Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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'The query below identifies powershell commands used by the threat actor Mango Sandstorm.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/'
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/'
ZLoader was delivered in a campaign in summer 2021 via malvertising. This campaign was tweeted about by @MsftSecIntel on twitter.
This query will identify strings in process command lines which match Base64 encoding format, extract the string to a column called Base64, and decode it in a column called DecodedString.
Use this query to find email stealing activities ran by Qakbot that will use "ping.exe -t 127.0.0.1" to obfuscate subsequent actions.
Email theft that occurs might be exfiltrated to operators and indicates that the malware completed a large portion of its automated activity without interruption.
Email theft that occurs might be exfiltrated to operators and indicates that the malware completed a large portion of its automated activity without interruption.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Solorigate supply chain attack. Please note that these attacks are currently known as the Nobelium campaign.
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query detects events when SolarWinds processes attempted to launch the cmd.exe command prompt using the 'echo' command. Using 'echo' in this way is suspicious, as it is an indirect way of issuing commands, and may not be readily detected by certain kinds of security solutions.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/cmd
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query detects events when SolarWinds processes attempted to launch the cmd.exe command prompt using the 'echo' command. Using 'echo' in this way is suspicious, as it is an indirect way of issuing commands, and may not be readily detected by certain kinds of security solutions.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/cmd
Use this query to find email stealing activities ran by Qakbot that will use "ping.exe -t 127.0.0.1" to obfuscate subsequent actions.
Email theft that occurs might be exfiltrated to operators and indicates that the malware completed a large portion of its automated activity without interruption.
Email theft that occurs might be exfiltrated to operators and indicates that the malware completed a large portion of its automated activity without interruption.
Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`). The technique involves manipulating strings to hide functionality, such as constructing class names using string insertion (e.g., 'indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W')) and correcting malformed URLs (e.g., converting 'htps://' to 'https://') at runtime. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders or droppers that aim to bypass static detection by hiding intent in runtime-generated strings and using legitimate tools for code execution. The use of `InstallProduct` and COM object creation, particularly combined with hidden window execution and suppressed UI, indicates an attempt to install software (likely malicious) without user interaction.
This rule detects the execution of 'rundll32.exe' with command-line arguments that suggest an obfuscated ordinal call. Ordinal calls are a way to execute functions within a DLL by their numerical index rather than their name. Adversaries may obfuscate these ordinal numbers by adding leading zeros or using large numbers that wrap around due to 16-bit integer limitations, making the command line harder to analyze and potentially bypassing signature-based detections.
Detects potential command-line obfuscation using Unicode characters. Adversaries may use these characters to evade detection by security tools that do not properly normalize or interpret them, making the command-line arguments difficult to analyze or signature.
Detects PowerShell command line patterns in combination with encoded commands that often appear in malware infection chains. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell or pwsh executable names combined with common encoded command flags (-e, -enc, etc.) and specific Base64 encoded strings frequently seen in malicious payloads.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell invocations by looking for specific command parameters that indicate obfuscation, hidden execution, or non-interactive sessions. Specifically, it flags the use of encoded commands (`-enc`, `-EncodedCommand`, `-ec`), hidden window styles (`-w hidden`, `-window hidden`, `-windowstyle hidden`, `-w 1`), and non-interactive flags (`-noni`, `-noninteractive`). These parameters are commonly used by adversaries to conceal their activities and bypass detection.
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocations using partial parameter names for common obfuscation techniques. This rule specifically looks for truncated forms of parameters like '-windowstyle hidden', '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', '-EncodedCommand', and '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass', which are frequently used by adversaries to hide their activity or bypass security measures.
Detects suspicious patterns in PowerShell command lines that indicate the use of `Invoke-Expression` (IEX) for potentially malicious code execution. This rule looks for various obfuscated or unusual ways IEX might be invoked, often in conjunction with base64 encoded strings, to execute arbitrary commands or scripts.
Detects various obfuscated PowerShell IEX invocation patterns generated by the Invoke-Obfuscation framework. The rule specifically looks for regex patterns in the ImagePath field of Event ID 7045 (Service Creation) that are characteristic of Invoke-Obfuscation's techniques to hide PowerShell commands.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell execution that leverages `clip.exe` to interact with the clipboard. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell module logs (Event ID 4103) where the payload contains `cmd` followed by `/c` or `/r`, then `clip` (with or without `.exe`), and finally a PowerShell command that accesses the clipboard using `[System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::SetText` or similar, often with string formatting. This technique is associated with `Invoke-Obfuscation`, a tool used to evade detection.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts obfuscated using techniques associated with Invoke-Obfuscation, specifically when launched via rundll32.exe and shell32.dll. This method is often used by adversaries to evade detection and execute malicious PowerShell code.
Detects PowerShell command-line obfuscation techniques, specifically those associated with Invoke-Obfuscation, by looking for patterns like backticks, string concatenation, and format string abuse in process command lines. It also includes a specific pattern for obfuscated environment variable access.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell commands being executed via standard input (stdin) by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 4697. The rule looks for specific keywords like 'set', '&&', 'environment', 'invoke', and '${input)' within the ServiceFileName field, which can indicate attempts to bypass detection by passing obfuscated scripts or commands directly to PowerShell.
Detects the use of Invoke-Obfuscation's VAR++ LAUNCHER technique, which obfuscates PowerShell commands using variable manipulation and string formatting. This technique is identified by specific patterns in the ServiceFileName field of Windows Security Event ID 4697, indicating a service creation with obfuscated command-line arguments.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell commands used in service creation events, specifically looking for patterns indicative of Invoke-Obfuscation's VAR++ LAUNCHER technique. The rule identifies service creations where the ImagePath contains specific keywords like '&&set', 'cmd', '/c', '-f', and format specifiers like '{0}', '{1}', etc., which are characteristic of highly obfuscated PowerShell commands often used for defense evasion.
Detects various obfuscated PowerShell IEX (Invoke-Expression) invocation patterns generated by the Invoke-Obfuscation framework. The rule specifically looks for distinct string manipulation and variable concatenation techniques used by the framework within the ServiceFileName field of Windows Security Event ID 4697.
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