Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
146 detections
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The analytic detects the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments used to start a process on a remote endpoint. This activity may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and lateral spread within the network.
This analytic detects the use of `mmc.exe` to launch Computer Management (`compmgmt.msc`) and connect to a remote machine. This technique allows administrators to access system management tools, including Event Viewer, Services, Shared Folders, and Local Users & Groups, without initiating a full remote desktop session. While commonly used for legitimate administrative purposes, adversaries may leverage this method for remote reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or persistence. Monitoring the execution of `mmc.exe` with the `/computer:{hostname/ip}` argument can help detect unauthorized system administration attempts or lateral movement within a network.
The analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments used to start a process on a remote endpoint via the WinRM protocol, specifically targeting the `Invoke-Command` cmdlet. This activity may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries.
Detects the execution of the Evil-WinRM hack tool by identifying specific hardcoded strings within PowerShell Module logs. This rule looks for patterns associated with Evil-WinRM's functionality, such as specific PowerShell commands for file operations, binary invocation, and registry queries, executed within the context of wsmprovhost.exe.
This rule detects the execution of the PowerShell cmdlet 'Enable-PSRemoting'. This cmdlet configures the computer to receive PowerShell remote commands, which adversaries may use for lateral movement and remote execution. Detection relies on Script Block Logging being enabled to capture the cmdlet's execution.
Detects inbound network connections to ports 5985 or 5986, which are commonly used for PowerShell Remoting (WinRM). This rule specifically looks for EventID 5156 (Windows Filtering Platform Connection) with a LayerRTID of 44, indicating an inbound connection.
Detects suspicious processes, including various shells and utilities, spawned by the WinRM host process (wsmprovhost.exe). This activity can indicate an adversary using WinRM for remote execution, potentially for initial access, persistence, or privilege escalation.
This rule detects remote access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process via Windows Remote Management (WinRM). This activity is highly indicative of credential dumping attempts, often performed by tools like Mimikatz, to extract sensitive authentication material from memory. The rule specifically looks for process access events where the target process is 'lsass.exe' and the source process initiating the access is 'wsmprovhost.exe', which is associated with WinRM. It also filters out common benign access patterns (0x80000000 GrantedAccess) to reduce false positives.
This rule detects the execution of `ruby.exe` with command-line arguments indicative of Evil-WinRM usage. Specifically, it looks for the presence of `-i`, `-u`, and `-p` flags, which are commonly used by Evil-WinRM for specifying the target IP address, username, and password for Windows Remote Management (WinRM) access. This activity suggests an adversary is attempting to establish remote control over a system using a known penetration testing tool.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with a specific flag sequence ('-NoP -NoL -sta -NonI -W Hidden -Exec Bypass -Enc') that is characteristic of the Wmiexec script, often used for lateral movement and defense evasion.
Detects an attempt to execute code or create a service on a remote host using `winrm.vbs` via `cscript.exe`. This technique leverages Windows Remote Management (WinRM) to interact with WMI for remote execution, often for lateral movement or persistence.
Detects a process that initiated a network connection over ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account. This could potentially indicate a remote PowerShell connection, often associated with Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The rule filters out connections from common network service accounts and localhost to reduce false positives.
This rule detects the initiation of a remote PowerShell session by looking for specific strings in PowerShell Classic logs. Specifically, it identifies events where 'HostName=ServerRemoteHost' and 'wsmprovhost.exe' are present in the log data, indicating that a remote host is interacting via Windows Remote Management (WinRM) to execute PowerShell commands.
This rule detects the execution of the PowerShell cmdlet 'Invoke-Command' with the '-ComputerName' parameter. This combination indicates an attempt to execute commands on a remote host using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). Adversaries commonly use this technique for lateral movement within a network after gaining valid credentials.
Detects the initiation of remote PowerShell sessions by identifying specific keywords in the `ContextInfo` field of PowerShell module logs. It looks for the presence of ' = ServerRemoteHost ' and 'wsmprovhost.exe', which are indicative of a remote PowerShell connection. A filter is applied to exclude legitimate PowerShell archive module activity.
Detects remote access to the LSASS process via WinRM. This could be a sign of credential dumping from tools like mimikatz.
Detects remote PowerShell sessions
Detects remote PowerShell sessions
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Detects a process that initiated a network connection over ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account.
This could potentially indicates a remote PowerShell connection.
This could potentially indicates a remote PowerShell connection.
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