Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20 detections
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Detects the creation of persistence mechanisms on Linux systems using APT Pre/Post-Invoke hooks (e.g., /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/99sys-update) or user profile initialization scripts (e.g., /etc/profile.d/sys-init.sh). The rule monitors for these files containing suspicious command strings such as curl downloads, xmrig mining configurations, or specific init-hook markers often used by cryptomining botnets.
Detects known KATARU IoT malware binaries via embedded strings and known SHA-256 hashes
Rileva l'esecuzione di un binario denominato acpid da un percorso diverso da /usr/sbin/acpid, tecnica di masquerading osservata in toolkit di persistenza Linux.
Detects unauthorized modifications to the /etc/init.d/workplace initialization script on SonicWall SMA appliances, specifically looking for additions of commands that launch the KNUCKLEBALL Python-based loader (deploy_new.py). This behavior indicates an adversary attempting to establish boot-time persistence.
Detects indicators of persistence on Linux systems, specifically targeting unauthorized cron job creation/deletion in /etc/cron.d/, execution of suspicious shell scripts (ssync.sh), modification of startup scripts (e.g., /etc/rc.d/cron), and execution of binaries from world-writable directories by cron or system daemons. This rule is designed to identify the footprint of known Linux-based persistence mechanisms associated with service account exploitation.
Detects the creation or modification of shell script files within known Linux system persistence directories ('/etc/profile.d/' and '/usr/local/lib/') that contain specific naming patterns (' .sh.local' or '.cache-update.sh'). This activity often indicates an attempt to establish persistence or inject code that executes upon user logon or system initialization.
Detects unauthorized modifications to cron jobs or RC scripts on Linux and BSD edge appliances, which is a persistence technique observed in the VerdantBamboo BRICKSTORM campaign. The rule flags suspicious file modifications in persistence-related directories, excluding activity from legitimate package managers.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms on Linux systems by identifying the creation of new systemd service files, modifications to init.d scripts, or the use of systemctl to enable or start services. The rule specifically excludes standard package management activities (apt, yum, dnf, dpkg) and flags if the triggered service operation involves suspicious file paths.
Detects modification of Linux RC initialization scripts for persistent execution
This rule detects network traffic containing the string "/etc/rc" over SSH (port 22) to a server within the home network. This pattern suggests an attempt to modify an RC script for persistence on a Linux system, potentially by an attacker who has gained SSH access.
Detects the creation of 'vector_notice.sh' in '/etc/profile.d/', a shell script dropped by VECT ransomware on Linux systems to display its ransom note upon user login. This rule specifically looks for file creation events on Linux systems where the target file name matches the exact path '/etc/profile.d/vector_notice.sh'.
This query identifies potential post-exploitation behavior on Linux systems by monitoring for clusters of discovery and enumeration commands. Instead of alerting on single, potentially benign commands, it utilizes a behavioral scoring engine that categorizes activities such as credential hunting, privilege escalation, and network scanning.
By implementing extensive allowlists for common administrative tools (e.g., Ansible, Zabbix, Monitoring Agents) and requiring a minimum threshold of unique activity categories, the query effectively filters out "noise." It calculates a dynamic Risk Score and assigns a Severity level based on the criticality of the commands and the speed of execution (Burst Detection), making it a highly reliable tool for SOC analysts to detect active hands-on-keyboard attacks.
By implementing extensive allowlists for common administrative tools (e.g., Ansible, Zabbix, Monitoring Agents) and requiring a minimum threshold of unique activity categories, the query effectively filters out "noise." It calculates a dynamic Risk Score and assigns a Severity level based on the criticality of the commands and the speed of execution (Burst Detection), making it a highly reliable tool for SOC analysts to detect active hands-on-keyboard attacks.
Hunts for modifications to RC initialization scripts. This could point to persistence
Detects creation of malicious init.d scripts for persistence
To accompany Hunting rule equivalent at
https://detections.ai/rules/019c91c0-b2e0-759d-a61c-78d08e1d3d99
To accompany Hunting rule equivalent at
https://detections.ai/rules/019c91c0-b2e0-759d-a61c-78d08e1d3d99
This detection identifies modifications to the 'convert_hosts.sh' script on Dell RecoverPoint appliances. This script is executed at boot time and was observed being modified by UNC6201 to establish persistence for the GRIMBOLT and BRICKSTORM backdoors.
Detects modification of the 'convert_hosts.sh' script on Dell RecoverPoint appliances. This technique is used by UNC6201 to establish persistence for the GRIMBOLT and BRICKSTORM backdoors.
KQL Query from file: DefenderXDR Exposure Management for CVE-2024-3094
KQL Query
'This rule identifies a web request to a URL that holds a file type, including .ps1, .bat, .vbs, and .scr that can be harmful if downloaded. This analytic rule uses [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) and supports any built-in or custom source that supports the ASIM WebSession schema (ASIM WebSession Schema)'
The following analytic detects the creation of files in Linux init boot directories, which are used for automatic execution upon system startup. It leverages file system logs to identify new files in directories such as /etc/init.d/ and /etc/rc.d/. This activity is significant as it is a common persistence technique used by adversaries, malware authors, and red teamers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence on the compromised host, potentially leading to further exploitation and unauthorized control over the system.
