Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the 'Zip Slip' vulnerability pattern within incoming ZIP archives. Specifically, it looks for the sequence '..\' (dot dot backslash) in the file data of a ZIP archive, which is indicative of an attempt to extract files outside of the intended directory. This vulnerability can lead to directory traversal and arbitrary file overwrite.
This rule detects attempts to exploit the Zip Slip vulnerability within TAR archives. Specifically, it looks for the sequence `../` (dot dot slash) within the file data of an inbound TAR archive, which indicates an attempt to write files outside of the intended directory during extraction. This is a common technique used in Zip Slip attacks to achieve directory traversal and potentially overwrite critical system files or place malicious files in arbitrary locations.
This rule detects the 'Zip Slip' vulnerability pattern within TAR archive uploads. Specifically, it looks for the sequence '../' (dot dot slash) in the file data of a TAR archive, which indicates an attempt to traverse directories and potentially write files outside the intended extraction directory. This is a common technique used in Zip Slip attacks to achieve arbitrary file write.
Detects the execution of the Supper SOCKS5 backdoor, used by the Vanilla Tempest threat actor, based on a unique command-line pattern involving DllRegisterServer and a .ULB file, which acts as a loader for the obfuscated payload.
This rule detects attempts to exploit the Zip Slip vulnerability by identifying ZIP archive uploads containing directory traversal sequences ('../') within filenames. This technique allows attackers to write files outside the intended extraction directory, potentially leading to arbitrary file overwrite or remote code execution.
This rule detects the 'Zip Slip' vulnerability pattern within TAR archive uploads. Specifically, it looks for the sequence '../' (dot dot slash) in the file data of a TAR archive, which indicates an attempt to traverse directories and potentially write files outside the intended extraction directory. This is a common technique used in Zip Slip attacks to achieve arbitrary file write.
This rule detects attempts to exploit the Zip Slip vulnerability by identifying the sequence '../' within a ZIP archive being uploaded to a server. This pattern indicates an attempt to write files outside the intended directory, potentially leading to arbitrary file overwrite or remote code execution.
SesameOP Uses OpenAI Assistants API as a mechanism for command-and-control (C2) communications. Instead of relying on more traditional methods, the threat actor behind this backdoor abuses OpenAI as a C2 channel as a way to stealthily communicate and orchestrate malicious activities within the compromised environment. To do this, a component of the backdoor uses the OpenAI Assistants API as a storage or relay mechanism to fetch commands, which the malware then runs.
Detects malformed DNG/TIFF image files used to deliver the LANDFALL Android spyware. These files contain an appended ZIP archive which holds the malicious components.
This rule detects the 'Zip Slip' vulnerability pattern within incoming TAR archives. Specifically, it looks for the sequence '|00 00 00 2e 2e 5c|' (which represents '..\') within the file data of a POSIX tar archive. This pattern indicates an attempt to extract files outside of the intended directory, potentially leading to directory traversal and arbitrary file overwrite.
This rule detects attempts to exploit the Zip Slip vulnerability by identifying the sequence '../' within a ZIP archive being uploaded to a server. This pattern indicates an attempt to write files outside the intended directory, potentially leading to arbitrary file overwrite or remote code execution.
This rule detects attempts to exploit the Zip Slip vulnerability within TAR archives. Specifically, it looks for the sequence `../` (dot dot slash) in file paths within a TAR archive being transferred to a client, which is indicative of an attacker trying to write files outside of the intended directory.
This rule detects attempts to exploit the Zip Slip vulnerability in inbound ZIP archives. It specifically looks for the sequence '../' within the file data of a ZIP archive, which indicates an attempt to write files outside of the intended directory during extraction.
This rule detects suspicious, obfuscated PowerShell commands by analyzing the command line for long string literals with low character diversity and high frequency of a single character. It extracts strings enclosed in single quotes, double quotes, or backticks, and then calculates the ratio of distinct characters to total length and the ratio of the most frequent character's count to total length. If these ratios fall below and above certain thresholds, respectively, the command is flagged as suspicious.
Detects processes with names used by Qilin malware (`hosts.exe`, `dato.exe`) that are launched without a visible window and subsequently make an outbound network connection. This pattern is indicative of a hidden C2 beacon, a technique used by Qilin to evade user detection.
Detects suspicious process creation activities executed by the SYSTEM user, specifically looking for known malicious programs or command-line parameters often associated with credential dumping, defense evasion, and privilege escalation techniques. This includes the use of tools like Mimikatz, Rubeus, ProcDump, and various PowerShell obfuscation methods, as well as commands related to shadow copy deletion and registry hive saving.
This rule detects a sequence of events indicative of a potential macOS ClickFix attack. It looks for a base64 encoded command executed by 'bash' or 'zsh', immediately followed (within 10 seconds) by a 'curl' command that initiates a network connection to a URL. The rule specifically excludes a whitelisted curl command to reduce false positives. The correlation of base64 execution, a subsequent curl command, and a successful network connection to the domain extracted from the curl command suggests an attempt to download and execute malicious content, possibly after decoding it.
Detects specific command-line patterns used by the Turla APT group, as detailed in an ESET report from May 2020. The rule looks for `tracert` commands targeting `yahoo.com`, PowerShell obfuscated commands involving `FromBase64String`, and `net use` commands attempting to connect to `docs.live.net` with an `@aol.co.uk` credential.
Detects the use of msiexec.exe to remotely download and execute an MSI package, which then spawns an encoded PowerShell command. This TTP is associated with NetSupport RAT loaders.
Detects the presence of SVG files containing obfuscated JavaScript and redirection logic. This technique is used by phishing campaigns, such as Tykit, to redirect victims to malicious sites.
Detects the use of PowerShell to decode a Base64 encoded string and write it to the filesystem. This technique is used by adversaries, including in the PassiveNeuron campaign, to drop web shells or other malicious payloads.
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