote administration.
Detects instances where the Windows Remote Management host process (wsmprovhost.exe) is associated with the execution of specific suspicious files (config.toml, cplsupport.exe, or wtass.exe) within a short time window. This activity often indicates post-exploitation behavior or remote execution of secondary tools using WinRM.
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