Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
327 detections
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This rule detects suspicious activity related to Notepad++ updater (gup.exe or update.exe) executing reconnaissance commands or loading suspicious DLLs. Specifically, it looks for the updater process initiating common reconnaissance tools like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or curl.exe with commands such as 'whoami', 'tasklist', 'systeminfo', 'netstat', 'ipconfig', or 'curl' that include redirection for staging. Additionally, it correlates this activity with the loading of suspicious DLLs (e.g., log.dll) from unusual locations like AppData or Temp folders, potentially indicating DLL sideloading.
Detects a sequence of system reconnaissance commands followed by data exfiltration to temp.sh, a TTP used in the Notepad++ supply chain attack.
Detects the spawning of a Windows command shell, powershell, or reconnaissance tools by the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe). This behavior is a strong indicator of a successful web application exploit, such as the deserialization vulnerability in WSUS (CVE-2025-59287), where an attacker gains remote code execution. Also detects the WSUS Service as the parent process spawning another process.
Detects a sequence of reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist, systeminfo, netstat) executed by the command prompt and piped to a text file. This specific TTP was used in the Notepad++ supply chain attack to gather system information for exfiltration.
Detects the SmarterMail service process ('MailService.exe') spawning command-line interpreters to execute reconnaissance commands. This behavior is highly indicative of remote code execution following the exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-23760.
Detects the execution of host or user discovery utilities such as "whoami", "hostname", "id", etc.
Adversaries may use the information from System Owner/User Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Adversaries may use the information from System Owner/User Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Detects the spawning of a Windows command shell, powershell, or reconnaissance tools by the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe). This behavior is a strong indicator of a successful web application exploit, such as the deserialization vulnerability in WSUS (CVE-2025-59287), where an attacker gains remote code execution. Also detects the WSUS Service as the parent process spawning another process.
This rule detects suspicious child processes spawned by 'msra.exe' (Microsoft Remote Assistance). Adversaries have been observed using msra.exe for process injection, discovery, and persistence. The rule specifically looks for common command-line utilities being executed as child processes of msra.exe, which could indicate malicious activity.
Detects potential remote code execution associated with the exploitation of Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerability CVE-2025-61882 on Windows hosts. The rule looks for a Java process spawning a command shell to execute reconnaissance commands, followed by an outbound network connection from the same Java process within a short time frame. This behavior is consistent with post-exploitation activity observed in the campaign.
This rule detects the use of various operating system utilities to discover local accounts, system owners, or users. It specifically looks for the execution of `whoami.exe`, `quser.exe`, `qwinsta.exe`, `wmic.exe` with 'useraccount' and 'get' in the command line, `cmdkey.exe` with the '/l' flag, `cmd.exe` executing 'dir \Users\', and `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with 'user' in the command line, while filtering out common legitimate uses of `net` and `cmd dir` commands.
Detects suspicious command-line activity spawned by the GoAnywhere MFT Tomcat service. This behavior is indicative of post-exploitation techniques observed following the exploitation of CVE-2025-10035, as detailed by Microsoft Threat Intelligence. The detection looks for specific discovery and execution commands launched via cmd.exe or powershell.exe from the GoAnywhere parent process.
Detects the initial PowerShell download cradle associated with ClickFix/CORNFLAKE.V3 campaigns. This activity is often the result of a user being tricked into pasting and running a command from a malicious website.
The analytic detects the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This activity is significant because both Red Teams and adversaries use `whoami.exe` to identify the current logged-in user, aiding in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attacker is gathering information to further compromise the system, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
This rule detects the execution of the built-in Windows utility "whoami.exe" specifically when used with the "/all" flag. This command is often used by attackers during the discovery phase to gather extensive information about the current user, including user name, security identifiers (SIDs), groups, and privileges. This detailed information can help an adversary understand their current access level and plan subsequent actions.
Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" with the "/all" flag
Detects the execution of suspicious commands commonly used for reconnaissance or networking, where the parent process command indicates it was triggered by an npm 'postinstall' script. This behavior is associated with the XORIndex loader used in the "Contagious Interview" campaign.
Detects the execution of whoami.exe with suspicious parent processes.
The analytic detects the execution of the `GetCurrent` method from the WindowsIdentity .NET class using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method identifies the current Windows user. Adversaries and Red Teams may use this for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery on compromised endpoints to map user accounts, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement.
This analytic detects the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged-in user by leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). Specifically, it monitors script blocks containing `$env:UserName` or `[System.Environment]::UserName`. This activity is significant because adversaries and Red Teams often use it for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery on compromised endpoints. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain insights into user context, aiding in further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.
Detects AS-REP roasting is an attack that is often-overlooked. It is not very common as you have to explicitly set accounts that do not require pre-authentication.
Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems
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