Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20 detections
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Detects extensive file access on the NAS from a source address without prior
history. Shared storage holds concentrated value, and bulk reads from an unfamiliar
origin is the reconnaissance-then-collection pattern applied to a file share.
Onboarding: DISKSTATION-NAS is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 826).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='DISKSTATION-NAS' and action='ACCESSED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, user
| select srcip, user, distinct_count(file)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 100
history. Shared storage holds concentrated value, and bulk reads from an unfamiliar
origin is the reconnaissance-then-collection pattern applied to a file share.
Onboarding: DISKSTATION-NAS is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 826).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='DISKSTATION-NAS' and action='ACCESSED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, user
| select srcip, user, distinct_count(file)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 100
Detects access to files hosted on a decoy share. Decoy shares carry inviting names and
plausible content but hold nothing real and are linked from nowhere, so a file open is
deliberate discovery rather than a user stumbling into the wrong folder.
Which file was opened is itself intelligence: it indicates what the intruder is
looking for, and that shapes where you look next in the real estate.
Onboarding: SMOKESCREEN is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 206).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='SMOKESCREEN' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and file != ''
| groupby file, user, srcip
plausible content but hold nothing real and are linked from nowhere, so a file open is
deliberate discovery rather than a user stumbling into the wrong folder.
Which file was opened is itself intelligence: it indicates what the intruder is
looking for, and that shapes where you look next in the real estate.
Onboarding: SMOKESCREEN is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 206).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='SMOKESCREEN' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and file != ''
| groupby file, user, srcip
Detects a single host or account interacting with a high volume of archive (PST/OST) and document files, or initiating mailbox exports within a short window, which is often indicative of mass data staging and collection prior to exfiltration.
SYSVOL / NETLOGON Enumeration
Cortex XDR
Every authenticated principal in the domain can read SYSVOL, and SYSVOL routinely stores logon scripts, scheduled-task XML, and GPP files that contain plaintext or reversibly-encrypted credentials. Adversaries recursively enumerate SYSVOL to harvest these — either grepping file contents (Select-String 'password') or matching file names (dir *password*). This rule detects the read-access footprint of that enumeration on the DC itself, independent of the tool or command line used, by counting distinct SYSVOL paths accessed by a single non-machine account in a short window. Default threshold is 100, change to a high volume for your environment
SYSVOL / NETLOGON Enumeration
Cortex XDR
Every authenticated principal in the domain can read SYSVOL, and SYSVOL routinely stores logon scripts, scheduled-task XML, and GPP files that contain plaintext or reversibly-encrypted credentials. Adversaries recursively enumerate SYSVOL to harvest these — either grepping file contents (Select-String 'password') or matching file names (dir *password*). This rule detects the read-access footprint of that enumeration on the DC itself, independent of the tool or command line used, by counting distinct SYSVOL paths accessed by a single non-machine account in a short window. Default threshold is 100, change to a high volume for your environment
This rule detects potential adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) activity targeting FortiGate firewalls, specifically looking for internal authentication traffic (LDAP, Kerberos, LDAPS, MS-SQL) originating from a firewall management IP. The rule triggers if there are 5 such connections within 60 seconds, indicating a possible listening post or attempt to intercept credentials.
Detects remote SMB access (Event ID 5145) to sensitive file paths where credentials are commonly stored, including DPAPI master keys, browser profiles, cloud provider configuration directories, and password manager data. This activity often indicates unauthorized credential discovery and staging during lateral movement or post-compromise reconnaissance.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to high-volume Server Message Block (SMB) share enumeration and the execution of a specific Python script named 'backup_dfs.py'. It combines three detection logics: identifying processes executing 'backup_dfs.py', detecting an unusual number of SMB network connections to common administrative shares (SYSVOL, NETLOGON, DFS), and flagging high-volume SMB-related identity directory events targeting SYSVOL or NETLOGON. This behavior could indicate an adversary performing discovery of network shares, collecting data, or preparing for data exfiltration.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to high-volume Server Message Block (SMB) share enumeration and the execution of a specific Python script named 'backup_dfs.py'. It combines three detection logics: identifying processes executing 'backup_dfs.py', detecting an unusual number of SMB network connections to common administrative shares (SYSVOL, NETLOGON, DFS), and flagging high-volume SMB-related identity directory events targeting SYSVOL or NETLOGON. This behavior could indicate an adversary performing discovery of network shares, collecting data, or preparing for data exfiltration.
This rule detects bulk Server Message Block (SMB) file read activity from a network share. It specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 445 (SMB) from any source within the home network to any destination within the home network, indicating established connections. The rule triggers if it observes 100 or more SMB packets (identified by the content "|FF|SMB") within a 60-second window from a single source IP address. This behavior could be indicative of data collection or exfiltration from network shares.
Detects a copy command or a copy utility execution to or from an Admin share or remote
Detects access to known sensitive file extensions on network shares. This can indicate an adversary attempting to collect sensitive data such as backups, memory dumps, Kerberos tickets, or various email/messaging data files.
Detects known sensitive file extensions accessed on a network share
Detects known sensitive file extensions accessed on a network share
This query can be used to explore any instances where a terminated individual (i.e. one who has an impending termination date but has not left the company) downloads a large number of files from a non-Domain network address.
Detects a copy command or a copy utility execution to or from an Admin share or remote
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
Detects a copy command or a copy utility execution to or from an Admin share or remote
The following analytic identifies network share discovery and collection activities performed on Windows systems using the Net command. Attackers often use network share discovery to identify accessible shared resources within a network, which can be a precursor to privilege escalation or data exfiltration. By monitoring Windows Event Logs for the usage of the Net command to list and interact with network shares, this detection helps identify potential reconnaissance and collection activities.
Detects the execution of copy commands or utilities (robocopy, xcopy, cmd copy, PowerShell Copy-Item/Move-Item) targeting or originating from Windows Admin shares (e.g., C$) or the Sysvol folder. This activity can indicate lateral movement, data collection, or exfiltration by an adversary.